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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the contributions to the economic 
analysis of welfare made by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. 
Heretofore unexamined, these contributions demonstrate the importance 
of the development of notions of sufficiency and moderation as 
integral parts of welfare analysis.
This dissertation also examines the significance of Plato's 
method of inquiry into matters of social science for contemporary 
economic analysis. In particular, the importance of metamathematical 
induction for the acquisition of knowledge of the values upon which 
welfare depend is analyzed in the form that it is employed in Plato's 
dialogues. This analysis is conducted to the end that economists 
might push beyond the aporetic conclusions of contemporary welfare 
analysis.
Finally, this dissertation explores the possibility that 
medieval theories of usury and the just price are rooted in the 
philosophy of Plato. It is widely conjectured that the theories of 
the Schoolmen derive from the Aristotelian and Roman theories of 
usury and the just price. This dissertation suggests that the 
theories of Aristotle, in turn, follow the same principles as Plato's 
analysis of just value.
vi
INTRODUCTION
PLATONIC ECONOMIC THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF MODERATION
Man has always been confronted with the fundamental economic 
problem of scarcity of resources relative to human wants and desires. 
One might assume, therefore, that economics, the social science that 
is concerned with the study of how scarce resources are allocated to 
satisfy human wants, ranks among man's older scientific endeavors. 
Oddly, many economists would argue that man has approached the 
problem of scarcity in a scientific manner for but a brief time. 
Specifically, economic science is perceived by many economists as 
beginning with the work of Adam Smith. Moreover, the important 
scientific developments in economics are thought to have occurred 
during the last one hundred years, since the rise of marginalism.
To be sure, economics as a science has evolved during the 
last few centuries, paralleling a growth of science in general. 
Indeed, an argument could be made that it was not until the 
eighteenth century, with the work of Adam Smith, that the analysis of 
economic issues formally became a legitimate intellectual pursuit—  
worthy of attention from minds that formerly concentrated on 
questions of a more traditionally philosophical nature. The effect 
of the growth of modern science on economics can be seen in the
2
development of a positive economic theory of the supply and demand of 
scarce resources. This theory has served to unify economics. There 
exists a consistency of thought among economists, with respect to 
positive theory, that seems more characteristic of the physical, 
rather than social sciences.
Unfortunately, the modern economist's preoccupation with 
developing and refining a positive theory of economics has precluded 
his appreciating the developments of ancient political economy. Even 
within the context of economic history and the history# of economic 
thought, there has been insufficient attention paid to ancient 
scientific analysis of economic problems. Although much has been 
written speculating about the extent to which ancient man understood 
economic phenomena, ancient economic treatises have, in large part, 
been looked upon as pre-scientific antecedents of modern economics.
Nowhere is the economist's inattentiveness to ancient 
political economy more evident than with respect to the writings of 
Plato, the fourth century, B.C., Athenian philosopher. Whereas 
modest attempts have been made to evaluate the contributions to 
economics made by the ancient Greeks, the teachings of Plato have 
been largely neglected. Although the Platonic dialogues remain 
popular among philosophers and political scientists, they receive 
little attention from most economists.
Perhaps "neglect" does not accurately describe the 
economist's treatment of Plato; several historians of economic 
thought have examined the works of Plato. None, however, has fully 
grasped the significance of the economic analysis contained within
3
the dialogues. This does not mean that economists are wholly unaware 
of Plato's attempt to resolve certain problems of scarcity and 
allocation of resources, but, rather, that they find Plato's approach 
unscientific. Joseph Schumpeter best characterized the economist's 
opinion of the works of Plato and other ancient social scientists 
when he described their efforts to solve economic problems as 
"economic thought," rather than "economic analysis."'*' To Schumpeter 
economic analysis constituted scientific theorization about economic 
phenomena, whereas economic thought could be defined as the descrip­
tion of economic problems in a manner satisfactory only for the 
audience addressed directly in the discussion. Schumpeter perceived 
the distinction to mean that economic thought could not be 
generalized to the level of scientific theory, whereas economic 
analysis could. Although Schumpeter attributed the origins of 
economic analysis to the ancient Greeks, he viewed the Platonic 
dialogues as essentially pre-scientific. He argued that the "value
of what [Plato] had to offer must not...be overestimated, apart from
2its historical significance." It is safe to say that Schumpeter's 
thought-analysis distinction has been widely accepted. Thus the 
writings of Plato have been ignored in modern economics.
Joseph A. Schumpeter, A History of Economic Analysis, ed. 
Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954),
p. 7.
2Idem, Economic Doctrine and Method: An Historical Approach 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 10.
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While the Schumpeterean distinction between economic thought 
and economic analysis is useful, it is sensitive to the economist's 
definitions of science and scientific method, and can be misapplied 
whenever an imperfect definition is utilized. With respect to many 
contributions to ancient political economy, one suspects that 
historical changes in the meaning of economic science have caused 
certain scientific analyses to be relegated to the status of economic 
thought. In particular the Platonic dialogues have been charac­
terized as an example of early economic thought, when, in fact, it is 
possible to demonstrate that they constitute a scientific investiga­
tion of human welfare, in which economic problems figure prominently. 
In short, the dialogues can be shown to be important for the 
economist beyond their historical significance. In order to demon­
strate this fact, however, it is essential that one understand the 
fundamental changes in the meaning of economic science that have 
occurred between the times of Plato and Schumpeter.
One of the main reasons that Plato is so frequently dismissed 
by economists as pre-scientific is that the scope and method of 
economics, the Greek oikonomia, has changed over time. For Plato, 
the scope of social sciences, especially economics and politics, 
included the analysis of observed phenomena of a metaphysical nature. 
In antiquity, moreover, it was not uncommon to embrace normative 
analysis as within the realm of proper scientific investigation. 
Today economists rely on the notions of positivism and value-free 
science so strongly that certain channels of economic investigation 
employed by the ancients are no longer considered to be scientific.
5
Despite differences in ideology, most economists adhere to the belief 
that economics must remain value-free in order to be truly scien­
tific. Even twentieth century economists as disparate in their 
beliefs as Milton Friedman and Oscar Lange maintain similar positions 
toward a value-free social science. In his essay, "The Methodology 
of Positive Economics," Friedman comments:
I venture the judgment, however, that currently in the 
Western world, and especially in the United States, dif­
ferences about economic policy among disinterested citizens 
derive predominantly from different predictions about the 
economic consequences of taking action...rather than from 
fundamental differences in basic values, differences about 
which men can ultimately only fight.
Lange makes a similar point concerning the role of values and ide­
ologies in economics in "The Scope and Method of Economics," in which 
he notes:
The statements of economic science have objective validity.
This means that two or more persons who agree to abide by the 
rules of scientific procedure are bound to reach the same 
conclusions. If they start with the same assumptions, thejr 
are bound, by rules of logic, to derive the same theorems.
Ideologies have no interpersonal validity. They convince 
only those who share the same subconscious motivations and 
undergo the same processes of rationalisation.
In an attempt to purge economics of the value-laden theories
of early political economists, the modern economist has frequently
3
Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," 
Essays on Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1953), p. 5.
^Oscar Lange, "The Scope and Method of Economics," Review of 
Economic Studies, 13 (1946), 22.
5Ibid., p. 23.
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resorted to emulation of his counterpart in the physical sciences. 
One result of this attempt to achieve an almost mathematical pre­
cision and level of certainty in economics has been the sacrifice of 
knowledge concerning the solutions to economic problems that were 
developed by the ancients.
Unlike the modern social scientist, Plato and other ancients 
made no attempt to excise values from social science. In fact, it is 
characteristic of ancient social science that normative theories, 
based upon value judgments, dominate the analysis of social issues. 
Platonic scientific investigation, for example, involves the attempt 
to elevate knowledge of human values from the status of uncritical, 
untested opinion, doxa, to the level of scientific fact. The method 
used in Platonic investigation is that of dialectical reasoning— a 
process in which men examine phenomena of mind and soul, unlike the 
process in which modern scientists examine phenomena of the world 
around man. The dialectic provides the social scientist with a 
method of constructing and checking hypotheses about issues of tran­
scendent reality— the realm of the psyche or soul. It is because 
Plato employed dialectics, rather than dogmatic demonstration as a 
technique for investigation of virtue that his method is scientific. 
The fact remains, however, that Plato's technique was normative.
It is because of this distinctly normative approach that 
modern social scientists discount the efforts of ancient thinkers. 
In social sciences today a distinction is made between facts and 
values, with the result that normative theory is regarded as 
unscientific. Like Descartes before them, modern social scientists
7
have "compared the ethical writings of the ancient[s] to very superb
£
and magnificent palaces built only on mud and sand." Of ancient
philosophy Descartes noted:
it has been studied for many centuries by the most outstand­
ing minds without having produced anything which is not in 
disrepute and consequently doubtful. I did not have enough 
presumption to hope to succeed better than the others; and 
when I noticed how many different opinions learned men may 
hold on the same subject, despite the fact that no more than 
one of them can ever be right, I resolved to consider almost 
as false any opinion which was merely plausible.
Following Descartes' lead some modern social scientists seek to
eliminate from the body of scientific knowledge all that is not
knowable with objective certainty.
It is most unfortunate that the fact-value distinction has 
created such a rift between ancient and modern social science. Not 
only has this distinction prejudiced our attitudes toward ancient 
political economy-modern readers often find it difficult to take 
seriously the writings of ancient economic theorists— it has resulted 
in the almost complete disappearance of ethics as a social science. 
Consequently, there is little scientific inquiry into human values 
today.
Political theorist Eric Voegelin has noted that reality can 
be divided into two parts: 1) all things that are objectively dis­
cernible by man's senses, and 2) things which man can only 
imperfectly discern through the fleeting glimpse with the mind's
^Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1950), p. 5.
7Ibid., p. 7.
g
eye. A chair is an example of the first category of real things— it 
is something fully observable by the senses. Virtue, on the other
hand, is not fully discerned with the senses, but is recognizable to
the mind. In modern social science, and particularly in economics, 
very little effort is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge of the 
second, less objectively knowable type of reality. Yet, this onto­
logical dualism is the heart of Platonic science. Plato maintained 
the same distinction as Voegelin between objects of sensation—  
aisthesis— and objects of intellection— noesis.
Since modern economists qua social scientists routinely deny 
the existence of noesis, they tend to view the objective of ancient 
social science, i.e., scientific knowledge of metaphysical phenomena 
— justice, temperance, happiness, etc.— as an unscientific and sub­
jective goal. Preoccupation with value-free "facts" has caused the 
modern economist to view the Platonic dialogues as an example of 
Schumpeterean economic thought.
It is clear that there are differences between what is meant 
by oikonomia in the ancient sense and economics in the modern sense
of the term. However, the two disciplines are not mutually exclu­
sive; rather, modern economic science can be thought of as the 
logical outgrowth of a subset of concerns present in ancient 
economics. Plato, for instance, was aware of and interested in the 
market problems associated with resource allocation among competing
g
Eric Voegelin, "The Structures of Consciousness," Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge, 3 April 1979.
ends. However, he was also keenly interested in the normative 
problems of human welfare as it is affected by economic processes. 
It would appear that a major difference between ancient and modern 
economics is one of focus and scope. Plato and other ancients con­
centrated on normative welfare analysis, elevating it to the status 
of scientific investigation, while many modern economists focus their 
attentions on the development of positive analysis of market alloca­
tion and efficiency.
If one approaches economic literature from the perspective of 
the ancient social scientist, it becomes possible to find much 
scientific analysis that otherwise would be overlooked. Since modern 
economics is based upon the idea that interpersonal comparisons of 
utilities are not scientific— that values have no basis in facts— the 
economic analysis contained within Plato's dialogues has not received 
the attention it deserves. The key to appreciating the importance of 
Platonic thought for modern economics is the willingness to accept a 
broad definition of economic science— one that recognizes the 
validity of normative, as well as positive scientific analysis.
The theme of this dissertation is that by transcending the 
fact-value distinction one uncovers a hitherto unrecognized economic 
analysis in the Platonic dialogues. As a philosopher Plato was 
interested in finding answers to the questions "What are goodness and 
happiness?" and "How do men become good and happy?" The dialogues of 
Plato constitute a dialectical inquiry into human values and opinions 
that attempts to derive a scientific answer to these questions. The 
recurring conclusion of the dialogues is that men are truly happy and
10
good if they are wise, honorable, and moderate. These virtues cor­
respond to the three parts of the human soul, psyche— the reasoning, 
honor-loving, and appetitive parts. Moreover, Plato observed that 
different parts of the soul dominate the characters of different 
people, accounting for the different types of personality one sees in 
society. Plato concluded that only when a proper balance is struck 
between the parts of the soul, in which reason, the least cultivated 
faculty in most people, governs the spirited and appetitive urges, 
can men be truly happy. This theory of the soul led Plato to an 
analysis of human welfare, which appears in his dialogues Republic 
and Laws. Recognizing the fact that many people are slaves of 
appetitive urges of all kinds, Plato devised a theory of welfare that 
hinges upon temperance or moderation, sophrosyne, as the means of 
achieving happiness for the many.
Plato's economic analysis of welfare was not intended as a 
subjective argument designed to take its place beside the myriad 
other social welfare theories that have appeared over time. Despite 
the fact that modern economists are wont to disregard all normative 
analyses which are based upon value judgments, tne economic theory of 
moderation is an important contribution to economic analysis. 
Because of the normative content of the dialogues, however, Platonic 
economic analysis has fared poorly in economic literature. The 
critiques of Plato's economic thought that have appeared in economic 
literature are surveyed in Chapter One of this dissertation.
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Chapter Two of this thesis is devoted to the task of reviving 
a definition of economics that is compatible with both ancient and 
modern methodologies. Understood from the perspective of ancient 
methodology the dialogues of Plato contain much that is of interest 
to economists today. Throughout the dialogues Plato is concerned 
with welfare, economic and otherwise. His welfare analysis is 
manifest in his theory of justice, which, in large measure can be 
summed up with the notion of moderation— for the many. Plato 
envisioned moderation of the appetitive urges as a participation in 
justice.
Much of this dissertation is given over to the analysis of 
Plato's theory of economic welfare. Chapter Three focuses on the 
virtue of moderation in Platonic economic theory. The fourth chapter 
examines a feature of Plato's welfare theory that is important for 
today. Central to the theory of moderation in the dialogues is the 
idea of sufficiency. Plato was one of the earliest Western writers 
to recognize the desirability of limiting economic growth. Although 
he approached conservation from the need to feed men's souls rather 
than their bodies, he championed the notion of sufficiency as a 
means of limiting economic growth. Finally, Chapter Five traces the 
roots of the theories of the just price and usury, which flourished 
under the Schoolmen, back to the dialogues of Plato, rather than the 
writings of Aristotle.
This dissertation is not intended to be a taxonomical re­
shuffling of fragments of Platonic thought demonstrating Plato's
12
awareness of certain features of modern economic theory— such treat­
ments can already be found in the literature. In the past, 
methodological barriers seem to have restricted surveys of Greek 
economic thought to this level of analysis. Instead, this paper 
argues that Plato possessed a strong interest in the investigation of 
human welfare. The dialogues contain an analysis of welfare that 
remains important today. By transcending the fact-value distinction, 
and thereby removing the methodological blinders worn by the modern 
economist, it is possible to show that Plato engaged in an economic 
analysis of welfare that helps to fill the void created by the 
restrictions of positive analysis. The economics of moderation, 
along with the accompanying notions of justice and sufficiency 
represent attempts to theorize issues of economic welfare in an 
objectively normative fashion that remains unique in economic 
science. In this dissertation the lost science of inquiry into 
normative economic problems is rediscovered through exposition and 
analysis of the Platonic theory of economic moderation.
CHAPTER 1
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON PLATONIC ECONOMICS
Many histories of economic thought begin with a statement of 
intellectual indebtedness to the ancient Greek philosophers. The 
writings of the early Greek philosophers, especially Plato and Aris­
totle, are said to contain the earliest attempts by Western man to 
reflect scientifically upon problems of political economy. In spite 
of this claim, literature devoted to analysis of ancient Greek 
economics is scarce. Analysis of Plato's contributions to modern 
economics is practically nonexistent. While some historians of 
thought pay lip service to the connections between Greek philosophy 
and economics, many more subtly condemn the works of the ancient 
Greeks by neglecting them.
It is not difficult to surmise the reasons that underly the
failure by economists to incorporate the works of Plato, Aristotle,
and other ancient Greeks into the body of economic science. With the
rise of logical positivism in the nineteenth century, economists and
other social scientists made a conscious attempt to develop value-
free theories of man's social intercourse. As Robert B. Ekelund and
Robert F. Hebert note in their A History of Economic Theory and
Method, An Introduction:
Many economists, especially those of the twentieth century, 
have attempted to link the scientific character of economics
13
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to positivism, defined as expressions of "what is" rather 
than "what should be." Economics, in this view, is "posi­
tive" because it is value-free. To admit value judgments—  
or, equivalently, to make normative statements— is considered 
unbecoming and nonscientific...
Because the writings of Plato, and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle are
rich with normative analysis and value judgment, their economic
thought is often dismissed as pre-scientific. In this light Plato
seems to fare worse than Aristotle in his treatment in the
literature.
However, some attempts to analyze the contributions of Plato
2to modern economics do exist. A History of Greek Economic Thought,
by Albert Augustus Trever, constitutes an earnest study of Plato's
major dialogues with an eye toward discerning tidbits of economic
3analysis. Similarly, M. L. W. Laistner's Greek Economics organizes
the writings of Plato, through the judicious use of excerpts, so as
to make clear the economic thought contained therein. And, Barry
4Gordon's Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith: Hesiod to Lessius is
heavily devoted to analysis of the Socratic conception of economics. 
Apart from these few works, however, little attempt has been made to
^Robert B. Ekelund and Robert F. Hebert, A History of Eco- 
nomic Theory and Method: An Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill,
19757, p. 5.
2Albert Augustus Trever, A History of Greek Economic Thought 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916X7
q
M. L. W. Laistner, Greek Economics (London: J. M. Dent,
1923).
^Barry Gordon, Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith: Hesiod
to Lessius (New York: Harper and Row, 1975J7
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analyze critically Plato's economic thought. In this survey of the 
economic literature devoted to Plato's dialogues, I will attempt to 
demonstrate that the cause of this peculiar treatment of Plato is a 
fact-value distinction maintained by modern historians of economic 
thought.
I. A Survey of the General Histories of Thought:
One can perceive the attitude with which economists address
questions of economics contained within the Platonic dialogues by
scanning the material devoted to pre-Smithian economics in some of
the popular histories of economic thought. In A History of Economic
Thought, Eric Roll comments on the economic thought of Plato in a way
characteristic of many historians of thought. Roll confines his
analysis to Plato's Republic and Laws, noting that these works con-
5tain Plato's "main economic ideas." Since the Laws and Republic
deal largely with the construction of a well-ordered state, they are
invariably the dialogues analyzed by historians of economic thought.
One sees in Roll's History a dismissal of the significance of
the economic ideas contained within the Republic and Laws, which is
made clear in the following passages from his History:
On a purely analytical side Plato's main achievement is 
the account of the division of labour and the origin of the 
city with which he prefaces his outline of the ideal 
republic. The city, he says, arises because of division of 
labour, which is itself the result of natural inequalities in 
human skills and the multiplicity of human wants...There is
^Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1956^, p. 27.
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as yet no concern with the cheapening of products which 
specialization brings about. It is not surprising, there­
fore, that Plato should have no idea of that connection 
between the size of the market and the deggee of division of 
labour which Adam Smith was to make famous.
Plato put his theory of the division of labour to an 
essentially retrograde use. In his hands, it became an 
idealization of a caste system and a support for^the aristo­
cratic tradition which was then on the defensive.
These passages contain much that is true. Plato was in fact one of
the first writers to stress the importance of the division of labor
in the development of the polis. Moreover, he did conceive of a
division of labor that was, in many respects, far different from the
division made famous by Smith. In the passages above, however, Roll
betrays a prejudice in his treatment of Plato's division that seems
to be out of place in a positive analysis— he concludes that Plato's
division of labor is inferior to Smith's. This conclusion calls for
some explanation or defense, although none is provided.
Plato suggests that a division of labor would arise from 
basic differences that exist in men's souls and temperaments— a 
division of labor based upon psychological comparative advantage. 
Smith, however, merely defended the division on grounds that it 
yielded an increase in economic efficiency. Roll uses Plato's 
perception of basic human inequalities as evidence of some subtle 
value judgment, which is supposed to lessen the usefulness of Plato's 
conception of the division of labor. Actually, Plato's theory of the
6Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
7Ibid.
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inequalities of human character is based upon positive analysis, as 
will be shown. Roll's preference for Smith's division seems to 
derive from his preference for economic efficiency over happiness as 
the goal of economic action. Further, his subtle condemnation of 
caste systems and of aristocracy as a political regime seems 
uncharacteristically normative. Roll simply pronounces Plato's 
division of labor to be put to a retrograde use, presumably because 
Roll does not like aristocracy or castes. Plato, however, defends 
his division with hard analysis, which is demonstrated elsewhere in 
this thesis. I would contend, therefore, that it is Roll who puts 
the Smithian division of labor to an essentially retrograde use—  
supporting it for its liberal and efficient tendencies. Although 
some attempt has been made to link Smith's notion of divisions of 
labor to Plato's, Smith's is presumed to be superior by reason of its
g
positive, rather than normative, analysis.
The tendency to dismiss ancient normative analysis as pre- 
scientific is common among historians of economic thought. John Fred 
Bell, in A History of Economic Thought, notes of Greek economic 
thought:
In spite of the vast contributions made by the Greeks to 
almost every branch of human knowledge, they paid relatively 
little attention to political economy as a subject. No Greek 
treatise devoted solely to political economy has been 
preserved, nor is there evidence that such a work was ever
g
See Vernard Foley's, "The Division of Labor in Plato and 
Smith," History of Political Economy, 6, No. 2 (1974), 220-242.
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written. Grgek economics is bound up with ethics and politi­
cal science.
Bell appears to view the social sciences, ethics, and political 
science as functionally separable from economics. To be bound up in 
ethics and political science, if one reads Bell correctly, is to be 
uninterested in economic questions at best and to be preoccupied with 
subjectivism at worst.
Bell seems to suggest that Plato was the victim of his own
imperfect subjective methodology. While Bell accurately details some
of the features of Plato's best state, he does so in an attempt to
point out the supposed insignificance of Plato's scientific thought,
owing to its subjective nature. Bell notes:
Plato pictures the perfect society, not the perfect man, 
since the idea of perfection and happiness is not to be found 
in the individual but in the species. Happiness is for the 
whole of society, and the ideal of happiness can be reached 
only in the ideal state. The Republic is an attempt to show 
how justice, as a social virtue, can be attained. The state 
has but one real function, namely, to insure happiness to 
everyone-j^through virtue, which means that justice will 
prevail.
Bell is nearly correct in everything he says in the above passage. 
Plato did, indeed, desire to obtain knowledge of how to ensure 
happiness to everyone through virtue. And, too, he did not envision 
that the idea of happiness would be found in the individual. Happi­
ness itself was perceived by Plato to be a virtue in which men could 
participate to varying degrees. Virtue itself, however, is neither
q
John Fred Bell, A History of Economic Thought (New York: 
Ronald Press, 1953), p. 26.
10Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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to be found in the individual nor in the state; it is, for Plato, a 
metaphysical Form. Bell fails to get at the important epistemo- 
logical and ontological distinctions that distinguish Plato's 
economics from that of modernity. More important, however, Bell does 
not make the connection between the Platonic quest for happiness and 
its importance for modern welfare theory.
Herein lies the distinction between Plato's understanding of 
economic welfare and that of the modern economist. The modern 
welfare economist seeks to maximize welfare by efficiently giving 
people what they want, whereas Plato sought to ensure happiness by 
making people do what they should. Plato realized that he could not 
succeed in constructing a theory of welfare maximization without 
reference to virtue. Of necessity, then, Plato's welfare theory is 
normative. Thus, for the modern economist at least, it becomes 
something "about which men can ultimately only fight."
W. E. Kuhn, in his book The Evolution of Economic Thought, 
refers to subjective theories of economic welfare, such as those 
examined by Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient Greeks, as "crude 
welfare economics."^ Kuhn gives no examples of crude welfare 
economics from Plato's dialogues. He does, however, make a connec­
tion between the work of Plato and Aristotle, as do many historians 
of economic thought, because both Plato and Aristotle employ the same 
outmoded method of normative analysis. Kuhn's characterization of
U W. E. Kuhn, The Evolution of Economic Thought, 2nd ed. 
(Cincinnati: South-Western, 1970), p. 7.
Aristotle's value theory gives an insight into his regard for ancient 
Greek normative analysis in general. Aristotle's value theory is, 
according to Kuhn, an example of crude welfare theory. Kuhn charac­
terizes it in the following way:
Aristotle's power of analytical thinking justifies his 
being ranked among the founders of the core of the subject 
matter of economics. This far-ranging Greek philosopher put 
forth the fundamental proposition that every commodity may 
be viewed from two angles: whether it serves to satisfy a
want directly, its proper use, as when shoes are worn; or 
whether it serves to satisfy a want indirectly, as when shoes 
are exchanged for something else. This latter, improper 
use— in contrast to the former— lends itself to abuse because 
it may lead to an accumulation of goods exceeding the neces­
sities of life.
Several distinctions grow from this dichotomy: (1) that
between value in use and value in exchange; (2) that between 
true or genuine wealth, to which there is a limit set by 
nature, and unnatural wealth, the acquisition of which is, 
broadly speaking, unlimited, being regulated only by the 
greater or lesser cupidity of man in his capacity as an 
economic agent; (3) that between the requirements of domestic 
economy, or finance in the good sense of the term, and wh^£ 
exceeds these requirements, or finance in the bad sense.
Kuhn follows this summary of Aristotle's work on value by noting:
Distinctions (2) and (3) are scientifically of little import, 
as they imply value "judgments" and presuppose a theoretical 
ideal concerning the stratification of wants in society as 
well as tlji<| means to their satisfaction (crude welfare 
economics).
Kuhn intends crude welfare economics to be understood as any attempt 
to comment on economic welfare in which value judgments are implied, 
which would render it unimportant scientifically. Here the reader 
gets a clear picture of the relationship between scientific analy­
sis and normative thought in modern economics. The scope of economic
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science has been whittled away to include only those economic issues 
that can be analyzed apart from human values.
Kuhn appears to have borrowed this distinction between
analysis and thought from Joseph Schumpeter. In his introduction
Kuhn enthusiastically endorses Schumpeter's work on economic thought,
as the following passage indicates:
Since 1954, year of the posthumous publication of J. A. 
Schumpeter's History of Economic Analysis (under the editor­
ship of his widow, Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter), the science 
of economics has been enriched by an English language 
reference work in which schools and streams of economic 
thought are discussed with rare comprehensiveness, insight, 
and clarity. The History, written primarily for professional 
economists and social scientists, testifies to such immense 
scholarship as few writers can ever hope to attain.
Certainly the level of scholarship evidenced in Schumpeter's History 
is beyond reproach. Indeed, even the distinction between economic 
analysis and economic thought put forward in the History and else­
where is useful to the historian of economic thought. The only 
question is where on the tree of economics should the thought- 
analysis axe fall. When the Schumpeterean distinction is coupled 
with a fact-value distinction, the modern economist is robbed of 
important contributions to economics made by the ancient Greeks. 
That is, ancient analysis is sometimes catalogued as economic thought 
because it contains statements that imply value judgments.
Schumpeter's regard for the work of Plato is made clear in 
Economic Doctrine and Method: An Historical Approach. In this work
■^Ibid., p. 1.
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Schumpeter traces the origins of economic science back to the ancient 
Greeks, noting:
The "philosophic" strand [of economics] has its ultimate 
literary base in the thought of Ancient Greece and can 
clearly be distinguished from the conceptions of everyday 
life and -|£he principles of legislators and founders of 
religions.
In History of Economic Analysis Schumpeter credits the Greeks with 
originating economic science, which he notes in the following 
passages:
Let us recall our distinction between Economic Thought— the 
opinions on economic matters that prevail at any given time 
in any given society and belong to the province of economic 
history rather than to the province of the history of eco­
nomics— and Economic Analysis— which is the result of 
scientific endeavor in our sense. The history of economic 
thought starts from the records of the national theocracies 
of antiquity whose economies presented phenomena that were 
not entirely dissimilar to our own, and problems which they 
managed in a spirit that was, in fundamentals, not so very 
dissimilar either. But th^ history of economic analysis 
begins only with the Greeks.
So far as we can tell, rudimentary economic analysis is a 
minor element— a very minor one— in the inheritance that has 
been left to us by our cultural ancestors, the ancient 
Greeks. Like their mathematics and geometry, their 
astronomy, mechanics, optics, their ecoij^nics is the foun- 
tainhead of practically all further work.
Schumpeter's endorsement is qualified, however. In de­
scribing the quality of economic analysis fostered by the ancient 
Greeks, Schumpeter claims that, "Even Aristotle and Plato presented
^Joseph A. Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and Methods: An
Historical Approach (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 10.
^Idem, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1954), p. 52.
17Ibid., p. 53.
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exceedingly poor and above all 'pre-scientific' pictures of eco­
nomics; they do not differ substantially from that of laymen of all 
18ages." Like other historians of thought, Schumpeter prefers the 
economic analysis of Aristotle to that of Plato, in terms of analyti­
cal rigor:
A whole world separates [Aristotle's] achievements from 
the highly coloured phantoms in Plato's thought. The latter 
offers us neither precise conceptions of an economic charac­
ter nor sustained analytical arguments. His aim was not to 
explain an economy which was problematic in itself but to 
create an economic order which was adapted to his ethical 
principles and to the conditions that prevailed in his ideal 
State. It is probably true that this was partly merely a 
form which he chose in order to present scientific ideas, but 
even his pronouncements on the division of labour, to which 
reference is always being made, afford little proof that he 
possessed a deeper insight into the sphere of economics.
Even Xenophon was easily his superior in this respect while 
the rest of h ^  economic statements and arguments are those 
of the layman.
In the following passages from History of Economic Analysis one sees 
as clear a condemnation of Platonic economic analysis as one is apt 
to find in economic literature:
Plato's aim was not analysis at all but extra-empirical 
visions of an ideal polis or, if we prefer, the artistic 
creation of one. The picture he painted of the Perfect State 
in his Politeia (The Republic) is no more analysis than a 
painter's rendering of a Venus is scientific anatomy... But 
analysis comes in after all. There is a relation between the 
painter's Venus and the facts described by scientific 
anatomy. Just as Plato's idea of 'horseness' obviously has 
something to do with the properties of observable horses, so 
his idea of the Perfect State is correlated wi||j the material 
furnished by the observation of actual states.
18Idem, Economic Doctrine and Method, p. 11.
19Ibid., p. 13.
20Idem, History of Economic Analysis, p. 55.
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Reasoning of an analytic nature is still more prominent in a 
later work, the Nomoi (Laws). But nowhere is it presumed as 
an end in itself. Consequently it does not go very far.
Plato's Perfect State was a City-State conceived for a 
small and, so far as possible, constant number of citizens.
As stationary as its population was to be its wealth. All 
economic and non-economic activity was strictly regulated—  
warriors, farmers, artisans, and so on being organized in 
permanent castes, men and women being treated exactly alike. 
Government was entreated to one of these castes, the caste of 
guardians or rulers who were tf^ live together without 
individual property or family ties.
Plato's "constitution" does not exclude private property 
except on the highest level of the purest ideal; at the same 
time it enforces a strict regulation of individual life, 
including limitation of individual wealth and severs restric­
tions upon freedom of speech; it is essentially 
"corporative"; and it recognizes the necessity of a clasjg 
dirigente--features that go far toward defining facism.
The analytic background, such as it is, comes into view as 
soon as we ask the question: why this rigid stationarity?
It is difficult not to answer.. .that Plato made his ideal 
stationary because he disliked the chaotic changes of his 
time...Whatever we may think of Platonic stationarity as the 
remedy, is there not a piece of— almost Marian— economico- 
sociological analysis behind that diagnosis?
Schumpeter is clearly dissatisifed with Plato's prescriptions for the
Greek state. He implies that the subjective, "almost Marxian,"
analysis found in the dialogues is pre-scientific. Schumpeter is a
positivist.
In the following passage Schumpeter summarizes his views 





Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
Ibid., p. 56.
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economics lie in his having sponsored the idea of the division of
labor as well as one of the first fundamental theories of money:
We need not stay to consider the numerous economic topics 
that Plato touched upon incidentally. It will suffice to 
mention two examples. His caste system rests upon the per­
ception of the necessity of some Division of Labor. He 
elaborates on this eternal commonplace of economics with 
unusual care. If there is anything interesting in this, it 
is that he (and following him, Aristotle) puts the emphasis 
not upon the increase of efficiency that results from divi­
sion of labor per se but upon the increase of efficiency that 
results from allowing everyone to specialize in what he is by 
nature best fitted for; this recognition of innate dif­
ferences in abilities is worth mentioning because it was so 
completely lost later on. Again, Plato remarks in passing 
that money is a 'symbol' devised for the purpose of 
facilitating exchange. (Rep II, 371) Now such an occasional 
saying means very little and does not justify the attribution 
to Plato of any definite view of the nature of money. But it 
must be observed that his canons of monetary policy— his 
hostility to the use of gold and silver, for instance, or his 
idea of a domestic currency that would be useless abroad—  
actually do agree with the logical consequences of a theory 
according to which the value of money is on principle 
independent of the stuff it is made of. In view of this fact 
it seems to me that we are within our rights if we claim 
Plato as the first known sponsor of one of the two funda­
mental theories of money, just as Aristotle may be claimed as 
the first known sponsor of the other.
Schumpeter appears to have been guilty of committing at least 
two errors common among Plato's modern critics. On the one hand, he 
characterizes Plato as having too little insight into problems of 
political economy. Here, Schumpeter is unwilling to recognize 
Plato's contributions because of his dissatisfaction with Plato's 
subjective methodology. On the other hand, Schumpeter may be guilty 
of giving Plato too much credit when he ascribes sponsorship of one 
of the fundamental theories of money to the ancient Greek. Plato was
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aware of the independence of the value of money from its physical 
composition, as Schumpeter claims, but the reasons Plato gives for 
limiting the use of gold and silver as currencies do not correspond 
to any modern theory of money. Plato opposed the use of gold and 
silver in order to make the currency of the ideal state unsuitable as 
a currency in foreign trade. His desire to change the currency of 
the Greek polis arises from his desire to curb foreign trade, which 
he opposed for moral reasons.
Schumpeter's dissatisfaction with the analytical rigor of the 
Platonic dialogues is reminiscent of the criticisms of Platonic 
economics made by James Bonar in Philosophy and Political Economy: 
In Some of Their Historical Relations. Like Schumpeter, Bonar is 
quick to credit the ancient Greeks with having first dealt with 
questions of political economy. Once again, however, one finds an 
economist's disapproval of ethical analysis, as the following state­
ment of Bonar's shows:
The conceptions of Wealth, Production, Distribution, and of 
the economical functions of State and Society are treated by 
Plato, some incidentally, others at length, but always in 
subordination of Ethics, and never as (even in theory) 
separable from ethical considerations... in the early Socratic 
dialogues of Plato he does not take hold of the notion of 
wealth or any other economical ng£ion and sift it as he would 
have sifted a metaphysical idea.
Henry W. Spiegel shows his feelings toward ancient Greek 
economics to be similar to Schumpeter's and Bonar's in his introduc­
tion to The Development of Economic Thought: Great Economists in
26James Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy: In Some of
Their Historical Relations (London: Allen and Unwin, 19275", p. 11.
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Perspective. "Social thought," he says, "...begins with the Greek 
27philosophers." He continues:
With them there was born the spirit of critical enquiry,
which never tires of examining human institutions, appraising 
them in the light of moral and political ideals. In the 
writings of the Greek philosophers economic arguments are 
developed only incidentally, ^id they are fused with ethical 
and political considerations.
Among the popular histories of economic thought, only A
History of Economic Theory and Method by Ekelund and Hebert gives the
reader an account, however brief, of the Platonic dialogues that cuts
to the heart of their economic import. Ekelund and Hebert have taken
Plato seriously and appear to be familiar with the applications to
economic welfare of Plato's attempt to discover the nature of
justice. They note:
At the heart of Plato’s Republic is a search for the meaning 
of the normative concept of justice, both for the individual 
and for society, that is, social justice. Individual justice 
is characterized by Plato (speaking, of course, through the 
character of Socrates) as a harmonious blending, furthered by 
the "conditioning" of music, gymnastics, and associations, of 
passion, desire and reason within man. In order to describe
the just man, however, Plato has to explicate the nature of 
the macro constraints upon men. The result is a contrast 
between ^lstice for the individual...and justice within the 
state...
Ekelund and Hebert move in the right direction by focusing on Plato's 
concern over social justice as it applies to economics. However,
27Henry W. Spiegel, ed., The Development of Economic Thought: 
Great Economists in Perspective, Abridged ed. (New York: John
Wiley, 1964), p. 3.
Ibid.
29Ekelund and Hebert, pp. 20-21.
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they make an error common in modernity in interpreting Plato's 
"normative concept of justice." It is true that Plato's concept of 
justice is normative— at least if that term is understood to imply 
that a concept is not value-free. Plato might argue, however, that 
attempts to discover a wertfrei justice do not produce justice 
itself, but rather produce a concept that is the product of con­
vention. Plato's investigation of justice, both for the individual 
and the state, was intended to be descriptive— it produced a defini­
tion of justice by sifting through subjective opinions and testing 
hypotheses, finally arriving at knowledge of justice itself. This 
attempt to describe justice is different from the normative exchange 
of values that discourse on the subject of justice generally produces 
today. Plato's investigation was incapable of producing an "objec­
tive" result— it simply was not intended to appeal to everyone in the 
way that a rhetorical speech might. It was not, however, merely 
subjective opinion; the dialectic on justice was intended to produce 
descriptive knowledge— i.e., definition— of justice in the mind of 
the participant in the dialectic.
On this count Ekelund and Hebert appear to confuse the posi­
tive-normative distinction with the fact-value distinction. They 
suggest that Plato maintained a normative concept of justice, which 
he did, when they mean to suggest that he maintained a value-laden 
theory of justice. Normative concepts are value statements. Con­
sistent with the epistemology of Plato and other ancients, however, 
is the notion that proper values are factually based— they partici­
pate in real, existent Forms that engender them with their qualities.
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Thus for Plato a normative concept, if it was the product of 
systematic investigation, was not necessarily counter-factual.
Therefore, while Ekelund and Hebert focus, appropriately enough, on 
Plato's concept of justice in an attempt to uncover his thoughts on 
economics, they fail to give this concept the attention it deserves, 
owing to their association of normative concepts with mere opinion.
Like Plato's other critics, Ekelund and Hebert call 
particular attention to Plato's implications for economics that
result from his analysis of justice— the division of labor and the 
proper use of wealth. Of the division of labor, they point out:
The very core of Plato's ideal state, within which the 
positive and negative constraints upon men are established, 
lies in the concept of specialization. Specialization arises 
from individual differences between men, and output may be 
increased by specialization...Exchange and trade, within and 
without the state, are an integral part of societal organiza­
tion. Production will be undertaken for both domestic and 
international trade, and classes of merchants and retailers 
arise. Money as a medium of exchange and as a standard of 
value comes into use and facilitates trade and exchange. 
Markets and marketplaces emerge to give impetus to the 
increase of wealth. Specialization arising from diversities 
of nature 2qLS at the root of all economic progress and
phenomena.
Concerning Plato's conception of the proper use of wealth, they 
claim:
Although specialization is the instrument of increased 
average output...it is not entirely an unmixed blessing. 
Progress requires expansion of population and territory, and 
expansion and "unrestrained needs" require war with 
neighboring states. A soldier class is called into being, 
which however valuable to the state, cannot be trusted to 
abstain from attacks upon society. Thus Plato must make 
philosophers out of (selected) soldiers. The resultant 
elitists, aristocratic society of guardians would combine the
30Ibid., p. 21.
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qualities of "gentleness and spirit" and would specialize in 
ruling society.
In order to produce gentle and spirited types, Plato 
advised various kinds of conditioning, including, for the 
guardians only, communal family and property arrangements.
His ideas on property are revealed in an assessment of the 
reasons for these prohibitions. Property communism was 
necessary, according to Plato, for several reasons, the first 
really including the others: Property would corrupt the
guardians; inclinations toward moneymaking and conflict of 
interest would be eliminated by communal property; and com­
munism would prevent the ̂ acquisitive nonguardians from 
wanting to become guardians.
Although Ekelund and Hebert do not, in their analysis of 
Plato's economics, seem to suffer from positivistic tendencies to the 
extent that Plato's other critics do, in the final analysis their 
investigation of Plato's thought is unhelpful. As may befit a survey 
of economic thought, Ekelund and Hebert confine their analysis 
largely to a discussion of the commonly surveyed topics of Platonic 
thought mentioned above. When they venture onto new ground to dis­
cuss Plato's concept of economic justice, they preface the analysis 
by warning the reader with the caveat that Plato's concept of justice 
is normative and, therefore, presumably, uninteresting.
II. A Survey of the Journal Literature on Platonic Economics:
The secondary literature on Platonic economics does not 
contain many entries. Perhaps it is because of the methodological 
bias of many economists against the type of analysis conducted by 
Plato that the literature is so small. Out of the existing litera­
ture devoted to the analysis of ancient Greek economics, only essays
31Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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by Welles, Foley, and Lowry provide the reader with glimpses of the
32economic content of Plato's dialogues. Welles focuses on the 
economic background of the Republic and Laws— the Athenian economy in 
which Plato found himself. Foley discusses the significance of 
Plato's division of labor, attempting to demonstrate a connection 
between it and Smith's better known treatment of labor specializa­
tion. Lowry, who has analyzed the contributions of the Greeks to the 
theories of conservation and natural resource economics, reviews 
Plato's economics with less enthusiasm than Welles or Foley. In a 
recent survey of the literature on Greek economic thought Lowry 
demonstrates the contemporary economist's dissatisfaction with 
Plato's method of economic analysis.
In "The Economic Background of Plato's Communism" C. Bradford 
Welles stresses the political and economic turmoil of fifth and 
fourth century Athens as causes of the reactions to mercantilism by 
Plato in the Republic and the Laws. Welles notes that Plato lived 
during a period of political decay which followed the defeat of 
Athens in the Peloponnesian War. At this time in Athenian history 
the labor force, which had produced large quantities of commodities 
for export from Athens, was reduced to half its former size. The 
famous silver mines of Athens were shut down, and the system of
”30
C. Bradford Welles, "The Economic Background of Plato's 
Communism," in The Tasks of Economic History, Supplement VIII to the 
Journal of Economic History, 8 (1948Xj 101-114; S. T. Lowry, "The 
Classical Greek Theory of Natural Resource Economics," Land Eco­
nomics , 41 (1965), 203-208; Idem, "Recent Literature on Ancient Greek 
Economic Thought," Journal of Economic Literature, 17 (1979), 65-86.
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agriculture, which had supplied many of the export commodities, was
in disarray. According to Welles, the disruption of the Athenian
economy after the Peloponnesian War produced the tyrannical political
33climate to which Plato reacted.
Welles places wealth at the center of Plato's theory of
communism. The Republic and Laws were written, Welles argues, in
response to Plato's dissatisfaction with the distribution of wealth 
in democratic Athens. Welles observes that Plato thought that men 
should not be too concerned with accumulation of wealth. The com­
munism which Plato espouses in the Republic is, Welles claims, an
attempt to place men as far as possible from the sensuous life of the
. .  r 34city of pigs.
In the Laws Welles finds Plato's theory of the second-best
state. Gone is the youthful optimism found in Plato's utopian
Republic. The Laws, according to Welles, contains a legal framework
for the founding of a self-sufficient, steady-state economy. Welles
writes of Plato's steady-state:
The goal of self-sufficiency was to be attained by providing 
an adequate living for a fixed population. Luxury was for­
bidden, on the general ground that prosperity was bettgjr 
obtained through limiting desires than increasing income.
Like Ekelund and Hebert, Welles succeeds in his brief essay
on Plato's communism in describing the major economic features of the
33Welles, pp. 101-105. 
34Ibid., p. 109. 
35Ibid., p. 113.
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dialogues, without casting doubt over their significance because of 
Plato's use of an archaic methodology in his analysis. Welles seems 
to have taken Plato seriously. And yet, he seems to have gone too 
far in ascribing an economic motive to Plato's examination of politi­
cal constitutions in the Republic and Laws. It is clear from Plato's 
dialogues that his principal concern was over man's ability to dis­
cover true knowledge of the Good and its associated virtues. To be 
sure, Plato was concerned deeply with the injustice he perceived to 
be associated with democratic and tyrannical distributions of prop­
erty. Indeed, the Laws deals with distributions of property and 
land that encourage moderation and temperance in economic life. The 
aim of Plato's discussion of distribution, however, is, the attain­
ment of happiness for men and women. The heart of Plato's Republic 
and Laws is virtue rather than wealth. Plato desired that men and 
women behave virtuously. The moderation of wealth and appetite 
called for in the dialogues is intended to produce the virtuous 
behavior that Plato desired.
Welles is not the only contemporary economist to have read 
too much into Plato's economic analysis. Foley, too, overemphasizes 
economics as the motive behind Plato's writing. Foley attempts to 
demonstrate a connection between Plato's division of labor and that 
of Adam Smith. In his excitement he manages to read more of an 
economic motivation behind Plato's theory of labor specialization 
than has previously been noted, and more than perhaps exists.
Vernard Foley has elevated the importance of Plato's notion 
of the division of labor for the modern economist by claiming that
34
Smith was influenced by Plato's work when he proposed his own divi­
sion. If Foley is correct, Smith may well have borrowed from Plato 
in constructing the famous version of the specialization of factor 
inputs. In "The Division of Labor in Plato and Smith," Foley notes:
Since Plato was one of the first to enunciate this conception 
i.e., [the division of labor], the question suggests itself 
of whether Smith drew any inspiration from the formulation of 
his predecessor. Several textual parallels between the two 
men, which seemingly have not yet been treated in^an inter­
related fashion, suggest that borrowing did occur.
Based upon fragments of Smith's Edinburgh lectures, "the 
possibility seems to arise that Smith could have gotten his 
original inspiration for the division of labor principle, not 
from the sources usq^lly cited in this connection...but from 
the ancient Greeks."
While it is heartwarming to see an economist seriously trying to 
weave the thread of Platonic economic theory into more recent eco­
nomic analysis, Foley relies too much on simple parallels that exist 
in both Plato's and Smith's writings as the basis for his conjecture. 
Calling upon A. Skinner's work on the Scottish Enlightenment, Foley 
comments:
One can begin by recalling that considerable attention has 
been given of late to what Skinner.. .has called the four- 
stages theory in eighteenth-century Scottish thought. To 
recapitulate them briefly, the four stages are as follows. 
First, man exists in a primitive state, subsistent from the 
natural and spontaneous fruits of the earth, by hunting and 
gathering. Next, with the discovery of herding, man comes to 
live a pastoral life. Third comes the discovery of agricul­
ture, and a more settled society. Last comes the development 
of an exchange economy and thus the division of labor.
36Foley, p. 220. 
37Ibid., pp. 220-21.
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In a passage in the Laws (667A-82B) Plato gives all four 
of these stages...Thus Plato provides an explicit model for 
Smith's four-stage theory. Moreover, both men treat the 
origin of the division of labor in connection with the fourth 
stage, the establishment of human settlements.
Based upon this parallel Foley believes that Smith and, perhaps,
Mandeville may have found the basis for their work on specialization
in the dialogues.
Another parallel that Foley sees between Plato's dialogues 
and the Scottish Enlightenment concerns the nature of the division of 
labor— i.e., for what purpose is the division intended. Here, Foley 
breaks with tradition in describing output and efficiency. The 
following passage from Foley's article serves to illustrate this 
point:
Plato's discussion of the division of labor in the 
Republic contains one other characteristic which seems to 
deserve mention. In specifying why it is that divided labor 
is more productive than the unspecialized sort, Plato gives 
three reasons (370B-C, also 374B-C). The first rests upon 
the assumptions that men are essentially different from one 
another, and that since different jobs require different 
capabilities, the introduction of economic specialization 
means that a man can now be more completely suited to his 
work than was the case before. The other two reasons are 
rather more modern sounding, as they have to do with freedom 
from interruption, and with doing the task at the moment when 
it can be done best. Plato says that one must not let slip 
"the right season, the favourable moment in any task, or the 
work is spoiled." Again, he says "business will not wait 
upon the leisure of the workmen, but the workman must attend 
to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work." And 
finally, he states that "more things are produced, and better 
and more easily when one performs one task according to his 
nature, at ĥjs right moment, and at leisure from other 
occupations."
38Ibid., pp. 224-25. 
39Ibid., p. 223.
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Tying this efficiency argument in with Smith's, Foley notes that
"several...passages in Smith's work which seem to echo Plato in other
40respects, also repeat his efficiency arguments."
One must admire Foley's attempt to break with the majority of 
historians of economic thought for whom Plato's division of labor 
represents only a crude approximation of its modern form. Objections 
have been raised to Foley's work concerning the true end served by 
the division of labor in Plato's dialogues. These objections 
invariably evoke the judgments of Schumpeter and other economists who 
have dismissed the Platonic division of labor as pre-scientific. 
Paul J. McNulty responds to Foley's article, saying "There are... 
certain fundamental differences between Plato and Smith on the divi­
sion of labor which [Foley] does not examine but which are
41significant for the subsequent development of economic analysis."
McNulty points out further:
Although division of labor had long before Smith's time been 
recognized as of economic importance— Schumpeter referred to 
it as "this eternal commonplace of economics"— its use had 
generally been in connection with some justification for 
occupational stratification and^abor immobility. This was 
the case in the Platonic system.
The view expressed by Aquinas that one man is unable to do 
all the things that society requires is precisely that of 
Plato, for whom the origins of the state are to be found in
40T,Ibid.
^Paul J. McNulty, "A Note on the Division of Labor in Plato 
and Smith," History of Political Economy, 7, No. 1 (1975), 372.
42T.Ibid.
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the juxtaposition of the diversity of man's wants with his 
individual inability to satisfy them.
For Plato...the natural differences in talents and abilities 
between individuals, and their inability to provide for all 
their own wants, leads to a division of labor which, in turn, 
leads society to a higher level of economic wellbeing than 
would otherwise be possible. But the division of labor in 
the Platonic system, based on societal economic stratifica­
tion and labor immobility within an artisan and handicraft 
economy, is of a fundamentally different character from the 
concept as employed by Adam Smith.
McNulty is correct on this point— that differences exist
between Smith's and Plato's divisions of labor. Both conceptions are
based upon characteristics of human nature. However, each is based
upon a unique notion of what human nature is. Smith envisioned a
division of labor arising in society gradually as the "consequence of
a certain propensity in human nature, which has in view no such
extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one
45thing for another." Plato, on the other hand, viewed the division 
of labor as a consequence of human nature in which men pursue their 
individual natural talents in order that they suit the temperaments 
of their souls. That is, Plato argues in favor of a notion of 
psychological comparative advantage. McNulty points to this "natural 
talents" argument in an attempt to refute Foley's contention that 
Smith borrowed his division from Plato. He says:
43Ibid., p. 373.
44Ibid., p. 374.
43Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1976), p. 17.
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By far the greatest difference, however, between Plato and 
Smith on the division of labor is the latter's early and 
substantial qualification of the "natural talents" argument.
No sooner has Smith introduced the idea...than he adds that 
"the difference of natural talents in efferent men is, in 
reality, much less than we are aware of."
McNulty no doubt finds the stratification of the labor force result­
ing from Plato's division of labor according to natural talents 
loathsome. He stresses the freedom of Smith's free market for goods 
and services, noting that "An important component of 'natural
liberty' was the freedom [in Smith's system] of the worker to seek
47employment in any industry or trade."
Again, one finds evidence of the modern historian's liber­
tarian tendencies. McNulty, like other interpreters of the Platonic 
dialogues, views Plato's observation of the differences in human 
temperament, which leads to a division of labor, as a value judgment. 
More important, however, is that McNulty finds Plato's observation to 
be based upon a value judgment with which he does not agree, pre­
ferring instead the "freedom" of Smith's market system. For the 
positivistic social scientist, the beauty of his science is that if 
he finds a value-laden observation not to his liking, he can 
immediately dismiss it as non-factual.
One finds in Lowry's work on ancient Greek economics the same 
sort of positivistic bias against value judgments as can be seen 
in McNulty's critique of Foley's essay on Plato's division of labor.
^McNulty, p. 376. 
47Ibid., p. 378.
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Lowry is a leading scholar in the field of ancient Greek economics.
Even so, one finds precious little of Plato's economic thought
reviewed in Lowry's work. In "The Classical Greek Theory of Natural
Resource Economics" Lowry hails the work of Aristotle and Xenophon,
leaving Plato out of his discussion entirely. Welles has noted
Plato's concern with the conservation of resources, pointing out that
Plato advocated a steady-state economy as the best constitution of an
economy. In spite of this, Lowry writes:
In any discussion of self conscious and formal presenta­
tions of ancient Greek theories of natural resources, the 
analysis may b^ justifiably limited to the works of Xenophon 
and Aristotle.
The rationale behind the omission of Plato's economics from an
analysis of ancient Greek theories of natural resources is, according
to Lowry, that only the theories of Xenophon and Aristotle provide
49clear and formal statements of economics. Thus, for reasons that 
have earlier been identified as methodological and epistemological 
prejudices against the Platonic dialogues, Plato is left out entirely 
from a discussion of ancient Greek resource economics.
More recently Lowry has surveyed the literature on ancient 
Greek economics. In "Recent Literature on Ancient Greek Economic 
Thought," Lowry does mention Plato's contributions to economic 
thought in connection with the works of contemporary economists, such
AO
Lowry, "The Classical Greek Theory of Natural Resource 
Economics," p. 203.
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as Welles, who analyze Plato's economics. In particular, Lowry 
mentions Plato's division of labor and his fiat system of money in 
connection with Schumpeter's criticism of Plato's work. Rather than 
describe these theories, however, Lowry is content to express 
Schumpeter's view that "These observations, of course, were reflec­
tions of economic systems and thoughts on economic subjects with no
50analytical content."
Elsewhere in the same essay, Lowry reviews Welles' analysis
of Plato's theory of communism, which he refers to as Plato's theory
of "administered production." Lowry concedes here that the goal of
Plato's state was self-sufficiency— the creation of a "steady state 
51economy." Lowry insists, however, that based upon Welles' survey
of Plato's economics it is clear that economic thought at the time of
Plato's writing was "embedded" within the total legal fabric, i.e.,
52that economics was only a part of political economy.
Lowry, like the economists surveyed in the literature on 
Plato's economics contained in the popular histories of economic 
thought, contends that the Schumpeterean distinction between economic 
thought and economic analysis effectively precludes serious con­
sideration of the dialogues. Like the economists mentioned earlier, 
Lowry is convinced that the value-laden theories of Plato are not
^Lowry, "Recent Literature on Ancient Greek Economic 
Thought," p. 67.
“̂ Ibid., p. 66.
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sufficiently formal and scientific to merit attention from economists 
in search of the origins of economic analysis.
III. A Survey of the Major Treatises on Greek Economic Thought:
The conclusion that the dialogues of Plato contain no eco­
nomic theory of importance for the modern economist is echoed to 
varying degrees in the major treatises devoted to the economics of 
Ancient Greece. Some of the criticisms contained in the histories of 
economic thought and other essays mentioned earlier can be found 
"writ large" in lengthy treatments of Greek economics. These works 
survey the dialogues and conclude that Plato's contributions 
to modern economic theory are small, almost to the point of 
insignificance.
One of the early surveys of Plato's dialogues in economic 
literature is Albert Augustus Trever's A History of Greek Economic 
Thought, published in 1916. In his History, Trever reviews Plato's 
work in a manner that is, at once, sympathetic to Plato's ideals and 
yet characteristic of the positivistic histories. "Plato," Trever 
says,
was the first great economic thinker of Greece. Plato, 
however, was primarily interested in neither economics nor 
politics, but moral idealism. All his economic thought is a 
direct outgrowth of it, and is shot through with its 
influence. Yet, despite this fact, he exhibits considerable 
insight into some of the basal principles of economics, and 




Here, one sees a classic observation made by an economist concerning
the Platonic dialogues. Trever recognizes an economic theory of
society as the underpinning of the Republic. Even so, Trever is
tempted to downplay the significance of this economic theory because
it is "shot through" with moral idealism.
On Plato's discussion of economic value and wealth, Trever
notes that "Strictly speaking, Plato's contribution to a theory of
economic value and a definition of wealth is practically nil. In his
discussion of a just price, he merely hints at the fact of exchange 
54value." He follows this statement with a denunciation of Plato's
subjective analysis when he says that "Plato has much to say of
wealth, though he deals with it strictly from the standpoint of the
moralist. We look in vain for a clear definition, or for a con-
55sistent distinction of economic wealth from other goods."
Trever's criticism of Plato centers on Plato's method of 
analysis rather than the Greek's avowed end of the dialectic inquiry, 
the greatest happiness for society. He is, at once, dissatisfied 
with Plato's use of value judgments and taken in by those same 
values, which must be close to his own sentiments concerning politi­
cal economy. In defending Plato's use of communism as an instrument 
for achieving social happiness, Trever is quick to distinguish 
Plato's communism from its modern manifestations. He notes:
55Ibid., p. 24.
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The ideal state of Plato's Republic has often been presented 
by socialists and other modern writers as the great prototype 
of all socialistic doctrine. We must consider to what extent 
such a view is justified. In his famous myth of the three 
metals, Plato divides his citizens into three classes—  
rulers, auxiliaries, and farmers and artisans. His avowed 
purpose here, as indeed throughout his Republic, is to secure 
the highest degree of happiness for all the citizens. In 
order to gain this end, he provides for a most thoroughgoing 
system of communism, including all property, both for produc­
tion and for consumption, except such as necessary for the 
immediate need. He extends it even to the common possession 
of wives and children, that all private interests may be 
reduced to a minimum. He provides further for a common work 
and education for men and women.
Such, in brief, is the system proposed in the Republic. 
Superficially considered, it would seem to be the parent of 
modern socialism and communism. There is, however, actually 
but slight similarity between them. The so-called communism 
of Plato extends only to the first two classes, which can 
include but a small minority of the citizenship. Thus the 
masses, with whom modern socialism is ̂ specially concerned, 
are not directly touched by his system.
Trever concludes that "The Republic cannot...be classified as truly
socialistic either in motive or in general plan."~*7
In an attempt to catalogue Plato's economics, Trever pushes
farther than other historians of economic thought. Besides the usual
interest in Plato's division of labor ("[Plato] evidently recognized
58it as the necessary basis of all higher life"), Trever demonstrates 
an insight into Plato's theories of welfare, money, trade, and the 
limits to growth.
In noting that Plato's dialogues do contain information 
important to modern economics, Trever points out:
56Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
57Ibid., p. 57. 
58Ibid., p. 29.
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a sympathetic study of Plato's thought on exchange reveals an 
insight into certain specific points, of interest to modern 
economics, which are commonly overlooked. His protest 
against the former axiom of economics, that the prime purpose 
of trade is profit, and that the mere fact that goods change 
hands, necessarily increases the wealth of a country, is 
substantially correct. Commerce for commerce' sake is a 
clear case of mistaking the means for the end, and is 
contrary to sound economics as well as ethics. The objec­
tions of Plato and Ruskin against the principle too generally 
accepted by business and economy of the past, at least 
tacitly, that "it is the buyer's function to cheapen and 
the seller's to qheat," are being recognized today as worthy 
of consideration.
Trever also appreciates Plato's inveighing against excessive com­
mercialism and immoderate wealth. While he finds Plato's system of 
market restraints unacceptable for the modern economy, Trever 
applauds Plato's desire to instill temperance as a virtue in the 
souls of the citizens of the polis, which the following passages 
demonstrate:
To be sure, Plato's demand for a limitation of private 
and national wealth, and his general negative attitude are if 
interpreted rigidly, unfruitful and economically impossible.
It is not business that should be curbed, but bad business. 
Individual or nation cannot become too prosperous, provided 
there is a proper distribution and a wise consumption of 
wealth, and Plato's idea that great prosperity is incom­
patible with this goal can hardly be accepted by modern 
economists.
Nevertheless, there is much of abiding truth in his 
doctrine of wealth. Aside from the profound moral value of 
his main contention, we may state summarily several points in 
which he remarkably anticipated the thought of the more 
modern humanitarian economists: (1) in the fact that exces­
sive private wealth is practically impossible without 
corresponding extremes of poverty, and that such a condition 
is the most fruitful cause of dissention in any state; (2) in 
the fact that extremes of wealth or poverty cause industrial 
inefficiency; (3) in the prevalent belief that no man can 
gain great wealth by just acquisition, since, even though he
59Ibid., p. 44.
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may have done no conscious injustice, his excessive accumula­
tion has been due to unjust social conditions; (4) in the 
growing belief that expenditures of great private fortunes 
are not likely to be helpful either to individual or to 
community, but are too liable to be marked by foolish luxury 
and waste that saps the vitality of the nation; in this, he 
was a forerunner of Ruskin, who opposed the old popular 
fallacy that the expenditures of the wealthy, of whatever 
nature, benefit the poor; (5) in the dominant note in 
economic thought today, so emphasized by Plato and Ruskin, 
that the prime goal of science is human life at its best...
(6) in the fact that the national demand for unlimited wealth 
is not recognized, as Plato taught, always to have been the 
most fruitful receiving ever-greater recognition by modern 
economists and statesmen, that the innate quality of the
object for good or harm^must be considered in a true defini­
tion of economic wealth.
Of course, even Trever's comments strike the modern economist 
as value-laden. Trever appears to be guilty of that for which he
criticizes Plato— assuming the role of moral idealist.
Trever's thesis has been supplemented occasionally. In 1923 
M. L. W. Laistner published Greek Economics. His study includes
excerpts of ancient writings which refer to topics of interest for 
modern political economy, but it does not provide the reader with an 
interpretive essay. Laistner appears to have conscientiously 
extracted the passages from the Platonic dialogues that bear on 
modern economics, but there is little in his work that serves to make 
clear his opinion concerning the merit of Platonic economic thought.
Michell provides the reader with the interpretive thought 
which is lacking in Laistner's book, in The Economics of Ancient
Greece. As a criticism of Platonic economics Michell's survey 
rivals the work of Schumpeter for its positivistic condemnation of
60Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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Plato's method. The following passage from Michell's Economics 
serves as an excellent insight into the epistemological gap that 
separates the modern economist from the ancient social scientist:
So great a gulf is fixed between our modern thought and 
that of the ancients that it is utterly impossible to bridge 
it. To read into the writings of the Greek philosopher a 
conception of economic theory which is recognisable to-day is 
a vain endeavor. Their thought was entirely dominated by 
ethical ideas; there was an absolute separation of the ideas 
of right and wrong in human conduct from that of economic 
advantage and disadvantage. It might, at first sight, be 
thought that in this the Greek philosopher was superior to 
the modern economist who is, apparently, too prone to over­
look the ethical in favour of the practical, and to preach a 
materialism in which spiritual values have no place. Reflec­
tion will reveal that such would be far from the reality.
The Greek philosopher's outlook was too constricted for him 
to appreciate the fact, which the modern economist has 
grasped, that economic advantage or disadvantage is, in the 
last analysis, conditioned by ethical values.
Michell appears to make a fact-value distinction, so common among
modern economists. The fact that those parts of ancient philosophy
that pertain to economics have an ethical flavor is quite logical,
given the epistemology of the ancient philosopher. Plato and
Aristotle understood economics to be, along with politics, social
sciences subordinate to the parent social science of ethics. Plato
considered an ethical fact to be no less true, and often more
important, than an economic fact. For Plato, economics is a policy
science, the end of which is the achievement of human happiness.
As a science it seeks the true answer to the question, "What
in political economy makes men good and happy?" In search of this
^H. Michell, The Economics of Ancient Greece (New York: 
MacMillan, 1940), p. 34.
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answer, the ancient economist sifts opinions and value judgments for 
a truthful answer. Consequently, ancient political economy appears 
value-laden to the modern reader. Michell is painfully aware of 
this fact, and finds it unacceptable for modern economics. He 
concludes:
the fact remains that while we may learn from the philoso­
phers the great truths and noble ideas of the relation of the 
human soul to God, they have nothing to tell us regarding 
those perplexing problems that so occupy our minds to-day.
Presumably, then, the "great truths" do not occupy our minds today.
Of course, the ancient social scientist might respond to such a
notion by saying that the perplexing problems that so occupy our
minds are solved as a consequence of attaining knowledge of the great
truths.
Concerning the specific economic theories found in Plato's
dialogues that are commonly discussed in economic literature,
Michell provides a survey quite in keeping with his dismissal of
pre-positivistic thought. Michell downplays the significance of
Plato's division of labor, arguing:
The idea of the division of labor is explicit in Plato's and 
Aristotle's writings and is based quite simply upon such 
human wants as food, clothing and shelter, which will be 
produced most efficiently if each individual confines himself 
to what he can do best...The concept of division of labor has 
proceeded on lines familiar and simple to the modern mind; 
but...it is given a twist, which presents the theory of the 
state not from the standpoint of individual well-being, but 
from that of the welfare of the state.
63Ibid., p. 25.
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In his discussion of Plato's conception of communism,
Michell makes the familiar point that it was intended only for the
highest classes. He goes on to say that "It was not an economic
doctrine in any way; it had not anything whatever to do with solving
the evils of poverty through a distribution of wealth or a regimenta-
tion of the productive efforts of society." On Plato's treatment
of wealth and poverty, Michell comments:
The treatment of poverty and wealth both by Aristotle and 
Plato is sound but limited in the view of the modern econ­
omist. Riches lead to deterioration of the character in 
those who possess them, while poverty is a deterent to the 
best work. Plato finds it hard to believe that a man can be 
rich, happy and good at the same time.
These comments all build to Michell's conclusion that "In general,
it may be asserted that whatever economic theory is to be found among
Greek writers is immature. Modern political economy is far in
66advance of any to be found among the ancients..."
In general, a progressive view of history— that things are 
getting better and better— appears to be a common thread that 
ties together the economic reviews of the dialogues. Michell, 
Schumpeter, Trever, and others look upon the writings of antiquity 
with the opinion that any economic thought appearing therein must be 
"immature" by comparison with modern economic theory. Ancient 
economic analysis, in other words, takes the form of Schumpeterean
^^Ibid., p. 26. 
65Ibid., p. 32. 
66Ibid., p. 33.
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economic thought, whereas its modern counterpart assumes the form of
true economic analysis.
The issue of whether or not things are getting better, or at
least more sophisticated, is not new, having been sorted out in one
form by economic anthropologists. At one time the economic writings
of antiquity were thought to contain little of relevance to modern
economics by virtue of the economic immaturity of a pre-market
society. The ancients, it was argued, reflected upon none of the
problems that occupy economists today because their lack of an
organized, developed marketplace for the exchange of goods and
services precluded their acquaintance with such problems. Even
Polanyi, who worked to dispel some of the myths concerning a lack of
sophistication in early economies, pointed to a distinction between
ancient economic thought and modern analysis. In "Aristotle
Discovers the Economy," Polanyi argued that "Economic analysis in the
last resort, aims at elucidating the functions of the market
67mechanism, an institution that was still unknown to Aristotle."
The absence of any market mechanism would seem to rule out 
the development of economic analysis of the market’s many functions. 
One may safely assume that the earliest written documents surviving 
from the Greek civilization contain no analysis that would appeal 
to the modern economist. In The World of Odysseus Moses Finley
67Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," in Trade 
and Market in the Early Empires: Economic History and Theory, ed.
Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg, and Harry W. Pearson (Glencoe: The
Free Press, 1957), p. 66.
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describes the exchange mechanism in operation during the Homeric
period of Greek development. Finley writes that "An exchange
mechanism was then the only alternative, and the basic one was gift- 
68exchange." During this phase of development of the Greek polis,
trade for profit was known, but it was discouraged as being evil.
Rather, exchange was based upon mutual benefit of another sort— the
exchange of gifts among friends. Finley writes:
In Adam Smith’s world [the] determination [of value] was made 
through the supply-and-demand market, a mechanism unknown in 
Troy or Ithaca. Behind the market lies the profit motive, 
and if there was one thing that was taboo in Homeric 
exchanges it was gain in the exchange. Whether in trade or 
in any other mutual relationship, the abiding principle was 
equality and mutual benefit. Gain at the expense of another 
belonged to a different realm, to warfare and raiding, where 
it was achieved by acts (or threats) of prowess, not by 
manipulation and bargaining.
Thus the degree of market sophistication necessary to produce mean­
ingful analysis was not present during the Homeric period. During 
this time, Finley points out, "The twin uses of treasure were in
possessing it and in giving it away, paradoxical as that may 
„70appear.
The gift economy was still a feature of the Athenian economy 
of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, both philosophers advocated this 
type of exchange mechanism. Plato went so far as to suggest in the 
Laws a system of market regulation that would restore the purity of
I. Finley, The World of Odysseus (New York: Viking




the gift-exchange economy. Nevertheless, there was in existence at 
this time a sophisticated system, by Homeric standards, of domestic 
and international trade. Trade-for-profit, money-changing, and other 
features of commerce were restricted to the occupation of the metic—  
a foreigner, more-or-less permanently residing in the Athenian polis. 
The type of exchange common today was considered beneath the dignity 
of a citizen of the polis. Still, Athens, and especially its port, 
Pireaus, was the site of vigorous trade.
One can assume that Plato and Aristotle had every opportunity 
to analyze the functions of the Athenian market. Indeed, in the Laws 
and elsewhere Plato appears to be quite aware of the complexities of 
the exchange mechanism. However, both Plato and Aristotle chose to 
address broader issues, rather than occupy their time with the 
pedantic analysis of an institution considered by them to be corrupt.
The seeming inability on the part of the modern historian of 
economic thought to discern economic analysis in the writings of 
Plato is, I think, less a function of the nature of the topics under 
consideration in the dialogues than of the shift in epistemology and 
methodology that parallels the rise in social sciences of Comtean 
positivism, historicism, relativism, and Popperian nominalism. In 
the twentieth century economics is restricted to the realm of that 
which can be objectively analyzed by the social scientist. For 
instance, men can objectively agree that prices are determined by 
phenomena of supply and demand. Because the economic ruminations in 
the dialogues are not restricted to such topics as can be immediately
52
perceived as objective in nature, Mitchell, Schumpeter, and others 
have found little which they can embrace in the work of Plato.
More recently, Barry Gordon has written on the economics of 
Plato and other ancients. In Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith; 
Hesiod to Lessius Gordon attaches more significance to Plato's eco­
nomics than had his predecessors. Gordon sees the dialogues not as 
the sentimental ramblings of a moral idealist, but rather as the 
logical reaction by Plato to the economic and political decline of 
the Athenian polis. Also, Gordon seems to understand the role of 
economics as a social science for Plato. Perceiving economics as a 
branch of ethics, Plato could not let economics deteriorate into the 
value-free scientism, so aptly described by Hayek in this century. 
Gordon writes:
[Plato and Aristotle] reacted against the mercantilist 
tendencies of their intellectual opponents, and this reaction 
was to prove decisive. Further, they refused to treat 
economics as a technology. Consideration of the relative 
desirability of alternate goals of economic^ction was at the 
core of their conception of the discipline.
Continuing in this vein, Gordon points out:
It is not surprising.. .to find that the economics of the 
Socratics is not a technology of an age of growth and 
development. Rather it is the product of an age of anxiety, 
part of an attempt to work towards establishment of a social 
order that might ensure a reasonable quality of life for 
individuals, despite a political environment threatening 
chaos. Economic analysis in the hands of the philosophers is 
not a tool to be developed for use in the pursuit of a 
transitory national strength such as the Athenian proved 
to be. Instead, it is an intellectual activity required 
for an understanding of the nature of a just society and the
^Gordon, p. 21.
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application of that understanding to the preservation of a 
certain quality of life.
Gordon's insight represents a departure from the long line of
criticism of Plato's work as pre-scientific. In describing the
dialogues as more than just a "tool to be developed for use in the
pursuit of transitory national strength," Gordon is setting them
apart from the type of economic thought common to antiquity. Plato's
is a type of analysis; it is simply alien to the modern mind, owing
to its peculiar methodology.
In Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith Gordon takes a first 
step toward understanding fully the economic content of Plato's 
dialogues. While the result of this undertaking still shows the 
undeniable differences between Plato's analysis and that of the 
modern economist, it also shows that Plato's work stands as economic 
analysis in the Schumpeterean sense. Gordon sees the incentive for 
Plato to analyze the economy of Athens as lying in his preoccupation 
with the attainment of knowledge of the good life, when he writes that 
"This unswerving focus on the idea of the good life as attainable 
through full participation of the individual in the communal inter­
changes of a moderately-sized society led Plato and Aristotle into
73examination of economic questions." The following statements make 
clear Gordon's view that Platonic economics is the analysis of a 





The philosophers' investigation of social evolution and 
ethics yield not only a distinctive approach to economic 
enquiry, but also a number of significant generalisations 
relating to particular aspects of that enquiry.
From the discussion of the formation of community life 
arise observations on the role of specialisation in economic 
activity, the functions of money, and the organisation of 
property. Out of the concern with justice comes an essay 
into the theory of value and consideration of the phenomenon 
of interest payment.
In dealing with these particular issues still of concern 
to modern economists, the philosophers constantly referred 
them to a broader framework than is usually chosen as the 
setting for similar discussions today. Aristotle, like Plato 
before him, did not conceive of the economy as a group of 
relationships which could be considered meaningfully apart 
from tjie other forms of interaction which characterise social 
life.
The distinction between the economic analysis of Plato and 
Aristotle, and that of Schumpeter and other moderns is not a matter 
of methodology alone. As Gordon points out, there is a basic dif­
ference between the ends of ancient and modern economic analysis. 
"Both Plato and Aristotle," Gordon notes," would see the modern claim 
to autonomy for economics as most inhibiting for the progress of 
social enquiry."7  ̂ That is, "Economic analyses can only be conducted 
properly as aspects of a much broader study than that for which most 
modern economists seem content to settle."7  ̂ More important, how­
ever, is the fact, as Gordon sees it:
The philosophers' steps in economic analysis are not 
motivated by any desire to stimulate a process of economic 
development. Plato's and Aristotle's economics is not the
74Ibid.
75Ibid., p. 27. 
76Ibid.
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economics of growth. Their approach is guided by a belief in 
the desirability of establishing a relatively stationary 
state of economic activity at a level which ensures the 
maintenance of~a moderate standard of material well-being for 
the citizenry.
Whereas many modern economists operate under the assumption that more 
of what people want is better than less, with its accompanying maxims 
of welfare optimization, Gordon recognizes that Plato and Aristotle 
sought through economic analysis those economic components of an 
objectively "good life" that would truly maximize human welfare. In 
this respect Gordon's survey must be understood as a significant
departure from the uniformly harsh criticism of Platonic economics 
attributable to other historians of economic thought.
Gordon's insight into the validity of Platonic analysis 
carries over to his survey of specific doctrine mentioned by Plato. 
Here, Gordon shows a greater sensitivity to the aims of Platonic
science than is the norm. Gordon affirms the efficiency motive
underlying Plato's conception of the division of labor, while point­
ing to an even more important consideration covered by Plato. On 
this point Gordon claims:
the beneficial impact on growth of output is not the reason 
for Plato's interest in [the division of labor]. He advo­
cates division of labour to the extent that the quality of an 
individual's life is improved by his being able to perform
that function for which he is best fitted by his natural 
endowments. Impact of the division on the grow^| of national 
product is, at best, a secondary consideration.
78Ibid., p. 28.
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In denying the "more is better than less" end of economic activity,
Plato and Aristotle are, in Gordon's words:
interested in economic growth only as a prelude to the 
achievement of a certain modest standard of material well­
being. That standard is one which provides the opportunity 
for maximisation of quality of life as they understand it.
Gordon even points to a "limits to growth" strand of thought in
Platonic economics, seldom described in economic literature. He
writes:
The possibility that maintenance of a positive rate of eco­
nomic growth is necessary to sustain an adequate scope for 
individual choice in role-playing or for social choice in 
such matters as population policy or management of the 
natural environment, does not seem to have been considered 
by...Plato...Such scope is ensured achieving and holding a 
given level of material well-being:
Unfortunately, Gordon does not in his survey of Socratic 
economics pursue Plato's economic analysis to the extent that it 
deserves. Instead, Gordon is content to comment on the more 
approachable contributions to economics made by Aristotle. Beyond 
those issues mentioned above, Gordon considers only Plato's theories 
of money, interest, and communistic holding of property. Rather than 
pull together the strands of economic analysis in Plato's dialogues 
into a coherent economic theory, Gordon offers, in final analysis, 
an insight, albeit a more keen insight than that of his colleagues, 
into the fairly obvious economic ideas suggested by Plato.
On money, Gordon points out that Plato was one of the first 




seen to espouse a theory of money in which it serves as merely a
token of exchange for commodities. Gordon writes:
Plato recognises that the presence of a division of labour in 
society gives rise to the need for exchanges of commodities 
amongst its citizens. The process of exchange will be
facilitated by the introduction of "a currency to serve as a 
token for purposes of exchange." The end or purpose of money 
then is its action as a medium of exchange, and for this 
function as mere symbol or token can suffice. The material 
of which money is composed is of little or no account.
Here, Plato is adopting a theory of money which can be 
called "non-metallist." Money, to function effectively as 
money, need not consist of a ^aterial that has a value
independent of its role as money.
Gordon makes a connection between Plato's advocacy of token money and
his call for the abolition of international currency. He notes:
That Plato was consistent in his non-metallism is illustrated 
by a passage from the Laws, his last written work. In this 
passage he advocates a type of policy that was anathema to 
orthodox monetary theorists of eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century Europe. He proposes a divorce between international 
trading currency and the internal circulating medium of the 
city-state. The latter,g2he believes, should be devoid of 
intrinsic material value.
It is important that one ask at this point in the analysis 
why does Plato advocate the adoption of a non-metallist monetary 
policy, as described by Gordon? In answering this question, Gordon 
adopts the attitude, common among Plato's critics, that no economic 
concerns underlie Plato's discussion of money. Rather, Gordon 
points out that Plato's system of money issue and control is, "as 
in the case of his advocacy of a division of labour.. .based on moral
81Ibid., p. 43.
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83considerations." From the context of modern economic analysis, 
Gordon is correct in his recognition of Plato’s interest in moral 
issues. If one approaches Platonic thought with an eye toward 
appreciating the philosopher's view of science, then these moral 
issues can be shown to be rooted in economics, understood in the 
ancient sense. Plato perceived the end of science to be knowledge of 
moral truths. Knowledge of these truths— i.e., the nature of 
justice, the nature of temperance, etc.— enables men to be truly 
happy in their lives. Certain virtues, such as temperance in acqui­
sition of things, or liberality in the use of wealth, are economic in 
nature. Consequently, the science of economics involves for Plato 
the search for knowledge or wisdom that permits the attainment of 
happiness through economic channels. The moral concerns that Gordon 
mentions all involve participation in the virtues that ensure 
happiness through economic means.
Gordon's assessment of Plato's theory of interest exemplifies 
his tendency to stop short of a complete analysis of a topic of 
Plato's economics. In his discussion of Plato's theory on the pay­
ment of interest, Gordon comments: "Plato, in a manner typical of
the moralists of antiquity, expresses general opposition to the
84practice of interest payment on loans." Gordon distinguishes 
between Plato's conception of voluntary and involuntary extensions of 
credit. Voluntary extension of credit involves the exchange of goods
88Ibid., p. 44.
84Ibid., p. 49.
for the promise of future repayment, or the lending of money for the 
purchase of commodities with the promise of future reimbursement of 
principle plus interest. Plato argued against the legal enforcement 
of such contracts, arguing that they promoted profit from the 
exchange of money, rather than gain from trade of real commodities. 
Involuntary extension of credit, however, occurs whenever failure of 
prompt repayment results in the course of ordinary trade. If a 
person fails to make payment for goods and services received, Plato 
argued that the law should provide for the recovery of principle plus 
interest on behalf of the seller. Gordon claims that this distinc­
tion between voluntary and involuntary grants of credit is "a quite
fundamental element in scholastic thinking and served to shape the
85course of their enquiry into the economics of lending." Gordon 
does not, however, appear to be interested in the reasons for Plato's 
advocacy of one type of credit and opposition to the other. Yet, it 
is only through analysis of Plato's justifications for his policy 
prescriptions that one is able to discern the philosopher's economic 
theory to be distinguishable from mere economic thought.
Gordon is even more vague in his discussion of Plato's system 
of communal sharing of property. While other historians of thought 
have given this topic a thorough going-over, although often to no 
appreciable end, Gordon is content to simply contrast Plato's 
communism with Aristotle's. After noting that Plato's pooling 
of property among the ruling and military classes is roughly the
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opposite of Aristotle's communism— it prevails for the masses— Gordon 
proceeds to discuss, at length, the nature of Aristotle's system.
Although Gordon's Economic Analysis fails, at times, to cut 
to the heart of an issue of Platonic economic theory, it must be 
acknowledged to be one of the better surveys of the economic thought 
of antiquity. Overall, Gordon appears sensitive to the method of 
Platonic economics, albeit more interested in moving on in his survey 
to the more genuinely analytical work of Aristotle. Gordon, at 
least, does not fall into the rut of glossing over Plato's contribu­
tions, using the arguments of a defunct positivism as the devices for 
measuring the significance of the economic thought of the ancients.
In summary one must be struck, if not impressed, with the 
unity of thought expressed by Plato's critics in their historical 
surveys. With only occasional exception, it appears that the study 
of the history of economic thought and analysis has been colored by 
the scientistic tendencies of modern economists to adopt a 
methodology more appropriate for the physical sciences, and 
especially physics, as the yardstick by which to judge the lengths to 
which Plato and other ancients carried economic analysis in its 
infancy. Even the sympathetic readers of Platonic philosophy, such 
as Foley and Gordon, fail to change, to any appreciable degree, the 
prevailing attitudes towards Platonic economics, in which the 
dialogues are viewed as the pre-scientific antecedents of the first 
formal analysis contributed to economics by Aristotle.
Nonetheless, Plato's dialogues can be demonstrated to contain 
an economic analysis of a level of sophistication at least comparable
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to Aristotle's, and, in many ways, striking in its sensitivity to 
issues of social science when compared with modern welfare analysis. 
Demonstration of this quality of Plato's thought depends upon the 
reader's being able to approach the dialogues from the context of the 
methodology intrinsic to ancient economic science. Chapter Two 
serves as a guide to the method of ancient economics as practiced by 
Plato, with an eye toward the re-establishment in economics of a 
sensitivity to the craft of subjective analysis— something that 
modern economics fails to develop to the degree of its ancient 
counterpart.
CHAPTER 2
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY AND PLATONIC ECONOMICS
In the survey of the literature devoted to an analysis of 
Platonic economics, Plato qua economist appears to be regarded with 
low esteem by modern economists. The widely held belief that the 
Platonic corpus is pre-scientific should not, however, be surprising. 
Interpretations of what constitutes science and the scientific method 
have changed noticeably since antiquity. Science has evolved in 
response to changes in the scientist's epistemology, and in par­
ticular to changes in his theory that explains the conscious mind's 
perception of knowledge. Since the time of Plato, and especially 
since the nineteenth century, changes in the scientific enterprise 
have corresponded to a growth in what political philosopher Eric 
Voegelin has called "ismology."^ "Isms," especially ideological 
beliefs in the historical tendency for change in human nature, are 
incompatible with the Platonic method of investigation into issues of 
social science.
A complete list of the many "isms" that have captivated the 
attentions of social scientists since the Enlightenment would prove
*1
Eric Voegelin, "The Structures of Consciousness," Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge, 3 April 1979.
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truly staggering. Of these, however, several stand out in importance 
for the pernicious effect they have had on the popularity of norma­
tive analysis and, thus, on Platonic science. Moral relativism, 
positivism, scientism, Popperian nominalism, and historicism are 
ideologies generally understood and even embraced by modern 
economists. The force and popularity of these "isms" serve to 
severely undermine the credibility of Plato and other scholars who 
focused their intellectual efforts on an attempt to elevate subjec­
tive opinion concerning the proper ends of human action to the status 
of objective, scientific knowledge, or episteme.
Plato was not a moral relativist— he believed that goodness 
itself, the agathon, exists and serves as a steering force for human 
action. The agathon was not, for Plato, a psychological construct, 
but rather it exists in its own right, quite apart from man's per­
ception of it. Plato's absolutism has been characterized as a kind 
of idealism. Aristotle criticized Plato for his preoccupation with 
Ideal Forms. Aristophanes painted a picture of Socrates, Plato's 
inspirer and mentor, that likens moral idealism to a sort of lunacy. 
The modern connotations associated with the concept of idealism, 
specifically naivete, are inappropriate for characterizing Plato and 
his work. Plato's idealism developed from his ontology. He 
envisioned a branch of reality that exists as pure Forms. These 
Forms are not capable of being discerned by mere senses. Plato 
called these metaphysical Forms eidoi, from which we derive the word 
"ideas." Existing in the realm of the eidoi are the virtues (arete)
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--justice (dike), love (eros, philia, agape), truth (alethea), tem­
perance ( sophrosyne), and the supreme virtue, agathon or goodness 
itself.
That firm belief in the existence of these metaphysical 
concepts is uncommon among people is nothing new. Moral relativism 
existed and even dominated intellectual opinion in Plato's day. In 
fact, Plato focuses on Socrates' attempt to dispel the popular rela- 
tivistic notions common among Athenians in several of his dialogues.
The acceptance of relativism today is almost universal. The 
notion that the desirability of certain ends of human action, e.g., 
living a temperate life or behaving honorably, is functionally 
dependent upon one's predilection, culture, history, and environ­
mental conditioning is widely regarded by social scientists to be 
self-evident. Widespread acceptance of relativism, especially 
concerning the interpersonal validity of value judgments, helps 
account for the economist's dismissal of Platonic economics as 
poppycock.
More damaging to the appeal of Plato's investigation into 
issues of social science than relativism has been the appeal of posi­
tivism for the social scientist. The desire for what Weber termed 
wertfreiheit, or value-free science, appears to have survived in the
social sciences even beyond the eclipse of positivism in philoso- 
2phy. First described by Comte and, later, by Weber, positivism
2Bruno Leoni, "Some Reflections on the 'Relativistic' Mean­
ing of Wertfreiheit in the Study of Man," in Relativism and the Study 
of Man, ed. Helmut Shoeck and James W. Wiggins (Princeton: D. Van
Nostrand, 1961), p. 158.
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is today dominant in the methodology of the social sciences, par­
ticularly in economics. Economists are justifiably interested in 
uncovering facts concerning man's economic interactions. Facts are 
understood to be only those concepts that have some claim to objec­
tive validity. From the perspective of the positivist, investigation 
of the Platonic virtues cannot be carried out objectively. There 
seems to be little acceptance among economists today of Plato's claim 
that proper values have a factual basis--they are grounded in the 
qualities of the eidoi that engender them.
Another ideology that produces hostile attitudes toward
Platonic philosophy is scientism. Scientism is a term used by Hayek
and the Austrian economists that, when applied to the work of German
historicists and American institutionalists, describes purely
empirical economic inquiry that does not admit the existence of a
priori theory. The economist guilty of indulging in scientism
blindly attempts to apply the inductive methods of the laboratory
sciences to his own craft. Presumably, this devotion to the
"scientific method" results in the development of a pure, pre-
suppositionless economics. Rothbard defines scientism, in "The
Mantle of Science," in which he states:
The key to scientism is its denial of the existence of 
individual consciousness and will. This takes two main 
forms: applying mechanical analogies from the physical
sciences to individual men, and applying organism^c analogies 
to such fictional collective wholes as "society."
3Murray N. Rothbard, "The Mantle of Science," in Scientism 
and Values, ed. Helmut Shoeck and James W. Wiggins (Princeton: D.
Van Nostrand, 1960), p. 165.
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The denial of consciousness and will that Rothbard describes places 
scientism in opposition to Platonism.
Historicism, one of the ideologies broadly characterized by 
Hayek and Rothbard as scientistic, is an ideology that is unusually 
opposed to the methods of Platonic economics. Historicists would 
have economists induce significant cultural patterns and trends from 
the empirical facts presented by historical data. In an essay 
written in his early years in economics, before he abandoned 
theoretical economics, Gunnar Myrdal described historicism as a 
school of thought devoid of a priori reasoning.^ In historicism, 
in its extreme form, there is no knowledge apart from history. 
Generalizations concerning human nature, made without regard for a 
historical sense of time and place, are considered inappropriate. 
This method contrasts sharply with Plato's attempt to discover the 
underlying logos that explains human behavior. Plato believed in the 
existence of an essentially immutable form of human nature. The 
implications of his argument are that human nature, which derives 
its qualities from the unchanging Forms, compels men to respond 
consistently and predictably to the circumstances in which they find 
themselves throughout history. Moreover, Plato would insist that 
empirical knowledge— really the perception of the senses— is an 
imperfect form of knowledge when compared with a priori knowledge. 
Plato's social science is, like the historicist's, inductive; yet the
^Gunnar Myrdal, "Ends and Means in Political Economy," in 
his Value in Social Theory, ed. Paul Streeten (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 228.
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basis for induction, for Plato, is the experience of introspection 
and dialectical reasoning, rather than the perception of historical 
data. Plato’s social science is incompatible with historicism.
Of the ideologies that discredit Platonism, none is more
clearly destructive by design than the philosophy developed in the
twentieth century by Karl Popper. Popper's unmitigated hostility
toward Platonic philosophy led philosopher John Wild to describe
Popper as being Plato's chief modern enemy.^ Popper's philosophy is
nominalism. It is devoted to answering the question "What does a
thing do for man?" rather than the Platonic question "Ti esti?" or
"What is it?" Popper dismisses Plato's inquiry as being unproductive
and unimportant, inasmuch as it places a heavy emphasis upon dis-
£
covering the essences of things. Plato's science is the science of 
definition. To use Popper's term it is "essentialism." Acceptance 
of the relative importance for the social sciences of answering the 
nominalist's question, "What can this do for man?" over "Ti esti?" 
precludes serious consideration of the work of Plato.
In the light of Voegelin's "ismology" there appears to be 
little room in modern economics for adherence to the objective 
validity of human virtues. The purpose of the chapter, however, is 
to demonstrate that Plato maintained just this sort of adherence to 
normative concepts, and that his analysis of them can be considered
^John Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural 
Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 10.
6Ibid., p. 35.
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scientific within the perspective of ancient social science. Under­
stood from this perspective Plato's political economy is intended to 
be consistent with Schumpeterean economic analysis, in spite of 
Schumpeter's classification of the Platonic corpus as economic 
thought.
To the end of establishing this claim the organization of 
this chapter is given over to the following form of exposition: 
first, the reader is given a detailed description of Plato's 
analytical method. This method derives from Plato's theory of 
knowledge and from his theory of being. These theories are Plato's 
contribution to Western thought. Second, this method of inquiry is 
contrasted with the methodologies of the anti-Platonic "isms." 
Finally, I attempt to justify the use of Plato's method of inquiry 
into the proper ends of economic action as being important for the 
social sciences today.
I. Plato's Epistemology and Scientific Method
Plato attempted to analyze normative issues of economic 
importance with an eye to obtaining scientific knowledge— episteme 
— concerning man's natural tendencies and the proper ends of his 
economic activity. Plato's belief in the social scientist's ability 
to transform opinion into knowledge--to reason scientific fact out of 
subjective value judgment— is consistent with his epistemology. 
Plato's theory of knowledge separates the products of cognitive 
reasoning into four categories. At the lowest level of consciousness 
people are aware of opinions, the Greek doxa. Doxa is an uncritical, 
untested opinion concerning some object of sensory experience, i.e.,
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aisthesis. More refined than doxa and, yet, less sophisticated than 
scientific knowledge is belief or pistis. Pistis is obtained after 
preliminary reflection upon some opinion held by the investigator. 
Reasoned analysis of some issue in the abstract can yield noetic 
thought or noesis. Noetic thought is attained through introspection. 
Finally, the highest level of knowledge envisioned by Plato is true 
episteme, or scientific truth.
Associated with this hierarchy of knowledge are the mental 
faculties that render the level of knowledge accessible to the con­
scious mind. Doxa is attained through uncritical speculation. Plato 
characterizes it as the product of imagination. Pistis is a type of 
knowledge not unlike that which an apprentice accepts as appropriate 
for his craft from his mentor. Techne, or the arts (e.g., weaving, 
carpentry, the applied fields of empirical social science) are 
products of pistis. The higher forms of knowledge are accessible to 
the mind through intellection. Moreover, true episteme can be 
acquired, according to Plato, only through an especially arduous form 
of intellection— the dialectic.
Plato's epistemology can be clearly seen in several of the 
dialogues. In the early dialogues Plato's theory of knowledge is in 
evidence, but is not yet formally developed. One can separate 
Plato's hierarchy of knowledge into two distinct parts, sensible 
knowledge and intellectual knowledge, based upon these early 
references. Doxa and pistis are products of sensation— aisthesis. 
Noesis and episteme are known only to the reasoning mind. Plato 
establishes metaphysical forms of being as being accessible through
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introspective reasoning in the Phaedo. Here, in a conversation 
between Socrates and Cebes, Plato argues that the eidoi are the 
formal causes of the qualities of sensible things, as the following 
passage shows:
Well, said Socrates, what I mean is this, and there is 
nothing new about it. I have always said it; in fact I have 
never stopped saying it, especially in the earlier part of 
this discussion. As I am going to try to explain it to you 
the theory of causation which I have worked out myself, I 
propose to make a fresh start from those principles of mine 
which you know so well— that is, I am assuming the existence 
of absolute beauty and goodness and magnitude and all the 
rest of them. If you grant my assumption and admit that they 
exist, I hope with their help to explain causation to you, 
and to find a proof that the soul is immortal.
Certainly I grant it, said Cebes. You need lose no time 
in drawing your conclusion.
Then consider the next step, and see whether you share my 
opinion. It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful 
apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it partakes 
of that absolute beauty, and for no other reason. Do you 
accept this kind of causality?
Yes, I do.7
In this passage Plato presents the reader with two important ideas. 
First, he believes in the existence of a transcendent form of 
reality— virtue. Next, Plato argues that the qualities of the 
sensibles are attributable to the refined qualities of the eidoi, 
which are only known to the mind.
One finds this concept elaborated again, in a playful manner 
so characteristic of Plato's sense of drama, in the Symposium. In a 
conversation between Socrates and his friend Alcibiades, Plato echoes
Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith 
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961), p. 81.
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the distinction between qualities of being and our knowledge of these
qualities, found in the Phaedo:
if you're right in thinking that I have some kind of power 
that would make a better man of you, because in that case you 
must find me so extraordinarily beautiful that your own 
attractions must be quite eclipsed. And if you're trying to 
barter your own beauty for the beauty you have found in me, 
you're trying to exchange the semblance of beauty for the 
thing itself— like Diomede and Glaucus swapping bronze for 
gold. But you know, my dear fellow, you really must be 
careful. Suppose you're making a mistake, and I'm not worth 
anything at all. The mind's eye begins to see clearly when 
the outer eyes grow dim--and I fancy yours are still pretty 
keen.
Socrates is teasing Alcibiades. At the same time he is making a 
point of extreme importance for the Platonic inquiry into true 
nature. Socrates is both old and ugly, yet he possesses some aware­
ness of beauty itself, the formal cause of mere physical beauty. 
This should render Socrates irresistible to Alcibiades. Alcibiades 
is young and handsome. His eyes see clearly, but his mind's eye has 
not yet become sufficiently developed to "see" Socrates' inner 
beauty.
The point of the story in the Symposium is that sensible 
beauty pales in comparison to beauty that is intellected, both in 
terms of the sensations of delight it stirs in the soul and in terms 
of relation to truth itself. These distinctions provide an insight 
into Plato's theory of knowledge and into his theory of being. 
Typically, however, they prove foreign to the reader unfamiliar with 
the philosophy of Socrates. Plato must have assumed this knowledge
g
Plato, "Symposium," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 570.
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in the memory of his audience when he penned these dialogues. Fortu­
nately, the epistemological significance of inner versus outer beauty 
is made clear in one of Plato's most intellectually mature dialogues, 
the Republic. His theory of knowledge is thoroughly described in the 
middle books of the dialogue, and can be seen in the following 
passage from Book VI, a conversation between Socrates and Plato's 
brother Glaucon:
(Socrates) "Well, then," I said, "conceive that, as we say, 
these two things are, and that the one is king of the
intelligible class and region, while the other is king of the 
visible. I don't say 'of the heaven' so as to not seem to 
you to be playing the sophist with the name. Now, do you 
have these two forms, visible and intelligible?"
(Glaucon) "I do."
"Then, take a line cut in two unequal segments, one for 
the class that is seen, the other for the class that is 
intellected— and go on and cut each segment in the same
proportion. Now in terms of relative clarity and obscurity, 
you'll have one segment in the visible part for images. I 
mean by images first shadows, then appearances produced in 
water and in all close-grained, smooth, bright things, and 
everything of the sort, if you understand."
"I do understand."
"Then in the other segment put that of which this first 
is the likeness— the animals around us, and everything that 
grows, and the whole class of artifacts."
"I put them there," he said.
"And would you also be willing," I said, "to say that 
with respect to truth or lack of it, as the opinable is 
distinguished from the knowable, so the likeness is dis­
tinguished from that of which it is the likeness?"
"I would indeed," he said.
"Now, in its turn, consider also how the intelligible
section should be cut."
"How?"
"Like this: in one part of it a soul, using as images
the things that were previously imitated, is compelled to 
investigate on the basis of hypotheses and makes its way not 
to a beginning but to an end; while the other part it makes 
its way to a beginning that is free from hypotheses; starting 
out from hypothesis and without the images used in the other 
part, by means of forms themselves it makes its inquiry 
through them."
"I don't," he said, "sufficiently understand what you 
mean here."
"Let's try again," I said. "You'll understand more 
easily after this introduction. I suppose you know that the 
men who work in geometry, calculation, and the like treat as 
known the odd and the even, the figures, three forms of 
angles, and other things akin to these in each kind of 
inquiry. These things they make hypotheses and don't think 
it worthwhile to give any further account of them to them­
selves or others, as though they were clear to all. 
Beginning from them, they go ahead with their exposition of 
what remains and end consistently at the objects toward which 
their investigation was directed."
"Most certainly, I know that," he said.
"Don't you also know that they use visible forms besides 
and make their arguments about them, not thinking about them 
but about those others that they are like? They make the 
arguments for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal 
itself, not for the sake of the diagonal they draw, of which 
they are shadows and images in water, they now use as images, 
seeking to see those things themselves, that one can see in 
no other way than with thought."
"What you say is true," he said.
"Well, then, this is the form I said was intelligible. 
However, a soul in investigating it is compelled to use 
hypotheses, and does not go to a beginning because it is 
unable to step out above the hypotheses. And it uses as 
images those very things of which images are made by the 
things below, and in comparison with which they are opined to 
be clear and are given honor."
"I understand," he said, "that you mean what falls under 
geometry and its kindred arts."
"Well, then, go to understand that by the other segment 
of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps
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with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not 
beginnings but really hypotheses— that is, steppingstones and 
springboards— in order to reach what is free from hypothesis 
at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, 
argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning 
and in such fashion goes back down again to an end— making no 
use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms them­
selves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too."
"I understand," he said, "although not adequately— for in 
my opinion it's an enormous task you speak of— that you wish 
to distinguish that part of what is and is intelligible 
contemplated by the knowledge of dialectic as being clearer 
than that part contemplated by what are called the arts. The 
beginnings in the arts are hypotheses; and although those who 
behold their objects are compelled to do so with the thought 
and not the senses, these men--because they don't consider 
them by going up to a beginning, but rather on the basis of 
hypotheses— these men, in my opinion, don't possess 
intelligence with respect to the objects, even though they 
are, given a beginning, intelligible; and you seem to me to 
call the habit of geometers and their likes thought and not 
intelligence, indicating that thought is something between 
opinion and intelligence."
"You have made a most adequate exposition," I said. 
"And, along with me, take these four affections arising in 
the soul in relation to the four segments: intellection in
relation to the highest one, and thought in relation to the 
second; to the third assign trust, and to the last imagina­
tion. Arrange them in a proportion, and believe that as the 
segments to which they correspond participate in truth, so 
they participate in clarity."
"I undei^tand," he said. "And I agree and arrange them 
as you say."
Plato's analogy of an unequally bisected line having its 
segments similarly bisected is a familiar one to students of Western 
thought. It serves as a compact and concise statement of the 
Platonic epistemology. Ontologically, reality consists of the 
sensibles and the intellectibles. While the sensibles are easily
^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan 
Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 190-92.
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discovered, they are but imperfect imitations of the intellectibles. 
The intellectibles are known to the mind when the mind reasons upward 
from hypotheses to a beginning. Knowledge of true Forms, or eidoi, 
is a priori, whereas knowledge of the sensibles is deductible from 
sensory experience. This ontology and resulting epistemology serves 
as the basis for all of Plato's inquiries into the questions of 
social science.
Plato's most fetching exposition of his theory of knowledge 
can be found in his allegory of the cave, from Book VII of the 
Republic.^ This well-known story is important not only for its 
elucidation of the Platonic hierarchy of knowledge, but also for the 
moving quality of its dramatic analogy. The story of the cave is 
told in the form of a myth. While the use of myth in science would 
be considered inappropriate today, it was especially suitable for 
Plato as a vehicle for conveying truths about subjects that are not 
capable of being dogmatically explained, by virtue of the soul's 
inability to step out above them.
Opinion on the philosophical use of the myth by Plato varies 
considerably, from highly critical to highly supportive. German 
Plato-scholar Constantin Ritter, in the Hegelian tradition of 
philosophical criticism, considers the Platonic myths to be 
" Phantasiegemalde; they were not meant by their author to be taken 
seriously. Ritter warns the modern reader against "the common
10Ibid., pp. 193-97.
"^Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 36.
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but gross fallacy of treating them as of equal significance with the
12results methodically reached...through scientific inquiry." In his
famous lectures on the "Chain of Being," Arthur Lovejoy argues
against the German positivistic interpretation of the Platonic myth.
Lovejoy provides the reader with a different interpretation of the
Platonic myth when he says that,
It is true that Plato himself warns us that myths are not to 
be taken literally; but this is not equivalent to saying that 
they are not to be taken seriously, that they are not figura­
tive intimations of theses which Plato regards as both true 
and important, but difficult to convey "in matter-moulded 
forms of speech." It is— especially in the Republic—  
precisely when he reaches the height of his argument, the 
conceptions which for him are plainly the most certain and 
the most momentous, that he begins to speak in parables. He 
does so, as he there also explains, because in these ultimate 
reaches of his thought the terms of common language fail him; 
the truth can only be shadoYed forth through sensible 
analogues, as in a glass darkly.
In his book Participation: A Platonic Inquiry, philosopher
Charles Bigger insists that "cosmological myth is meant to reveal the 
grounds of order and the way it comes to be the form of fact."^ 
Bigger suggests that a true insight into the intentions of Plato for 
the use of myth can be found in Eric Voegelin's explanation of the 
use of myth in antiquity. In Plato and Aristotle Voegelin describes
an intellectual problem faced by Plato in his quest for knowledge of
12Ibid.
13Ibid., p. 37.
14Charles P. Bigger, Participation: A Platonic Inquiry
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p ~ 163.
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the intelligibles, and shows the myth to be one solution to this 
problem:
...the cosmos is not a datum of immanent experience; the 
philosopher, as a consequence, cannot advance verifiable 
propositions concerning the psychic nature of its order.
That is the difficulty which Plato solves by means of the 
myth...On this conception of a cosmic omphalos of the soul in 
the depth of the unconscious rests Plato's acceptance of the 
myth as a medium of symbolic expression, endowed with an 
authority of its own, independent of, and prior to, the 
universe of empirical knowledge constituted by consciousness 
in attention to its objects.
Plato consciously resorted to the use of myth when investi­
gating the nature of subjects that are not the data of immanent 
experience. These subjects are those that Plato insisted the soul 
could not step outside of. Investigation of these subjects requires 
the use of the intellect. Moreover, the language of formal discourse 
could prove too dogmatic for hypothesizing the nature of metaphysical 
concepts. In these instances, Plato would resort to the use of the 
metaphorical myth to point the investigator of truth in the direction 
of knowledge.
In the myth of the cave Plato tells of a group of people 
chained together on the floor of a cave in such a manner as to be 
facing its deepest recesses. Closer to the neck of the cave is a 
path, sided by a wall. The wall is just tall enough to hide from 
view the people that walk along the path, so that only the pots they 
carry on their heads are visible from inside the cave. Opposite the
Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. Ill of Order and 
History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957),
p . 184.
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pathway from the prisoners a fire is maintained, which illuminates
the carried pots and casts shadows of these objects onto the back
wall of the cave. Having no experience of any other images than
these shadows, the prisoners imagine them to be real objects. Their
knowledge of clay pots is, of course, uncritical and untested. It
corresponds to doxa, the lowest level of knowledge in the Platonic
hierarchy. Plato characterized the problem of holding such knowledge
in the following way:
(Glaucon) "It's a strange image," he said, "and strange 
prisoners you're telling of."
(Socrates) "They're like us," I said. "For in the first 
place, do you suppose such men would have seen anything of 
themselves and one another than the shadow cast by the fire 
on the side of the cave facing them?"
"How could they," he said, "if they had been compelled to 
keep their heads motionless throughout life."
"And what about the things that are carried by? Isn't it 
the same with them?"
"Of course."
"If they were able to discuss things with one another, 
don't you believe they would hold that they are naming these 
things going by before them that they see?"
"Necessarily."
"And what if the prison also had an echo from the side 
facing them? Whenever one of the men passing by happens to 
utter a sound, do you suppose they would believe that any­
thing other than the passing shadow was uttering the sound?"
"No, by Zeus," he said. "I don't."
"Then most certainly," I said, "such men would hold that 
the truth- is nothing other than the shadows of artificial 
things."ib
■^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, pp. 193-94.
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The problem Plato refers to here is that people who hold mere opinion 
concerning some observation are apt to be as fervent in their belief 
as if it were reasoned truth that they possessed. It will be seen 
that the means of sorting out opinion from reason is the dialectic.
Next Plato considers what would happen if suddenly one of the 
prisoners were to be unchained. He would, Plato claims, experience a 
periagoge— literally a turning-around. To see for the first time 
that the images on the cave wall were mere shadows, when he turns 
into the light, would prove unsettling. In connection with Plato's 
epistemological hierarchy, the periagoge corresponds to a breaking- 
through from mere opinion to the level of techne, for which the 
corresponding knowledge is belief or pistis.
Plato tells of a more profound experience that occurs when 
the prisoner is dragged out of the cave into the light of day. 
Annoyed by being dragged, and physically in pain from the sudden 
transition from the dark cave to the light of day, the prisoner would 
be at a loss to explain his experience. And yet, after becoming 
accustomed to the new surroundings the prisoner would come to an 
understanding of the relationship between the natural objects outside 
the cave, their manufactured imitation in the form of the pots, and 
the vague images of the pots— reality twice imitated— that appear as 
shadows on the cave wall.^7
The allegory is an analogy to the segmented line. Each 
serves as a heuristic device to explain the nature of being and
17Ibid., p. 195.
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knowledge of being as it is understood by Plato. The cave story
helps explain the reference to the clarity of different types of 
knowledge made in the explanation of the segmented line. The theory 
conveyed here serves as the basis for all Platonic science. It gives 
rise to Plato's systematic inquiry into normative issues of political 
economy, in search of the objective knowledge of human values he 
expects to find.
Plato intended the acquisition of knowledge of intelligible
phenomena to be a scientific pursuit. That this pursuit is con­
sidered by many today to be unscientific is likely the result of a 
shift in modernity away from the ontology of antiquity to one that is 
more purely phenomenological— one that limits being to aisthesis. 
These changes in ontology correspond to changes in the nature of 
science. In its purest form science is a systematic pursuit of
generalized knowledge of objectively verifiable truths or facts. For 
Plato, a believer in the existence of metaphysical Forms or 
Aristotelian formal causes, the dialectic was the science of the 
objective truths concerning objects of intellection. To appreciate 
the scientific nature of Plato's political economy one must keep in 
mind the theories of knowledge and being that underlie Plato's 
philosophy. These theories are not the foundations of modern social 
science. Failure to be cognizant of the ontological and epistemo- 
logical differences between modern economics and Plato's economics 
results in the superficial charges that Plato is pre-scientific, that 
one finds in the literary criticism of Plato's economics.
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Almost all of Plato's writing is dialectical and is intended 
to be scientific. That is, the dialogues are written testimony to 
the possibility of scientific knowledge of virtues. The dialogues 
are intended to systematically point toward objective truth. Dis­
covery of truth occurs through a process of recollection, which is 
fostered through the dialectic.
Plato's theory of learning is a theory of recollection. The 
idea that knowledge is acquired through recollection is first 
developed in the Phaedo. This theory is described by the character 
Cebes, who summarizes an argument often made by Socrates. It appears 
as follows:
Besides, Socrates, rejoined Cebes, there is that theory 
which you have often described to us— that what we call 
learning is really just recollection. If that is true, then 
surely what we recollect now we must have learned at some 
time before, which is impossible unless our souls existed 
somewhere before they entered this human shape. So in that 
way too it seems likely that the soul is immortal.
How did the proofs of that theory go, Cebes? broke in
Simmias. Remind me, because at the moment I can't quite 
remember.
One very good argument, said Cebes, is that when people
are asked questions, if the question is put in the right way
they can give a perfectly correct answer, which they could 
not possibly do unless they had some knowledge and a proper 
grasp of the subject. And then if you confront people with a 
diagram or anything like that, the way in which tljLgy react is 
an unmistakable proof that the theory is correct.
Plato provides the reader with a demonstration of the argument
Cebes speaks of in the Meno. In this dialogue Socrates attempts
to convince Meno, an acquaintance, of the fact that knowledge is
I O
Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 55.
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recollected by proving that an untutored slave-boy knows the prin­
ciples of geometry."^
Acquisition of knowledge by recollection occurs in stages.
Classicist Norman Gulley characterizes these stages in his study of
20Plato's theory of knowledge. Gulley claims that
One feature of the theory [of recollection] which must be 
considered before its metaphysical implications are discussed 
is Plato's division of the process of recollection into three 
main stages. The first stage, illustrated in the first part 
of [the Meno], is the process of disillusionment, a negative 
stage which elicits the recognition that propositions which 
at first are believed to be true are in fact false. The 
significance of this is that by explicitly affirming that 
this process is the first stage in the process of recollec­
tion, and assuming that, if the questioning is systematically 
continued, knowledge will eventually be acquired, Plato makes 
quite clear that the theory of recollection is introduced as 
a foundation for the Socratic dialectic. With this basis the 
method can pass beyond the^merely 'purgative' stage and lead 
to the discovery of truth.
The stages of recollection correspond to the acquisition of succes­
sively higher levels of knowledge, as described in the analogy of the 
segmented line. The sense of disillusionment--that opinions pre­
viously thought to be true are now known to be false— is an important 
step in the discovery of truth in the dialectic. By design, many of 
the dialogues are aporetic. That is, they systematically divorce the 
investigator from opinions that can be shown to be false, producing a 
sense of aporia— a sense of being painted into a corner, or a sense
^Plato, "Meno," The Collected Dialogues, p. 354.
20Norman Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London:
Methuen, 1962), p. 13. 
Ibid.
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of being without resources. The early dialogues, which essentially 
focus on the discovery of some particular virtue, are generally 
aporetic.
Lysis, for instance, inquires into the nature of friendship, 
without actually reaching a conclusion as to what exactly friendship 
is. Rather, by pointing out what opinions concerning friendship are 
demonstrably false, it produces aporia. Euthyphro provides a similar 
vehicle for a discussion of the nature of piety or holiness, to an 
aporetic end. Other well known aporetic inquiries are the Laches, 
which centers around the development of knowledge of courage itself, 
and the Charmides, which deals with the nature of temperance, or 
sophrosyne.
In each of the aporetic dialogues Plato strives to foster a 
sense of Socratic ignorance. The act of cutting away by layers mere 
opinion concerning some value judgment produces the sense of aporia 
sought in the dialectic. Aporia is, for Plato, an important 
scientific springboard that prepares one to make a move upward into 
the realm of reasoned knowledge, and to inquire into the true nature 
of the Form that lies behind a value concept.
Beyond a sense of aporia, however, the early dialogues are 
designed to point the reader in the direction of truth. An awareness 
of Socratic ignorance by the investigator prepares him to reason out 
some objective insight into the nature of those concepts that serve 
as the ultimate ends— telea— of political and economic action.
Not all of the early dialogues end aporetically. Some move 
on to arrive at the second-stage level of knowledge, pistis. The
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Meno, for instance, succeeds in instilling right opinion in the mind 
of the slave-boy, although the boy is not prepared to explain the 
higher principles that lend truth to his sense of trust. In his more 
mature work Plato moves the dialectic to a stage of recollection that 
provides insight into true definition, which is the telos of dialec­
tical inquiry. According to Plato, happiness requires knowledge of 
happiness itself. He makes this point clear in the Meno, where he 
argues that no one voluntarily desires evil:
(Socrates) When you speak of a man desiring fine things, do
you mean it is good things he desires?
(Meno) Certainly.
Then, do you think some men desire evil and others good? 
Doesn't everyone, in your opinion, desire good things?
No.
And would you say that the others suppose evils to be 
good, or do they still desire them although they recognize 
them as evil?
Both, I should say.
What? Do you really think that anyone who recognizes
evils for what they are, nevertheless desires them?
Yes.
Desires in what way? To possess them?
Of course.
In the belief that evil things bring advantage to their 
possessor, of harm?
Some in the first belief, but some also in the second.
And do you believe that those who suppose evil things 
bring advantage understand that they are evil?
No, that I can't really believe.
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Isn't it clear then that this class, who don't recognize 
evils for what they are, don't desire evil but what they 
think is good, though in fact it is evil; those who through 
ignorance mistake bad things for good obviously desire the 
good?
For them I suppose that is true.
Now as for those whom you speak of as desiring evils in 
the belief that they do harm to their possessor, these pre­
sumably know that they will be injured by them?
They must.
And don't they believe that whoever is injured is, in so 
far as he is injured, unhappy?
That too they must believe.
And unfortunate?
Yes.
Well, does anybody want to be unhappy and unfortunate?
I suppose not.
Then, if not, nobody desires what is evil, for what el^ 
is unhappiness but desiring evil things and getting them?
To know what happiness is, therefore, is to be happy. The end of 
social science, which must be to make men happy, requires some knowl­
edge of what happiness is. In modernity, happiness is, for the 
individual, what the individual opines happiness to be. Plato's 
dialectic produces, on the other hand, knowledge of happiness out of 
opinions of happiness.
Transformation of opinion to knowledge is a rational process. 
In Plato's terminology reason goes to a beginning; it explains 
Forms by using Forms, rather than the objects of sensation. Gulley
oo
Plato, "Meno," in The Collected Dialogues, pp. 360-61.
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states that the important feature of Plato's theory of recollection 
is that
it appeals to a transcendent source of knowledge and implies 
a transcendent reality as the object of knowledge, tran­
scendent in the sense that it is superior to and different in 
kind from the 'reality' which belongs to the objects of the 
incarnate experience of this life. But no attempt is made to 
analyze this latter experience or to specify the nature of 
its objects; in particular no attempt is made to associate it 
with specifically sensible experience.
When the mind grasps at concepts of transcendent reality it must,
according to Plato, adopt as a technique of investigation a method
that does not rely upon sensory observation for verification of an
hypothesis. The dialectic is the rational process that satisfies
this criterion.
The importance of the dialectic as a method of inquiry into
the true nature of intelligible, rather than sensible, phenomena can
be seen in Plato's characterization of the problem confronting the
investigator of metaphysical concepts. Plato insists that a soul,
when investigating intelligible phenomena, is compelled to employ
hypotheses, because it "is unable to step out above the hypoth- 
24eses," to go to a beginning. By nature metaphysical Forms, if they 
exist, exist outside the conscious mind. The investigator of these 
concepts, therefore, is unable to hold them as an object of his 
consciousness. Whereas the laboratory scientist is afforded
the luxury of ordinarily being able to observe the object of his
^Gulley, p. 19.
24Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 191.
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investigation, the philosopher cannot see that which he seeks. 
Rather, the philosopher qua investigator of virtue must infer quali­
ties of metaphysical Forms, based upon glimpses perceived through the 
mind's eye. The soul's perception of virtue, according to Plato's 
epistemology, is not unlike the experience of seeing a three- 
dimensional model of a hypercube. At any moment the observer of the 
hypercube can see only three of the dimensions of this four­
dimensional figure. One does glimpse the fourth dimension of the 
hypercube from the shadows cast by the fourth dimension onto the 
three that are visible. So, too, the observer of an ideal virtue 
glimpses with the mind's eye the metaphysical qualities of that Form
as they become visible to the soul.
The problem of verifying the existence of the invisible Forms 
of reality described in the dialogues has long perplexed the serious 
scholar. Aristotle had much to say about Plato's theory of Ideal 
Forms, almost none of it flattering. Although Aristotle shared 
Plato's belief in the existence of objective virtues, he had little 
patience for Plato's preoccupation with acquiring knowledge of forms.
The peripatetic was quite concerned that people do good, but he was
25not interested in whether or not they know goodness itself.
Aristotle understood the agathon to be the ultimate telos, or 
final cause, of human action. This can be seen in his introduction
to Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle states that
25Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," in Introduction to 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 1947), p.
315.
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Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action 
and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this 
reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which 
all things aim...If, then, there is some end of the things we 
do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being 
desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose every­
thing for the sake of something else (for at that rate the 
process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be 
empty2 ând vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief 
good.
Ontologically, however, Aristotle was not sympathetic to his mentor's 
notion of Forms of Ideas. He did not disapprove of Plato's inquiry 
into the nature of fixed and objective virtues; rather, Aristotle did 
not accept the theory of Forms at rest that generate the qualities 
found in the sensibles. In particular, Aristotle saw objective 
virtues existing as separate entities, rather than as qualities of a 
single Form. This departure from Plato's theory of Forms can also be 
found in Nicomachean Ethics, and appears below:
An objection to what we have said, however, may be dis­
cerned in the fact that the Platonists have not been speaking 
about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and 
loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single 
Form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve these 
somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by
reference to these in a secondary sense...Let us separate, 
then, things good in themselves from things useful, and 
consider whether the former are called good by reference to a 
single Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in
themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated
from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain
pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also 
for the sake of something else, yet one would place them 
among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than 
the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will 
be empty. But if the things we have named are also things 
good in themselves, the account of the good will have to 
appear as something identical in snow and in white lead. But
26Ibid., p. 308.
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of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their 
goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, 
there|yre, is not some common element answering to one 
Idea.
The existence of transcendent being that lends objective 
validity to statements of moral principle has proved far more 
problematic to modern scientists than it did to Aristotle. Today 
there is hardly any mention of idealistic realism beyond statements 
that relegate it to some defunct philosophy from the past. In 
economics, for example, we have seen that leading methodologists are 
confident in their claims that normative science is an oxymoronic 
term. Friedman, after all, has said that "fundamental differences in 
basic values are differences about which men can ultimately only 
fight." Moral principles are all treated as value judgments, i.e., 
doxa, none of which can have any basis in facts.
The reasons that modern social scientists resist the 
absolutism of Plato, and, thus, label the dialogues pre-scientific, 
are several. Science inquires into the nature of objective truth.
The methods of science depend upon two critical perceptions of the 
mind: (1) what is the nature of being, and (2) what is the nature of
knowledge of being and how is it obtained? Clearly, the radical 
differences between the science of antiquity and of modernity must 




II. The Epistemologies of Contemporary Economics
The statements of Friedman, Lange, and others concerning the 
unscientific nature of normative prescription and value judgment can 
be traced to intellectual roots from the eighteenth century and 
earlier. The methodological distinction between "is" and "ought," 
and between "fact" and "value" prominent in the methodology of 
Friedman and others is Hume's. In his book A Treatise of Human 
Nature, Hume displays a clearly modern sense of science. In this 
thesis Hume explains that virtue can never be derived from reason; 
rather, it is the perception of emotion. Hume curiously applies a 
Platonic measurement to the validity of thought when comparing reason 
and emotion, yet he arrives at a conclusion concerning virtue that is 
the antithesis of Plato's. Hume writes that,
...It has been observed, that nothing is ever present to 
the mind but its perceptions; and that all the actions of 
seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall 
under this denomination. The mind can never exert itself in 
any action which we may not comprehend under the term percep­
tion; and consequently that term is no less applicable to 
those judgments by which we distinguish moral good and evil, 
than to every other operation of the mind. To approve of one 
character, to condemn another, are only so many different 
perceptions.
Now, as perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds, 
viz. impressions and ideas, this distinction gives rise to a 
question, with which we shall open up our present inquiry 
concerning morals, whether it is by means of our ideas or 
impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and 
pronounce an action blamable or praiseworthy? This will 
immediately cut off all loose discourses and declamations, 
and reduce us to something precise and exact of the present 
subject.
Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity 
to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses 
of things, which are the same to every rational being that 
considers them; that the immutable measure of right and wrong 
impose an obligation, not only in human creatures, but 
also on the Deity himself: all these systems concur in the
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opinion, that morality, like truth, is discerned merely by 
ideas, and by their juxtaposition and comparison. In order, 
therefore, to judge of these systems, we need only consider 
whether it be possible from reason alone, to distinguish 
betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur 
some other principles to enable us to make that distinction.
If morality had naturally no influence on human passions 
and actions, it were in vain to take such pains to inculcate 
it; and nothing would be more fruitless than that multitude 
of rules and precepts with which all moralists abound. 
Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and prac­
tical; and as morality is always comprehended under the 
latter division, it is supposed to influence our passions and 
actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of 
the understanding. And this is confirmed by common 
experience, which informs us, that men are often governed by 
their duties, and are deterred from actions by the opinion of 
injustice, and impelled to others by that of obligation.
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions 
and affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from 
reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already 
proved, can never have any such influence. Morals excite 
passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself 
is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules 
morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Hume makes the Platonic distinction of knowledge seen in the analogy
of the segmented line. He distinguishes between impressions and
ideas. However, he relegates morals and moral principles to the
status of impressions— i.e., the Platonic doxa. Hume's argument is
too simplistic. It is based upon the idea that reason is indolent,
whereas passion is active--that action derives from the passions.
His argument proves nothing. In fact it is anticipated and dealt
with by Plato in his argument that to know virtue is to behave
virtuously. Nevertheless, Hume's proof neatly summarizes the modern
distinction between facts and values.
28David Hume, "A Treatise of Human Nature," in Value and Man, 
ed. Louis Z. Hammer (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 164-65.
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Hume, Friedman, and Lange seem to share an ontology, popular
since the Enlightenment, that does not admit the experience of
immutable Forms which engender virtues. The possible reasons that
explain the differences between this ontology and Plato's are many,
but a few stand out as plausible. It is possible that Hume and
others did indeed experience or "see" virtues as clearly as Plato
did, but they saw them to be demonstrably relative, rather than
absolute. Or, in modernity the "mind's eye," like the appendix, has
become a vestigial organ. In this case the soul would no longer
perceive virtue in the way that Plato's did. Finally, it is possible
that Hume and others did experience the Platonic periagoge, but, not
recognizing the experience, they elected to invoke the Cartesian
decision to reject "almost as false" anything that was not
29immediately verifiable as true.
Of the three explanations of the ontological differences 
between Platonic and modern thought, the first is the least 
believable. A relativist would be inconsistent in putting forward an 
argument in support of an immutable existence of relativity with 
respect to virtues. Relativism cannot logically admit of any 
absolute doctrine. It is also unlikely that the second reason 
captures the underlying difference between the two theories of 
being. Psychologically we must be capable of seeing what Plato saw, 
which is not to say, however, that we accept his interpretation of
29Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1950), p. 7.
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that perception. Rather, it is more likely that the third explana­
tion characterizes Hume's belief that values are distinct from facts. 
With the development of the scientific method during the Enlighten­
ment, the normative philosophies of antiquity must have appeared as 
magnificent castles built upon sand. Hume, like Descartes before 
him, understands science in a way that foreshadows modern positivism.
Plato would be intrigued by Hume's epistemology. He would, 
no doubt, agree with Hume on the point that moral principles excite 
the passions. Moreover, he would insist that the majority of
opinions held by people concerning moral and ethical principles have 
no basis in truth at all. He would, however, strongly disagree with 
Hume concerning the issue of the impotence of reason. We have seen 
that he did not separate knowledge of virtue from virtuous behavior. 
In both the Protagoras and the Meno Plato insists that no one would
voluntarily behave in a way inconsistent with virtue, assuming that
30that person possessed some knowledge of virtue. For Plato, the 
mind is not indolent in directing the will to act upon reason. To 
know what is good is to do what is good, and this knowledge is
acquired by the reasoning mind. Plato would admit the existence of
speculative and practical spheres of philosophy, but would insist
that the speculative branch serves as the sighting device with which 
one aims the practical.
It is clear that contemporary social scientists, like Aris­
totle before them, have a tough time making sense out of the theory
^0Plato, "Protagoras," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 338.
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of Forms. The outer eyes of the social scientist still see too 
clearly. Nevertheless, the rejection of ancient epistemology by Hume 
and others has profoundly altered the nature of scientific inquiry, 
with the predictable result that Plato's inquiry has been ruled out 
of court.
III. Rhapsody, Sophistry, and Modern Relativism
Even in his own day Plato had a difficult time convincing his
contemporaries. The Athenian culture was steeped in a long tradition
of moral relativism— a tradition that Plato's mentor Socrates sought
to overturn through his teaching. The popularity of relativism in
Plato's day can be seen in the dialogues, in Plato's account of the
sophists, the itinerant teachers of persuasion and rhetoric. In the
dialogues the sophists appear as advertisers of a belief in the
malleability of virtue. To the sophist virtue is what you would make
of it. The sophistic position is summarized in the famous maxim of
Protagoras, the greatest of all sophists. In the Cratylus and the
Theaetetus we are reminded by Plato that Protagoras lived by the rule
31that " Panton krematon metron einai anthropon." This translates
literally as, Of all things the measure is man."
The popularity of the sophist in the Athenian polis can be 
attributed to the long romance that existed between the Athenians and
the powers of verbal persuasion and demonstration. The polis fairly
teemed with all sorts of artisans whose principal trade was wit and
■^Plato, "Cratylus," p. 424, and "Theatetus," p. 856 in The 
Collected Dialogues.
95
persuasion. In an early dialogue, Ion, Plato tells of a conversation
between Socrates and Ion, a celebrated rhapsode. Ion makes a living,
we are told, by telling the tales of Homer in the most exciting and
persuasive way that he can muster. In the dialogue Socrates
systematically discredits Ion as being a peddler of an essentially
useless product. Socrates argues that Ion, by creatively reciting
the Homeric legends, is not delivering the truth to the Athenian
citizens. Moreover, Ion pretends, by virtue of his mastery of verse,
32to have mastered the crafts mentioned in the Homeric epic poems.
Rhapsody, the creative recitation of ancient verse, is a 
craft of the relativist. Rather than convey the "truths" of the poet 
in their original form, the rhapsode would make them his own. Tales 
and legends handed down from antiquity would be exaggerated and 
otherwise modified so as to flatter and catch the ear of the 
listener. To Plato the rhapsode was a nuisance. Although Ion claims 
to be the master of the many crafts that are the subject of his 
tales, Plato demonstrates that Ion actually possesses not true 
knowledge of these subjects. The rhapsode is merely a flatterer.
Plato reserves his intellectual strength to do combat with 
the sophists. The sophists were widely regarded as excellent 
teachers and, as in the case of Protagoras, received handsome fees 
for their lectures. Like the rhapsode, the sophist would hold forth 
with long-winded speeches and demonstrations, with an eye toward 
persuading his audience with the sweetness of his rhetoric. The
■^Plato, "Ion," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 225.
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sophist was the grand flatterer of the polis. In the Theaetetus
Plato characterizes the sophist as a "skirmishing mercenary in the 
33war of words." He says that the sophist
might lie in wait for you armed with a thousand such 
questions, once you have identified knowledge and perception.
He would make his assaults upon hearing and smelling and 
suchlike senses and put you to confusion, sustaining his 
attack until your admiration of his inestimable skill 
betrayed you into his toils, and thereupon, leading you
captive and bound, he would hold,you to ransom for such a sum 
as you and he might agree upon.
In the Theaetetus we are told that knowledge is simply per­
ception, in the minds of the many. By perception Plato means
appearance. The unity of knowledge and appearance serves as the 
basis for the sophistic moral relativism. Socrates accuses
Theaetetus, the issuer of the statement that knowledge is perception, 
of arguing like the great Protagoras. The Protagorean position with 
respect to moral values is that what one perceives as virtuous is 
virtue for that individual. Social virtues become the shared beliefs 
of the many. The sophist considers virtue to be egoistically deter­
mined.
Plato was prepared to do battle with the moral relativists of 
his day. He devoted the Theaetetus to the issue of whether or not 
knowledge conforms to the notion of perception. In the dialogue the 
sophistic position centers around the belief that knowledge and
perception are indistinguishable. Plato proceeds to hack away at the 
beliefs of his interlocutors, showing that knowledge, whatever it
•5 "3Plato, "Theaetetus," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 871.
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truly is, cannot be perception. Perception is demonstrated to be 
constantly changing. It cannot be classified in the Platonic 
ontology as among ta onta— the things that are. Knowledge, as under­
stood in the Platonic epistemology, is knowledge of Forms. Forms are 
ta onta. Perceptions, however, are either objects of doxa or claims 
pistis. Although Plato provides the reader with no dogmatic 
definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus, he shows that it would be
epistemologically inconsistent for it to be perception, at least with
35respect to his understanding of reality.
To the modern reader Plato's argument in the Theaetetus is 
unconvincing. Plato intended this. Indeed, he chastises his inter­
locutors for accepting his argument uncritically. Plato understands 
that knowledge of Forms cannot be demonstrated to be a product of 
rational discourse. Neither can knowledge be demonstrated to be 
relative or perceptual. Nevertheless, the modern relativist can 
dismiss Plato on grounds that his mind does not admit the existence 
of metaphysical forms, and that knowledge must consequently be 
treated as mere perception.
Protagorean relativism has been nearly universally accepted 
in the sciences today. The science of Plato— i.e., investigation of 
the forms that engender moral values— is for the modern social 
scientist a kind of proto-science. The Delphic charges "know thy­
self" and "nothing too much" have been replaced by the maxim found 
over the entrance to the NBER that "science is measurement." It is
35Ibid., p. 857.
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important that measurement is a sensible rather than intellectual 
form of analysis. As botanist Conway Zirkle has suggested,
Today almost every scientist whose interests extend 
beyond the range of his technical researches is a relativist 
of one kind or another. To a professional scientist, this 
needs no explanation; it is only what he would expect. When 
we view the phases through which our expanding sciences are
passing, we find that they contain a vast amount of informa­
tion and that this information is still growing exponentially 
just as it has been growing for the past three hundred years. 
While we have not yet learned to know ourselves, we are 
getting a better idea as to what sort of creatures we 
actually are. And this knowledge helps to explain what might 
otherwise be a paradox. The more our knowledge increases-- 
the greater the achievements in which our species can take 
legitimate pride— the greater becomes the modesty of the 
scientists who are responsible for the increase. Today our 
better scientists know so much about themselves that they 
have become^ acutely aware of their many limiting 
deficiencies.
In economics the acceptance of relativism seems as complete as it is
in the physic il sciences. In discussing relativism Mises has said
that "Weber gave the deathblow to the methods applied by the schools
of Schmoller and Brentano by demonstrating the unscientific character
37of judgments of value." In a statement that recapitulates
Protagoras, Mises claims that
With regard to ultimate ends, all that a mortal man can 
assert is approval or disapproval from the point of view of 
his own judgments of value. With regard to means there is 
only one question, viz™ whether or not they are fitted to 
attain the ends sought.
36Conway Zirkle, "Human Evolution and Relativism," in Rela­
tivism and the Study of Man, p. 23.
37Ludwig Von Mises, "Epistemological Relativism in the 




The epistemology of modern relativism is the very antithesis
of Plato's. There exists a basic agreement upon the role of science
between Plato and the relativists, but disagreement exists concerning
the order of being. Mises, for instance, says, in Platonic fashion,
that "All human wisdom, science, and knowledge deal only with the
segment of the universe that can be perceived and studied by the 
39human mind." Ideal forms, however, would not be capable of being 
scientifically analyzed by the human mind, according to Mises. He 
goes on to say that the "promulgation of judgments of value is not 
the business of a man in his capacity as a praxeologist, economist, 
or historian. It is rather the task of religion, metaphysics, or 
ethics .49
In its purest form modern relativism recaptures the zeal of 
the sophistic spirit. The sophistic implications of a completely 
relativistic position can be seen in the following quotation from an 
essay on relativism by former Secretary of the Smithsonian Institu­
tion, Leonard Carmichael:
One who adopts a completely relativistic approach to ethical 
or esthetic questions either accepts his own feelings as law 
or may come to assert that a statistically analyzed poll of 
the beliefs of a well-selected sample of individual is to be 
taken as a temporary norm. Or such relativists may assert 
that a complete and adequate statistical study of the actual 
behavior of other individual selected by some "sampling 
technique" in a given society at a specific time may indicate 
not only what people now do, but amazingly enough, what they 




statisticians call "measures of central tendency" for old 
discovered and establ^jhed absolutes of what people "ought to 
do" in social living.
The popularity of relativism in modernity can be attributed,
at least in part, to the development in modern science of tolerance
among scientists for theories and opinions different from one's own. 
Today it is a sign of intelligence and an enlightened character to 
outwardly espouse a kind of philosophical individualism. That is, it 
is chic to imagine that each individual is the best judge of his own 
values, and that all values can be treated as equal. Or, as Lange 
states, interpersonal comparisons of value have no validity. Value 
relativism, developed from a sense of individualism, breeds modern 
liberalism.
Liberalism is the belief that each man is the measure of all
things pertaining to him, and that, consequently, each man deserves
the highest degree of personal freedom in order to exercise his will 
over his self-determined values. Liberalism is the logical extension 
of value relativism. Because truths are imagined to be self- 
determined, it is argued by many that the individual in society must 
enjoy some freedom from having the values of others imposed on him.
Although the liberal understanding of ethics is quite popular 
today, it is plagued by one serious rational flaw. Liberalism, 
derived from value relativism, depends upon an absolute— i.e., 
the dogmatic claim that values are subjective. It seems that the
^Leonard Carmichael, "Absolutes, Relativism, and the 
Scientific Psychology of Human Nature," in Relativism and the Study 
of Man, p. 13.
relativist who so dearly values freedom to pursue subjective ends 
depends upon an acceptance by society of the absolute claim that the 
telea of human action are subjectively rather than objectively 
engendered.
In his essay "Relativism,” political philosopher Leo Strauss 
describes the intellectual problems that arise from the acceptance of 
a liberalism that is based upon value relativism. Strauss, in 
describing relativistic liberalism, distinguishes two senses of 
freedom upon which liberalism can be based. Borrowing from Isaiah 
Berlin, Strauss describes freedom as either being "positive," i.e., 
"freedom for," or "negative," i.e., freedom from. Negative freedom 
is freedom from interference and social control. In the positive 
sense freedom is freedom to "be one's own master: or to participate
/ Q
in the social control to which the individual is subject." Accord­
ing to Strauss liberalism most often relies upon a negative sense of 
freedom— because each individual determines his own telos he ought to 
be free from interference from others when he pursues that telos.
Strauss cuts to the heart of the problem underlying rela­
tivistic liberalism when he states that "'Relativism,' or the 
assertion that all ends are relative to the chooser and hence equal, 
seems to require some kind of 'absolutism.' The relativist, in
/ 0Leo Strauss, "Relativism," in Relativism and the Study of 
Man, p. 135.
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asserting that values are subjective, must embrace an absolute. As
Strauss sees it, "Liberalism...cannot live without an absolute basis
and cannot live with an absolute basis.
Plato was probably the first philosopher to recognize the
absolutely made assertion of subjectivity that is implicit to value
relativism. In the Theaetetus Plato considers the philosophical
problems that are associated with the dogmatic pronouncement made by
Protagoras that, "Of all things man is the measure." In this
dialogue the sophistic maxim is worded to emphasize this problem.
Whereas in the Cratylus Protagoras' statement is quoted as "Panton
krematon metron einai anthropon," in the Theaetetus it appears as "
Panton krematon metron anthropon einai." By placing einai, the verb
"to be," at the end of the statement, Plato is emphasizing the
dogmatic quality of the Protagorean method. Protagoras' statement,
as it appears in the Theaetetus, reads, "Of all things the measure
man î s." Plato arranges Protagoras' statement this way in the
Theaetetus for effect— the topic of the dialogue is whether or not
knowledge is perception, and the proof that it is not is based upon a
46distinction in being between sensibles and intelligibles. That 
is, the sensible come into being--they are becoming--whereas the 
intelligibles actually are. It would be more consistent with true
45Ibid., p. 138.
46The subtleties of phrasing in the dialogues are often lost 
upon the reader of Plato in translation. I am indebted to James A. 
Arieti, Associate Professor of Classical Languages, Hampden-Sydney 
College, for pointing out Plato's meaning when he changes Protagoras' 
"einai anthropon" to "anthropon einai."
relativism for Protagoras to have said that "Of all things man may be
the measure." Political scientist and relativist Arnold Brecht
states that "Scientific Value Relativism may...be too humble to offer
47a scientific decision." Protagoras, however, is famous for his 
absolute claim that man is the measure of all things. The relativist 
does indeed require an absolute as an anchor for his methodology.
In spite of the popularity of relativism, it is no more 
capable of proving the absolutist's vision of truth defunct than is 
absolutism capable of dogmatically demonstrating the impossibility of 
the relativist's position. As Zirkle states, "That truth exists, of 
course, is a hitherto unprovable postulate, but the proposition that 
it does not exist cannot be established on relativistic grounds.
The rational human mind, however, always searches for truth. "Scien­
tists," Zirkle says, "must assume that somewhere and at some time
there is something very like the 'truth.' Otherwise there would be
49no difference between science and quackery."
Plato believed in truth. Although he could not hold the Form 
itself as an object of his consciousness, he could infer its quali­
ties from the imperfect manifestations of truth that the Form 
engendered in the sensibles. He could then refine these images by 
reasoning them through hypotheses. Images would thus give way to




knowledge. Plato's theory of Forms is, epistemologically, an
ordering principle from which science can arise. Economist Joseph
Spengler introduces his work, Origins of Economic Thought and
Justice, with an appeal to the notion that without order there is no
science. He quotes Whitehead, saying that "There can be no living
science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the
existence of an order of things, and in particular, of an order of 
50nature." The relativist's Protagorean liberalism reduces science 
to the art of demonstration or rhetoric. Science is incompatible 
with relativism, which is not to say that science does not benefit 
from the scientist's Socratic skepticism. Socrates' distrust of 
appearances, however, was restricted to the science of the sensibles. 
Plato recognized that without Forms nothing is. In the absence of an 
underlying ontological order to the universe everything is becoming. 
Without Forms there is no science, only history and historicism. 
Plato may, or may not have uncovered scientific truth. His investi­
gation, however, is truly scientific.
IV. Historicism
Value relativism taken to its conclusion leads to his­
toricism. Historicism stresses the uniqueness of historical events. 
Once all vestiges of a priori knowledge are eliminated through value 
relativism, history becomes the moving force behind human action. In
^A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 3, quoted 
in Joseph J. Spengler, Origins of Economic Thought and Justice 
(Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980),
p. xi.
105
the absence of belief in common tendencies and common values among 
men it is difficult to maintain a belief in the existence of human 
nature. Relativism clears the way for historicism— under relativism 
all values are equal, thus no objective logos can be evoked to 
explain human behavior. The elimination of logos through relativism 
leaves only nomos— conventional wisdom— to explain social phenomena. 
Nomos, unlike logos, is subject to change over time. Therefore, the 
historicist is free, in the wake created by relativism, to hypothe­
size some importance to history itself. In the mind of the 
historicist events are determined not by human nature, but by history 
itself. Once the theories of the absolutist philosopher are 
tarnished by the relativist, the historicist is free to create a 
purely empirical science.
Historicism opposes Platonism by virtue of its denial of the 
possibility of a priori knowledge. Under historicism, human nature 
ceases to exist. Presumably, there is nothing to be gained by an 
inquiry into the nature of virtue, because virtue does not exist. 
Rather, the term virtue is applied, if at all, to an ever-changing 
body of subjective beliefs that are extolled by ever-changing 
societies. Plato, with his ideas concerning the existence of Forms 
that engender values, threatens the historicist.
Historicism in economics comes through the influence of the 
German historical school. At the hands of the German economist 
theory is obtained through a different process of induction than 
Plato's. Platonic induction— reaching intelligible generalizations 
from intelligible hypotheses— has no meaning to the German economist.
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The historical school insisted that laws of economic action, insofar 
as they exist, must be theorized on the basis of empirical fact. 
German economics becomes an attempt to explain a historical evolution 
toward an eschaton. Mises succinctly describes the condition that 
gives rise to historicism when he points out:
Epistemologically the distinctive mark of what we call 
nature is to be seen in the ascertainable and inevitable 
regularity in the concatenation and sequence of phenomena.
On the other hand the distinctive mark of what we call the 
human sphere or history, or, better, the realm of human 
action is the absence of such a universally prevailing 
regularity. Under identical conditions stones always react 
to the same stimuli in the same way; we can learn something 
about these regular patterns of reacting, and we can make use 
of this knowledge in directing our actions toward definite 
goals. Our classification of natural objects and our 
assigning names to these classes is an outcome of this cogni­
tion. A stone is a thing that reacts in a definite way. Men 
react to the same stimuli in different ways, and the same man 
at different instants of time may react in ways different 
from his previous or later conduct. It is impossible to 
group-, men into classes whose members always react in the same 
way.
The historicist's conviction that men, unlike things, react dif­
ferently to the same stimuli causes the historicist to turn a deaf 
ear to the theories of Plato, which depend upon a commonality of 
human action, through participation in the Form of virtue. The 
German school, in this way, is insensitive to the Platonic inquiry.
The supposed uniqueness of each human act, which results in 
the abolition of human nature from the framework of social science, 
is a conviction of the historicist. Historicism is incapable of 
proving that human action is unique, or that human nature does not
^Ludwig Von Mises, Theory and History (New Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1957), pp. 4-5.
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exist. Nevertheless, historicism remains popular today. Perhaps 
this popularity can be attributed to the influence of twentieth 
century individualism upon the Western mind. Individualism places a 
premium upon the notion that the self is singularly unique— each 
individual represents a distinct collection of thoughts and values 
that cannot be duplicated in history. The individualist savors the 
differences between people, and not the shared traits. The message 
of individualism can be heard in the sweetest tones in the egoism of 
Ayn Rand. The appealing image of the human self hawked in her books 
is irresistible, or nearly so. Western individualism all but pre­
cludes the possibility of social science, leaving behind only history 
to explain the meaning of man's acts.
Plato understood the pull of individualism, and would not 
have been surprised at the popularity of egoism in the twentieth 
century. In the Republic Plato describes the historical deteriora­
tion of society, moving from aristocracy to tyranny, in a way that 
foretells the excesses of twentieth century liberalism and 
individualism. In Book VIII Plato traces the historical progression 
of regimes through forms that mirror the stages of development of the 
soul itself. In ancient times, Plato relates, men lived in a true 
aristocracy, i.e., rule by the best or most excellent citizens— the 
aristoi. From aristocracy society steadily moves toward both public 
and private tyranny. Tyranny is a condition that results from an 
extreme imbalance of the parts of the psyche, or soul, that Plato 
describes earlier in the Republic. The soul consists of the 
rational, spirited, and appetitive parts. When properly ordered, the
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soul is ruled by reason, with spirit serving as reason's watchdog
checking the passions. Plato recognized the tendency among men to
permit the appetitive urges and desires to dominate the soul. The
degrees of psychological imbalance that ensue determine the character
of the man within the polis, and consequently, the character of the
52regime that surfaces in the polis.
Timocracy results when reason gives way to honor as the 
steward of the psyche. Once reason is displaced, however, Plato sees 
it as all but inevitable that the passions take over as the proximate 
cause of human action. Timocracy is soon eclipsed by oligarchy in
the state, as lovers of honor lose ground against lovers of money-
, . 53making.
Oligarchy reflects a condition in the soul in which passion
displaces both reason and spirit. This regime, Plato says, "is the
54first to admit of the greatest of all evils." Extreme poverty, 
that results whenever a man sells all of his possessions and is left
with nothing, is, for Plato, the greatest social evil.
Born into a society in which a fundamental imbalance of the
soul is permitted, the sons of the oligarchs become the founders of
democracy. Democracy, for Plato, does not connote goodness,
fairness, and justice as it does in modernity. Plato sees demo­
cracy as the regime that flourishes under conditions of psychological




imbalance that replace wealth with licentiousness as the aim of 
economic action. Plato describes democracy as the regime in which 
freedom is corrupted to mean freedom to pursue whatever end one 
wants. The Platonic democrat, in a way characteristic of the modern 
individualist,
doesn’t admit true speech or let it pass into the guardhouse, 
if someone says that there are some pleasures belonging to 
fine and good desires and some belonging to bad desires, and 
that the ones must be practiced and honored and the others 
checked and enslaved. Rather, he shakes his head at all this 
and says that all are alike and must be honored on an equal 
basis.
According to Plato, democracy is the fairest regime. That
is, Plato imagines that democracy would be heralded by the many as 
fairest and most just. Again, Plato would not be surprised at our 
love of freedom and democracy in the twentieth century. Democracy, 
in Plato's estimation does not flourish, but gives way to a regime 
that reflects the final state of deterioration of the soul— tyranny.
Tyranny results from the excesses of passion exercised over
the democratic soul, in an atmosphere of complete freedom. The
freedom cherished by the democratic relativist becomes the enslaver 
of passion under tyranny. Modern concepts of tyranny do not 
completely convey the idea of Plato, when he speaks of the genesis of 
tyranny. Whereas in modernity we view tyranny as the condition in 
which a faction malignantly rules over an enslaved majority, Plato 
viewed tyranny as being a private affair. The tyrannical mind is so 
infused with the notion of primacy of the passions, that it develops
55Ibid., p. 239.
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a sense of paranoia toward others, who would, in the mind of the
tyrant, interfere with the tyrant's attempt to satisfy his desires.
Oligarchic money-making replaces the agathon as the telos of human
action. In an environment of licentiousness that is fostered in
56democracy, avarice generates tyranny of the soul. Allan Bloom
interprets Plato's vision of the tyrant as being " the man of 
57desire." The fatal flaw of tyranny is that by depending upon 
desires it depends upon that "which, when emancipated, [is] infinite
CO
and make[s] man's needs infinite."
Modern historicism is the science of tyranny. All values and 
goals are treated as equal by the historicist. Moreover, no theory 
of human nature can be applied to history to organize human action 
around a few compelling points. Rather, historicism is the science 
that describes, using history, the quest of the tyrannical soul 
after the infinite ends of an insatiable appetite.
The existence of Platonic philosophy is predicated upon the 
perceived existence of an order of nature, such as that described by 
Whitehead. Man, moreover, is a part of nature. While Plato sees an 
inevitable unfolding of historical events, these events can be 
attributed to the existence of human nature, which is incapable of 




If Plato feared anything, he feared the persuasiveness of the 
moral relativist, who would turn people away from truth. Rather than 
fear the historicist, however, Plato, no doubt, would pity him 
instead. Whereas relativism may be seen as the product of a sinister 
mind that would replace justice with the opinion held by the powerful 
man, historicism is the product of a mind insensitive to the natural 
order of things seen by Plato. Plato was the supreme anti- 
historicist. His theories cannot survive in an environment of 
historicism.
Historicism rises from an acceptance of value relativism. It 
paradigmatically competes with Platonism to explain human action. 
Positivism, on the other hand, can be seen as the result of the 
social scientist's shying away from consideration of the relative 
merits of absolutism versus relativism. The development of posi­
tivism in the nineteenth century, out of the fact-value distinction 
made by Hume (primarily) and others in the eighteenth century, arises 
from the desire to avoid the complications for science of the 
seemingly irreconcilable split between the absolutist's and rela­
tivist's visions of order. While it is true that some positivists, 
because of their implicit acceptance of value relativism, approach 
the fact-value and the is-ought distinctions with the dogmatic zeal 
of Protagoras, many positivists simply abstain from normative 
speculation from a sense of uncertainty concerning the validity of 
the notion that proper values are grounded in virtue itself.
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V. Positivism
Positivism has a methodological lock on economics and the
social sciences in general, that far exceeds the impact of
historicism, or even relativism. The positivists claim— that
description of what is is scientific and speculation as to what ought
to be is unscientific— is as widely accepted today as Friedman's
boast (that differences among economists are only differences in
subjective preferences) suggests.
Positivism began as a movement in the nineteenth century to
retheorize the social sciences. Implicit in this movement was the
desire on the part of some social scientists to adopt the methods of
the natural sciences as relevant criteria for judging hypotheses.
The culmination of positivism for social science is the development
59of wertfreiheit, called for by Weber.
Positivism as a methodology for the social sciences is rooted 
in an epistemology in which the existence of metaphysical Forms is 
not accepted. The positivist does not accept as valid the Platonic
claim that men can possess knowledge, true episteme, or Forms. The
tenets of positivism, as well as their implications for economics, 
can be seen in the work of Mises, especially in Theory and History. 
Mises notes:
Propositions asserting existence (affirmative existential 
propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential proposi­
tions) are descriptive. They assert something about the 
state of the whole universe or parts of the universe. With 
regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant.
They must not be confounded with judgments of value.
SQLeoni, p. 159.
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Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express
feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters 
them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of 
truth or falsity, ^ h e y  are ultimate and not subject to any 
proof or evidence.
In the statement above Mises clearly expresses the fact-value dis­
tinction that is integral to positivism. Concerning the nature of 
value judgments Mises goes on to note:
All judgments of value are personal and subjective. There 
are no judgments of value other than those asserting 1̂ 
prefer, I like better, 1̂ wish.
It cannot be denied by anybody that various individuals 
disagree widely with regard to their feelings, tastes, and 
preferences and that even the same individual at various 
instants of their lives value the same things in a different 
way. In view of this fact it is useless to talk about 
absolute and eternal values.
...What the theorem of the subjectivity of valuation
means is that there is no standard available which would 
enable us to reject any ultimate judgment of value as wrong, 
false, or erroneous in the way grj can reject an existential 
proposition as manifestly false.
What Mises means by the above is that science is not possible for the
realm of subjective valuation in the way that it is for existential
propositions. Mises' positivism thus betrays an underlying value
relativism. Mises' regard for valuation can be seen below:
Value is not intrinsic. It is not in things and condi­
tions but in the valuing subject. It is impossible to 
ascribe value to one thing or state of affairs only. 
Valuation invariably compass one thing or condition with 
another thing or condition.
Not only does Mises dismiss the possibility of intrinsic value,
but, in the statement above he also denies the existence of Forms,




preferring to consider virtues (values) as existing in the valuing 
subject. In establishing positivism as the methodological criterion 
for judging the scientific qualities of an hypothesis, Mises, like 
Weber before him, denies the possibility of conducting a scientific 
inquiry into values as endorsed by Plato.
Legal theorist Hans Kelsen echoes the positivism of Mises in 
What is Justice? Describing the problems associated with the con­
struction of a normative discipline Kelsen notes:
It is impossible to decide between...two conflicting 
judgments of value in a rational scientific way. It is, in 
the last instance, our feeling, our will, and not our reason; 
the emotional, and not the rational ̂ element of our con­
sciousness which decided this conflict.
Apparently, Kelsen and other positivists accept the distinction made
by Hume that values are not judged by the rational part of the mind.
Kelsen expands on this notion:
If a man has been made a slave or a prisoner in a Nazi 
concentration camp, and if it is impossible to escape, the 
question of whether suicide is justifiable in such a 
situation arises...The decision depends on the answer to the 
question of which is the higher value: life or freedom. If
life is the higher value, then suicide is not justifiable; if 
freedom is the higher value, if life without freedom is 
worthless, suicide is morally justified...Only a subjective 
answer is possible to this question, an answer valid only for 
judging subject; no objective statement, valid for everybody, 
as for,instance the statement that heat expands metallic 
bodies.
Positivism, as Friedman argues, is the standard methodology 
of modern economics. The validity of this statement can be seen in
Hans Kelsen, What is Justice? (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1957), p. 5.
64t. . jIbid.
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the survey of the literature of Platonic economics, in which the 
Platonic corpus is routinely dismissed as normative, and, therefore, 
unimportant. In the social sciences, however, there is a growing
dissatisfaction with wertfreiheit. Strauss and Voegelin in political 
science, Polanyi and Kuhn in the philosophy of science, and Diener
and Crandall in psychology and sociology have all questioned the
wertfrei nature of social science, and found that value-free social 
science is impossible. Economics, however, has been slow to question 
the validity of the positivistic epistemology. To be sure, the
neoclassical paradigm has its critics. One need witness only the 
fervor of the institutionalist or the Marxist to be convinced of 
this. These departures from orthodoxy, however, all retain a posi­
tivistic methodology.
In Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research, Edward Diener
and Rick Crandall characterize the positivistic image of modern 
65social science. They note:
The traditional image of science has been one of 
dedicated individuals seeking objective truth. When the term 
"value free" was applied to the social sciences it reflected 
the belief that scientists' values and personal opinions 
should not influence their scientific inquiry...The only 
values that were supposed to influence research were the 
scientific values placed on truth, objective methodology, and 
the open distribution of knowledge.
...Largely on the basis of philosophies such as logical 
positivism, scientists assumed that there was a material 
world "out there" with properties independent of the 
observers, and that the true properties of this world could 
be discovered by careful empirical research...Indeed, the 
logical positivists went even further in claiming that value 
statements were meaningless and therefore could not possibly
f. C
Edward Diener and Rick Crandall, Ethics in Social and 
Behavioral Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
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be a part of science...In conducting research and presenting 
findings, the c^dinal rule was, "Thou shalt not commit a 
value judgment."
The positivist's notion that all values are equal and, there­
fore, meaningless is fraught with intellectual problems. Plato was 
certainly aware of the logical problems that accompany an attempt to 
make science wertfrei— i.e., an attempt based upon the acceptance of 
value relativism. He argues against a value-free methodology in the 
Theaetetus where, as I have shown, Plato hypothesizes the existence 
of objective knowledge of values which is not mere perception.^ 
A few social scientists have picked-up on Plato's argument in 
an attempt to retheorize social science away from a positivistic
basis. Perhaps the most successful attempt to retheorize social
68science is Voegelin's The New Science of Politics. In this work
Voegelin characterizes the error of positivism saying:
The destruction worked by positivism is the consequence of 
two fundamental assumptions. In the first place, the 
splendid unfolding of the natural sciences was co-responsible 
with other factors for the assumption that the methods used 
in the mathematizing sciences of the external world were 
possessed of some inherent virtue and that all other sciences 
would achieve comparable success if they followed the example 
and accepted these methods. This belief by itself was a 
harmless idiosyncracy that would have died out when the 
enthusiastic admirers of the model method set to work in 
their own science and did not achieve the expected successes. 
It became dangerous because it combined with the second 
assumption that the methods of the natural sciences were a 
criterion for theoretical relevance in general. From the
66Ibid., pp. 181-182.
^Plato, "Theaetetus," in The Collected Dialogues, pp. 856-
870.
68Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1952).
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combination of the two assumptions followed the well-known 
series of assertions that a study of reality could qualify as
scientific only if it used the methods of the natural
sciences, that problems couched in other terms were illu- 
sionary problems, that in particular metaphysical questions 
which do not admit of answers by the methods of the sciences 
of phenomena should not be asked, that realms of being which 
are not accessible to exploration by the model methods were 
irrelevantggand in the extreme, that such realms of being did 
not exist.
Voegelin sees the culmination of the positivist movement in 
the work of Max Weber. According to Voegelin, "The movement of
methodology...ran to the end of its immanent logic in the person and
work of Max W e b e r . I n  Weber's work is also to be found the funda­
mental problem with positivism, as Voegelin sees it. Voegelin notes:
...Weber's work was ambiguous. He had reduced the 
principle of a value-free science ad absurdum. The idea of a 
value-free science whose object would be constituted by 
"reference to a value" could be realized only under the 
condition that a scientist was willing to decide on a "value" 
for reference. If the scientist refused to decide on a 
"value," if he treated all "values" as equal (as Max Weber 
did), if, moreover, he treated them as social facts among 
others— then there were no "values" left which could con­
stitute the object of science, because they had become part 
of the object itself. This abolition of the "values" as the 
constituents of science led to a theoretically impossible 
situation because the object of science has a "constitution" 
after all, that is, the essence toward which we are moving in 
our search for truth. Since the positivistic hangover, 
however, did not permit the admission of a science of 
essence, of a true episteme, the principles of order had to 
be introduced as historical facts. When Weber built the 
great edifice of his "sociology" (i.e., the positivistic 
escape from the science of order), he did not seriously 
consider all "values" as equal. He did not indulge in a 
worthless trash collection but displayed quite sensible 
preferences for phenomena that were "important" in the 




major civilizations and less important side developments and 
equally well between ’’world religions" and unimportant 
religious phenomena. In the absence of a reasoned principle 
of theoretization he let himself be guided not by "values" 
but by the -,̂ uctoritas majorum and his own sensitiveness for 
excellence.
Positivism, it seems, is undone by its systematic denial of "values" 
as a point of reference. Like relativism, positivism seems unable to 
survive with an absolute and unable to survive without an absolute.
Positivism, historicism, and relativism all fail to irrefuta­
bly disprove the possibility of ontology, which serves as the basis 
for Platonic absolutism. Relativism, we have seen, cannot live 
without an absolute reference, and it cannot admit the validity of 
such an absolute. Historicism denies the existence of a priori 
knowledge and of logos, each of which the nonexistence cannot be 
proven. Positivism fails for the reason that social science cannot 
be made wertfrei. Weber, the greatest spokesman for wertfreiheit, 
could not construct a social science without recourse to "values" as 
a reference. In spite of their popularity none of these ideologies 
succeeds in demonstrating that Platonic science is invalid by virtue 
of subjectivity.
VI. Nominalism
In the twentieth century, however, nominalism, an ideology 
that poses a serious threat to Plato's work, has become popular. 
Karl Popper, the leading proponent of nominalism, has openly 
condemned the work of Plato as being unimportant for modern social
71Ibid., pp. 20-21.
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science. Unlike positivism, historicism, or relativism nominalism
does not deny the existence of Platonic Forms. Instead, nominalism
opposes Platonism on essentially Aristotelean grounds. The
nominalist, like the Aristotelean, may or may not doubt the existence
of Forms, but, in any case, would not find an inquiry into the nature
72of Forms interesting.
So openly hostile is Popperian nominalism toward Platonic
philosophy, that Wild claims Popper's The Open Society and Its
Enemies to be the "most extreme and pretentious anti-Platonic tract
73to be penned in recent times." Popper accuses Plato of being an 
historicist. He elevates Plato's theory of the development of 
tyranny, from the gradual decay and deterioration of aristocracy, to 
make it Plato's chief contribution to social science. This evolu­
tionary theory of regimes is, Popper claims, the mark of an 
historicist. Popper regards historicists with an attitude of "frank 
hostility.
Popper is an anti-Platonist. He accuses Plato of having 
subverted the teachings of Socrates, who was, in Popper's opinion, 
the first positivist. According to Popper, Socrates' successor was 
not Plato, but Antisthenes. Plato, he says, "was soon to prove 
the least faithful. He betrayed Socrates, just as his uncles had
72K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: 




done."7'* Popper refers to Plato's uncles Critias, the leader of the
Thirty Tyrants of Athens, and Charmides, Critias1 chief lieutenant.
Popper's intention in writing about Plato is to undo the "spell of
Plato." He says:
Although I admire much in Plato's philosophy, far beyond 
those parts which I believe to be Socratic, I do not take it 
as my task to add to the countless tributes to his genius. I 
am, rather, bent on destroying what is in my opinion mis­
chievous in his philosophy.
To understand Popper's hostility toward Plato one must under­
stand Popper's own philosophy and its positivistic and historicist 
roots. Like Friedman, Mises, and others Popper holds fast to the 
central theme of modern social science— the belief that values are 
not the subject of science. In a statement supporting positivism, 
Popper rivals Friedman in the conviction of his endorsement of 
positivism when he notes:
it is impossible to derive a sentence stating a norm or a 
decision or, say, a proposal for a policy from a sentence 
stating a fact; that is only another way of saying that it 
is impossible to derive norms or decisions or proposals from 
facts.
By adopting nominalism as the proper methodology for social science, 
Popper accepts the fact-value distinction commonly made by rela­
tivists and historicists. The subject of science, Popper says, 





virtues "are not to be found in nature." Men introduce morals and
virtues into the natural world. Popper notes:
Nature consists of facts and or regularities, and is in
itself neither moral nor immoral. It is we who impose our 
standards upon nature, and who in this way introduce morals 
into the natural world, in spite of the fact that we are part 
of this world.
Popper, unlike the historicists, believes in the existence of an 
underlying order to the things of nature. He shares with the his­
toricists, however, the belief that virtue is unnatural. Such a
belief precludes ontology as conceived by Plato. Since Platonic 
science is grounded in the possibility of ontology, Popper's denial 
of the participation of Platonic Forms or Ideas in nature rejects the 
validity of Plato's social science.
Popper's attack on Plato goes beyond Plato's supposed his­
toricism. Popper is one of the most articulate defenders of modern 
liberalism. He supports the notion that democracy is the best 
regime, contrary to Plato. He thus defends the open society which he 
says Plato attacks. According to Popper, Plato would restore a 
closed society— a regime that perpetuates inequality and takes from 
individuals the right to make meaningful decisions about their lives. 
Popper sees Protagoras, Socrates' nemesis, as the great defender of 
the open, or democratic society. This places him in the long line of 
defenders of liberalism who, as Berlin and Strauss claim, observe 
liberty to be negative freedom or "freedom from." Plato was a 
liberal in the sense that he believed in liberty as a "freedom for"
78Ibid., p. 61.
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something— specifically freedom for the ability to choose happiness 
over unhappiness. The claim made by Popper that Plato, by virtue of 
his advocacy of aristocracy, was a totalitarian and, thus, an enemy 
of the open society does not do justice to Plato's liberalism.
Plato endorsed liberty as a virtue. Liberty in this sense 
was not freedom to do what one pleases. That type of freedom Plato 
associates with licentiousness. That Plato would not endorse 
Popper's liberalism, however, derives from Plato's belief that 
liberty was not synonymous with virtue itself. For Plato moral 
virtues like liberty, honor, and liberality are subordinate to the 
Form of goodness itself— the agathon. Plato's criticism of democracy 
as an undesirable regime is due to his understanding that "freedom 
from" coercion, which breeds freedom to follow the pull of appetitive 
urges, is inconsistent with true happiness. This belief, moreover, 
is the result of Plato's investigation of virtue; it is not intended 
to be interpreted as equal to common opinion, which is the product of 
sensation rather than intellection.
Wild criticizes Popper for his interpretation of Plato as 
being a totalitarian historicist. Unlike Popper, Wild views Plato's 
philosophy to be grounded in the science of nature. He says:
Plato leaves us in no doubt as to where he stands as a 
moral thinker. Not only does he develop a clearly articu­
lated system of moral principles based upon a coherent view 
of the nature of man, but he also gives us a moving picture 
of Socrates, the concrete embodiment of his ethical 
principles, the moral man in action. In contrast to 
influential modern views which base moral values on arbitrary 
preferences or self-imposed maxims, Plato's ethics is founded 
on the nature of men and the nature of things. Modern 
ethical discussion is abstract and theoretical, remaining 
aloof from any concrete consideration of the moral virtues
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and the exigencies of everyday life. Plato's ethics embraces 
a description of the human virtues in the concrete, as well 
as a more abstract attempt to found them on the laws of human 
nature.
Wild next points out the modern reader's dissatisfaction with Plato's 
theory of human nature, noting:
To the modern mind this conveys an impression of over­
weening dogmatism, one of the commonest charges made against 
Plato by almost all of his modern enemies. Thus Popper 
believes that Plato's ethical system, with its anthro­
pological and metaphysical substratum, is a dogmatic 
authoriggrianism which blasphemes the memory of his doubting 
master.
Plato's theory of human nature is the product of what Plato
thought to be scientific investigation. Popper, who believes that
science should not attempt to uncover essences, has a different
understanding of science. Like other modern thinkers Popper
restricts science to exclude "any attempt to gain clarity about the
81meaning of...'knowledge,' 'good,' 'man,' 'virtue,' etc." Wild 
explains the difference between Plato's and Popper's concepts of 
science noting:
By science Plato means not merely what Popper means, but 
philosophic science as well— the science of knowledge, 
ethics, and being. By reason he means not merely the logical 
and experimental processes by which the different restricted 
sciences gain control over, and a certain amount of theoreti­
cal insight into, the processes of ^vjbhuman nature, but 
philosophical and moral insight as well.
79Wild, p. 10. 
80Ibid..
81Ibid., p. 35. 
8^Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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The difference between Plato's and Popper's science to which
Wild refers can be traced to the fundamental ontological and
epistemological changes in Western thought that have occurred since 
the Englightenment, which culminate in the widespread acceptance of 
the fact-value distinction in twentieth century social science.
Wild, too, emphasizes these changes and focuses on problems for
social science created by the fact-value distinction. He claims that 
Plato's epistemology was based upon an ancient notion of natural law 
that is not supported today. Wild notes:
The theory of natural law...presupposes certain realistic 
epistemological principles. It implies that nature is an 
ordered set of traits possessed in common by every human 
individual and essential to his being. This is inconsistent 
with nominalism. It also implies the capacity of human 
reason to apprehend this essential common structure and the 
perfective tendencies characteristic of the human species.
When so understood and expressed in universal propositions, 
these tendencies are norms or moral laws. This realistic 
doctrine is inconsistent with any view which would regard 
norms as separated frogî  existent fact or as arbitrary con­
structions made by man.
Wild goes on to clearly recapitulate the characteristics of the
modern fact-value distinction, noting:
Such a separation of fact from value has dominated the 
whole course of modern ethical theory. Being has been 
thought of as the realm of fully actual atomic fact with 
value as an extraneous realm of norms. The is is not what 
ought to be, the ought jjs not the is, and there is no natural 
bridge between the two.
^Ibid., p. 66.
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Within the context of the fact-value distinction that is fundamental 
to positivism, relativism, historicism, and nominalism, Platonic 
investigation of virtues is deemed unscientific.
Acceptance of the fact-value distinction by modern econ­
omists, which is rooted in a sense of doubt as to the verifiability 
of the existence of Forms, does not preclude the validity of Platonic 
science. Plato's theory of Forms is not susceptible to being dis- 
proven, by virtue of the fact that Forms are not the objects of 
immanent experience. Man, in Plato's theory of being, lives in the 
realm of an "in-between" reality— the metaxy; he neither is nor is 
not. It is not possible, if this theory is correct, for man to 
empirically investigate the things that are— ta onta. Forms are the 
object of intellection. For the conscious mind that is not attuned 
to the existence of Forms, i.e., has not undergone the periagoge, 
Plato's ontology must always be met with skepticism.
Socratic skepticism need not, however, be taken to the 
extreme of the Cartesian maxim that things that are not immediately 
verifiable must be rejected almost as false. Descartes' rejection of 
classical philosophy was hypothetical— it enabled him to begin 
science anew; it was not intended as a methodological validation of 
modern positivism and nominalism. Descartes' "razor" has been per­
verted, however. Instead of building a scientific theory from the 
first assumption that it is safer to treat concepts that are not 
immediately verifiable as false, than to tacitly accept them, the 
modern social scientist vigorously proclaims such concepts to be 
false.
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The "isms" of modern social science all suffer from the same 
tendency to modify a guideline— Cartesian doubt— and make it into an 
absolute. Protagoras, who could not prove the superiority of one 
virtue over another, responded by making absolute the statement that 
all values are equal, which follows from "Of all things man is the 
measure." Historicists, who do not see the logos claimed by Plato to 
underlie human action, give history itself a theoretical significance 
by default. Positivists approach the uncertainty that surrounds any 
theory the subject of which is not the province of immanent 
experience by restricting science to only objective description. Not 
content they then hold forth with the absolute pronouncement that 
virtues are unscientific. Finally, Popper and other nominalists, 
when confronted with the Cartesian problem of verifying ethical 
theory, claim that definition is unimportant when compared with 
nominalistic concepts because, presumably, a physical scientist would 
not ask the question "ti esti?"
This is scientism. Moreover, it is a misapplication of the 
procedures of physical science to refrain from the question "what is 
it?" Physical scientists surely ask this question with great 
frequency. It is understandable, however, that social scientists shy 
away from theories for which the modern scientific method is 
inequipped to judge. Yet, it is inexcusable to arbitrarily pronounce 
such theories invalid. Economist Sidney S. Alexander lodges this 
complaint in his essay "Human Values and Economists' Values." Noting 
that "economics is not almost as 'value-free' as its practitioners 
can make it," Alexander argues that one "can talk about values in a
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sensible, hardheaded way." Unlike most economists Alexander 
believes in the possibility of normative science.
Alexander terms the tendency for the modern economist to 
accept that values are indisputable for Fallacy of Misplaced Values. 
He notes:
As Professor Friedman's remarks have illustrated, econ­
omists generally regard value judgments as essentially 
personal and irreconcilable...among social scientists there 
is widespread acceptance of the belief that values are 
indiscutable (sic). Non disputandum has, in the social 
studies, been raised to the position of a first principle.
The pernicious effects of this belief, or in my opinion, this 
error, are seriously compounded by a widespread mistake that 
may be called the Fallacy of Misplaced Values.
By misplaced values Alexander means the acceptance within methodology
of some values and the rejection of others by economists. Alexander
points out that economics has not been made wertfrei. According to
him norms still exist in economics, although they are frequently not
recognized as such. He notes:
The one first-level norm, as distinguished from such 
higher level, methodological, norms as the exclusion of value 
judgments, that still survives in economics is regarded as so 
obvious as hardly to be normative at all, and so it is exempt 
from the test of operational verification. That norm is 
sometimes referred to as the pig principle, that if you like 
something, more is better. Its corollary is the ethical 
value of efficiency— the only first-level ethical value 
normally admitted into economic discourse. Whatever you 
want, it is argued, you can have more of it if you respect 
the dictates of efficiency. As Professor Boulding says, 
even the heroic must come to terms with economic scarcity,
OC
Sidney S. Alexander, "Human Values and Economists' Values," 
in Human Values and Economic Policy, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New
York University Press, 1967), p. 102.
86Ibid., p. 105.
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so to the Kwakiutl the economist can say, in the spirit of
Edwin Cannan's precis of Lionel Robbins, "Burn down your
house ifR ŷou want to, but mind you, don't use too many
matches."
Alexander argues that it is naive of economists to uncriti­
cally accept these norms as scientifically objective while they 
dispute the validity of others. In a gesture uncharacteristic of the 
modern economist Alexander suggests that questions involving judg­
ments of interpersonal validity of values can be resolved 
scientifically. He claims:
The best way we have of settling such questions...still seems 
to be the Socratic dialectic, the bringing to bear on the
issue whatever we believe that appears to be relevant, and 
considering the joint implication for this question of those 
things we believe. This procedure can claim to be rational, 
even though not operational, and beliefs that emerge from 
this process are worthy of being designated as knowledge 
achieved by rational inquiry. No argument to the contrary 
can reasonably be based on other than normative principles, 
and it is hard to see how that higher-level argument could 
reasonably be conducted except within the framework of the 
dialectic.
The Socratic notion that men can sensibly discuss norma­
tive issues, that they can devise impersonal means, if not of 
verification, at least of evaluation of normative judgments, 
that they can cooperate in progressive rational inquiry 
directed toward making those judgments soundly, is still 
worthy °fgg consideration even by hardheaded social 
scientists.
Plato's normative concept of economics is scientific, 
especially within the context of ancient ontology and epistemology. 
Plato's economics is an attempt to answer the question "What can be 
done economically that can make men happy?" His discussions of the 




of the division of labor are all theories that hypothesize how men
might be made happy. This science uncovers objective truth, although
it does not do so objectively— the dialectic is personal and does not
demonstrate truth to the many in the manner of a persuasive speech.
Schumpeter defines science as "any kind of knowledge that has
been the object of conscious efforts to improve it." He expands upon
this notion, saying that "science is refined common sense; science is
tooled knowledge." Finally, he notes: "a science is any field of
knowledge that has developed specialized techniques of fact-finding
89and of interpretation or inference (analysis)." Plato's inquiry
into virtue as it applies to questions of economy satisfies all of
Schumpeter's criteria for science. The dialogues are clearly
conscious attempts by Plato to improve upon opinion concerning
virtue; they represent tooled knowledge. The dialectic technique of
discourse was specifically developed as a special fact-finding
technique. It is, as Alexander points out, the fact-finding
technique appropriate for questions about normative concepts.
Schumpeter warns the economist against excluding from science
examples of tooled knowledge that do not obtain from modern
standards. He says, "The exclusion of any kind of tooled knowledge
would amount to declaring our own standards to be absolutely valid
90for all times and places. But this we cannot do." In this spirit 
89Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p . 7.
90Ibid., p. 8.
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the modern economist should not overlook, as Schumpeter himself does,
the contributions to economics made by Plato. Political philosopher
Hans Jonas claims that ancient normative science does not appeal to
the modern mind because of an "ontological reduction" that has
91occurred since the seventeenth century. The ontological reduction 
to which he refers consists of the abandonment of the theory of 
Forms, which are not the subject of empirical verification. The 
modern denial of the validity of ancient ontology is an attempt to 
declare our own standards to be absolutely valid for all times and 
places. This declaration cannot philosophically be made on the basis 
of any of the "isms" that motivate modern economists; Platonic 
economics cannot be arbitrarily relegated to the realm of mere 
thought.
Plato's conception of economics, to which this dissertation 
now turns, can be explained simply enough. Plato reasoned that all 
men desire to be happy. Further, he judged that men can be truly 
happy only insofar as their temperaments will permit them to know 
what happiness truly is; thus, some men will be happier than others. 
Based upon his theories of being and knowledge Plato next reasoned 
that men must strive to know what happiness itself is. Pending the 
definition of happiness, according to Plato, is the attempt to 
identify how it may be fostered through economic means.
91Hans Jonas, "The Practical Uses of Theory," in Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences, ed. Maurice Natanson (New York: Random
House, 1963), p. 132.
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Plato's welfare analysis can be demonstrated to be consistent 
with his definition of happiness and with his understanding of human 
nature, each of which Plato investigated scientifically. That this 
analysis is not the product of application of the pig principle to 
Plato's given ends of economic action— that it is not standard 
analysis in the modern sense— is not grounds for its dismissal. 
Rather, Plato's welfare economics is a competing theory with Pareto 
optimality. This claim will be examined in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 3
PLATONIC ECONOMIC THEORY: THE VIRTUE OF MODERATION
Plato aimed, I have argued, at the discovery of objective, 
positive knowledge concerning the happiness of men. That his inquiry 
is subjective— that it does not conform to the methods of con­
temporary scientific investigation— is not, I claim, sufficient 
reason for labelling it pre-scientific. Plato's method of investiga­
tion, the dialectic, was never intended by Plato to have the broad 
appeal of the sophistic demonstration, which was the popular form of 
argumentation in Plato's day. Demonstration— the attempt to sway 
public opinion through the public presentation of persuasive speeches 
that argue the speakers point of view— is incompatible with Plato's 
epistemology, which holds that knowledge is attained through active 
introspection, not through passive listening. According to Plato, 
discovery of knowledge of real, intelligible phenomena— ta onta—  
requires noetic reasoning of the student. This process was lacking 
in demonstration— it did not extract the level of participation 
necessary for the discovery of knowledge. The dialectic was used by 
Plato to analyze intelligible rather than sensible phenomena. Since 
the intelligibles are reasoned rather than sensed the dialectic must 




Plato's interest in economics, like his interest in all 
social science, evolved from his desire to understand the nature and 
causes of happiness. The reorganization of the Hellenic economy 
called for in his dialogues logically obtains from Plato's investiga­
tion of happiness and its fulfillment in the human soul. The 
economic prescriptions that one finds in the dialogues, especially in 
the Laws, are propositions of welfare economics— they are designed to 
promote welfare by making men happy. Of his legal prescriptions 
Plato says "[t]hey are correct laws, laws that make those who use 
them happy.
I. A Review of Welfare Theory
The normative content of Plato's welfare theory is seemingly 
inconsistent with the development of a contemporary theory of 
economic welfare. Contemporary welfare economics, however, has 
developed to a point where the necessity of merging a normative 
analysis of distribution with the positive analysis of production is 
generally conceded. In order to appreciate the usefulness of Plato's 
welfare theory for today it is useful to recall the stages of 
development of welfare economics that have emerged during the last 
two hundred years.
Welfare economics has come full cycle in the two centuries 
since the first printing of Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legis­
lation. In its infancy welfare economics was neither value-free nor
■'"Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L. Pangle 
(New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 10.
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capable of being generalized. The welfare theory of the Classical
period gave way to the "new" welfare theory, which originated with
the writings of Pareto and the economists of the Cambridge school.
During this phase of development welfare economics was envisioned as
a value-free theory deduced from propositions of production. Bergson
was correct, however, in pointing out that Paretian and Cambridge
school welfare analyses require that the economist make value
judgments concerning the characteristics of a social utility 
2function. More recently, welfare economics has developed along the
lines suggested by Bergson— it is now a mixture of the positive
analysis of production with the normative analysis of distribution.
Bentham's Principles is generally accepted as being the first
formal treatise on welfare economics. It is heavily laden with
Bentham's value assumptions concerning the principle of utility,
which recognizes the sensations pleasure and plain as the proximate
causes of human action. Principles also relies on the presumed
validity of Bentham's value assumptions concerning the maximization
of social welfare. The following passage from Principles of Morals
and Legislation illustrates Bentham's principle of utility:
To a number of persons, with reference to each whom the value 
of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or 
less, according to seven circumstances: to wit...
1. Its intensity.
2. Its duration.
3. Its certainty or uncertainty.
2Abram Bergson, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of 
Welfare Economics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52 (1938), 
310-334; reprinted in A.E.A. Readings in Welfare Economics, ed. 
Kenneth J. Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, 1969), pp. 7-25.
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4. Its propinquity or remoteness.
5. Its fecundity.
6. Its purity.
And one other; to wit:
7. Its extent; that is, the number of persons to whom it
extends; or (in other words) who are affected by it.
The seven qualities of pleasures and pains mentioned above, Bentham
thought, governed a society's welfare. Measurement of that society's
welfare, Bentham suggested, could be achieved by following the
following guidelines:
To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any 
act, by which the interests of a community are affected, 
proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose 
interests seem most immediately to be affected by it: and
take an account,
1. Of the value of each distinguishable pleasure which
appears to be produced by it in the first instance.
2. Of the value of each pain which appears to be pro­
duced by it in the first instance.
3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be
produced by it after the first. This constitutes the 
fecundity of the first pleasure and the impurity of the first 
Eiin-
4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be pro­
duced by it after the first. This constitutes the fecundity 
of the first pain, and the impurity of the first pleasure.
5. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one 
side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, 
if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency 
of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of 
that individual person; if on the side of the pain, the bad 
tendency of it upon the whole.
6. Take an account of the number of persons whose 
interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above pro­
cess with respect to each. Sum up the numbers expressive of 
the degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with respect 
to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is 
good upon the whole: do this again with respect to each
individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon 
the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in
3Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, in The Utilitarians (1789; rpt. Garden City: Anchor
Press, 1973), p. 38.
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regard to whom the tendency of it is bad upon the whole.
Take the balance; which, if on the side of pleasure, will 
give the general good tendency of the act, with respect to 
the total number of community of individuals concerned; if on 
the side of pain, ^he general evil tendency, with respect to 
the same community.
The value judgments implicit in Bentham's claims are obvious. First,
Bentham equates pleasure with the good and pain with the bad.
Second, Bentham suggests that all individuals in an economy have
equal affinities for pleasure and pain. This point is clear from
Bentham's claim that social welfare is equal to the unweighted sum of
individual levels of welfare. It is an egalitarian's view of social
welfare, which avoids the problem of interpersonal comparisons of
welfare. Bentham's welfare theory is not wertfrei.
Mill also recognized the necessity of introducing value 
judgments into the discussion of the theory of distribution. In 
Principles of Political Economy Mill distinguishes between the posi­
tive theory of production and the normative theory of distribution.^ 
The structure of Principles illustrates this distinction: Books I
through III, which many economists consider an example of nineteenth 
century positive analysis, analyze the science of efficient produc­
tion, whereas Books IV and V, long considered to be normative, are 
devoted to, amongst other things, an analysis of the stationary state.
In spite of attempts to develop a positive analysis of 
distribution, modern welfare theory— the so-called 'new' welfare
^Ibid., pp. 38-39.
^John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 2 vols., 
Revised ed. (New York: The Colonial Press, 1899), I, p. 22.
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economics— remains subjective. The 'new' welfare economics has its 
origins in the writings of Pareto. Pareto first theorized the condi­
tions necessary for equilibrium resulting from exchange betweeen
£
economic agents in his Manual of Political Economy. Although 
Pareto's welfare theory is not subjective, it is not conclusive 
either; and, it established the tack of the subjective analyses that 
followed its publication.
Pareto hypothesized that two individuals would trade freely 
so long as they experienced different rates of weighted elementary 
ophelimity (the term corresponds to the ratio of an individual's 
marginal utility from a commodity divided by the commodity's price—  
and so long as neither party would be injured, i.e., lose ophelimity, 
by trade). These equilibrium conditions are those associated with the 
now-famous Paretian equilibrium. Pareto suggested that people will 
trade commodities and services until the ratio of their marginal 
rates of substitution were equal to price ratios for the goods 
exchanged. While this notion of an exchange equilibrium is useful, 
it remains ambiguous. Because Pareto refused to make interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, one cannot determine by the existence of a 
Paretian equilibrium whether or not social welfare is being 
maximized. Pareto simply defined an exchange equilibrium which is 
one of an infinite number of possible, non-comparable equilibrium
^Vilfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, trans. Ann A. 
Schwier (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1971).
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points. These points are associated with F. Y. Edgeworth's exchange 
line or contract curved
Much of the 'new' welfare theory is devoted to extending the 
range of usefulness of the Paretian concepts of exchange equilibrium. 
The works of Barone, Bergson, Lerner, Hicks, Kaldor, Scitovsky, and 
Little attempt, to various degrees, to come to grips with the problem 
of comparability of exchange equilibria. As early as 1908 Barone 
suggested the principle of compensation as a method of comparing
g
exchange equilibria. Later, Hicks and Kaldor rediscovered the
9compensation principle in separate articles.
Under the principle of compensation movement from one equi­
librium point to another distribution would be acclaimed an 
improvement in welfare if individuals gaining under the change could 
compensate losers adequately for accepting change. None of the 
writers suggested that compensation actually be paid— a redistribu­
tion of wealth would improve welfare so long as the compensation 
could be made.
Blaug points out the primary weakness of the potential 
compensation rule. If compensation is not actually paid, Blaug
^Ibid., p. 262.
g
Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect, 3rd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 621.
Q
Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions in Economics and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal, 49 (1939), 
549-552, reprinted in A.E.A. Readings in Welfare Economics, pp. 
387-389; J. R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Eco­
nomic Journal, 49 (1939), pp. 696-712.
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contends, one implicitly accepts the prevailing distribution of 
income as
a measure of the relative strength of feeling of gainers and 
losers...[one] presum[es] to know something about the indi­
vidual preference pattersn ( sic) without observing the 
behaviour that corresponds to^it, and this is an inter­
personal comparison of utility.
Blaug continues:
If we seriously believe that principles of income distribu­
tion cannot be deduced from the utility calculus by rules of 
logic, we must confess ourselves agnostic about situations in 
which compensation is only potentially feasible. It may well 
be that a good case can be made for failing to pay compensa­
tion, but such a case must rest on a 'normative' choice about 
income distribution, -̂ -pot on the 'positive' grounds of 
allocative efficiency.
Scitovsky attempted to overcome the limits of the compensa­
tion method by adding to it a second criterion. In "A Note on 
Welfare Propositions in Economics," Scitovsky argues that the com­
pensation principle is "asymmetrical." The principle, he claims,
"attributes undue importance to the particular distribution of
12welfare obtaining before the contemplated change." Scitovsky gives 




12Tibor Scitovsky, "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Eco­
nomics," The Review of Economic Studies, 9 (1941), 77-88, reprinted 
in A.E.A. Readings in Welfare Economics, p. 400.
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...imagine a change, say the imposition of a duty on imports, 
that brings the welfare of A and B from P-̂  [Figure 1] on the 
contract curve of diagram 1 onto TL on the contract curve of 
diagram 2. According to Mr. Kaldor's test this change is 
desirable, because by redistributing income we could travel 






But once the tariff has been imposed and situation n„ 
established, it will be free trade and the resulting 
(original) situation that will appear preferable by the 
same test, because starting from P,, income could be so 
redistributed (travelling along the PP curve in the first 
diagram this time) as to reach P2 , which is superior to
Because the two situations shown in Scitovsky's example are shown, by
the same test, to be preferable, Scitovsky appropriately rules the
test invalid. He improves on the welfare test by adding a second
test:
We must first see whether it is possible in the new situation 
so to redistribute income so as to make everybody better off 
than he was in the initial situation; secondly, we must see 
whether starting from the initial situation it is not 
possible by a mere redistribution of income to reach a posi­
tion superior ̂ o the new situation, again from everybody's 
point of view.
What Scitovsky requires is that a movement from one distribution to a 
second distribution constitutes an improvement in welfare according 
to the Hicks-Kaldor rule, while movement back to the first point is
not an improvement, according to the same test.
Even Scitovsky's double-criterion fails to produce a positive
theory of distribution. In his critique of the double-criterion
Blaug clearly points out the chief disadvantage of the Scitovsky
test. "It is," says Blaug,
...that the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, whether applied once or 
twice, accepts A's and B's estimates of the amount of the 
compensation payments, and this is tantamount to accepting 
the distribution of income that produced these estimates.




judment ( sic) as the ̂ demand for a radical change in the
distribution of income.
Blaug contends that this normative judgment is the strongest of all
interpersonal comparisons of utility.
More recently, Little, Samuelson, and Harsanyi are reconciled 
to the fact that the analysis of distribution is inherently norma­
tive. They restate Bergson's critique of the early efforts in the 
'new' welfare economics. Bergson's criticism follows:
In my opinion the utility calculus introduced by the
Cambridge economists is not a useful tool for welfare econ­
omies. The approach does not provide an alternative to the 
introduction of value judgments...[T]he comparison of the
utilities of different individuals must involve an evaluation 
of the relative economic positions of these individuals. No 
extension of the methods of measuring utilities will dispense 
with the necessity for the introduction of Y§^ue propositions 
to give these utilities a common dimension.
Little also notes the ethical nature of the New Welfare
Theory. He claims that "Economists have used no methods of
scientific research in arriving at their conclusions about economic
welfare; and since there are no methods of scientific research
17involved there can be no methodology." Little continues:
Welfare economics and ethics cannot, then, be separated.
They are inseparable because the welfare terminology is a 
value terminology. It may be suggested that welfare econ­
omists could be purged by the strict use of a technical
terminology, which, in ordinary speech, had not value 
implications. The answer is that it could be, but it would 
no longer be welfare economics. It would then consist of an
■^Blaug, pp. 624-625. 
■^Bergson, p. 20.
17I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics, 2nd ed. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1957J7 P- 1*
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uninterpreted system of logical deductions, which would not 
be about anything at all, let alone welfare...Getting rid of 
value judgments would be throwing the baby away with the 
bathwater.
Samuelson not only recognizes the value-laden nature of
welfare economics. He defends, in limited fashion, the co-mingling
of ethics and economics in welfare theory, noting:
It is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to examine 
the consequences of various value judgments, whether or not 
they are shared by the theorist, just as the study of com­
parative ethics is itself a science like any other branch of 
anthropology...In saying this, I do not mean to imply that 
the field of welfare economics has scientific content because 
a number of its theorems do not require inter-personal com­
parisons of utility; this after all is a mere detail. That 
part which does involve inter-personal comparisons of utility 
also has real content and interest for the scientific 
analyst, even though the scientist does not consider it any 
part of his tack to reduce or verify (except on the anthro­
pological ]j&vel) the value judgments whose implications he 
grinds out.
Unlike other economists of the 'new' school of welfare 
economics, Harsanyi recognizes and embraces the subjective-normative 
nature of the analysis of distribution. He accepts the claims of 
Little and Blaug that distribution analysis cannot produce an 
unambiguous welfare maximum without resorting to interpersonal com­
parisons of individual levels of wellbeing. Harsanyi's addition to 
the theory of distribution is his endorsement of such comparisons. 
He contends that economic agents routinely engage in making inter­
personal comparisons of utility during the course of routine 
decision-making involving economic choices. So long as the value
18Ibid., pp. 79-80.
19Paul Anthony Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 220.
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judgments concerning interpersonal comparisons are based upon common
standards of ethics, Harsanyi argues, they are not out of place in
20modern distribution analysis.
Unless one is content to limit welfare economics to questions
concerning efficient production, it seems that it is necessary to
introduce to welfare theory some method of systematically analyzing
normative issues. Of course, some economists would indeed refrain
from analyzing distribution altogether. Pigou, Kaldor argues,
21encouraged this practice. More recently, Kaldor himself has
endorsed limiting welfare theory to the theory of production. Kaldor
has argued that only the analysis of production is important in
modern welfare analysis— that it is "far the more important part,"
and "should include all those propositions for increasing social
22welfare which relate to the increase in aggregate production..." 
Koopmans has also argued that welfare economics can be divided 
according to Mill's and Pigou's schemes, with the efficient alloca­
tion of resources in production assuming the role of importance in
23the economist's analysis.
20J. C. Harsanyi, "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics 
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," in Economic Justice, ed. 
Edmund S. Phelps (Baltimore: Penguin Education, 1973Tj P*~ 267.
^Kaldor, p. 389.
22t , . ,Ibid.
O O
Tjalling C. Koopmans, "Efficient Allocation of Resources," 
Econometrica, 21 (1951), 455-465, reprinted in Readings in Micro­
economics , ed. William Breit and Harold M. Hochman (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 414-422.
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If one assumes that Little, Samuelson, and Harsanyi are 
correct in encouraging economists to analyze the problem of finding 
the welfare maximizing distribution of wealth, it then becomes 
necessary to resort to subjective analysis. Plato's methodology was
developed to enable the scientist to investigate rationally the
qualities of subjectively perceived intelligible phenomena. Since 
distribution analysis requires that the economist make judgments
concerning the welfare-promoting tendencies of economic changes, 
welfare economics must contain propositions that are reasoned rather 
than sensed. The notion of social welfare is itself a rational 
concept. Plato used the dialectic to systematically test proposi­
tions concerning intelligible, rational phenomena.
II. Plato's Welfare Theory
Plato's welfare theory, which has heretofore been treated as
proto-science, can be understood as a dialectical inquiry into the
nature and causes of happiness. Plato assumed as self-evident that
2 Aman desires happiness. In order that one might discover the 
organization of the economy which best promotes social welfare qua 
happiness, Plato would insist that one must first possess some 
knowledge of the nature of happiness itself. Acquisition of
knowledge of the nature and causes of happiness thus becomes the 
principal goal of Platonic welfare analysis. Only with a working 
definition of happiness in hand does Plato proceed to the 
interesting questions of which organizations of productive factors
0 APlato, "Symposium," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 557.
146
and distributions of wealth within an economy promote welfare.
Plato's methodology, constructed along the lines of ancient science,
is useful for today because it enables the social scientist to
consider not only productive efficiency, which comprises the efforts
made under the aegis of the "new" welfare theory, but also to analyze
desirable distributions of wealth.
Plato's investigation of the nature of welfare led him to
conclude that the best economic state is one in which each individual
would be encouraged to work and behave in a virtuous manner, and in a
way consistent with the requirements of his temperament. Evidence of
this view can be found in the Republic. In Book II Plato writes,
"more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man
performs one task according to his nature at the right moment, and at
25leisure from other occupations." From Book IV:
citizens...must be sent to the task for which their natures 
were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them 
fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and 
so the^entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a 
unity.
Plato's theory of welfare is not limited to a discussion of a 
psychological division of labor, however. His theory, as it appears 
in the Laws and elsewhere, can be divided into four areas of investi­
gation: (1) the analysis of the Good, (2) the investigation of the
happy, virtuous life, in which the individual possesses knowledge of 
the Good, (3) the effects of a psychological division of labor, and
2^Plato, "Republic," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 616.
26Ibid., p. 665.
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(4) the description of the organization of the economy that best 
fosters virtue and happiness. Plato's conclusions from these areas 
of research are captured in the following theory of welfare: men can
be truly happy only if they possess knowledge of the Good and behave 
in a just, virtuous way. Virtuous behavior requires that the 
individual behave in a just, honest, truthful, and temperate fashion, 
and that the individual uses wealth liberally.
This does not imply that Plato envisioned all members of 
society marching in lockstep to the same psychological cadence. 
Plato understood that the concept of virtuous behavior for the 
individual depends upon which part of the soul dominates a person's 
character. The souls of men are, according to Plato, fashioned in 
varying proportions. In some, the rational part dominates the honor- 
loving and appetitive parts of the soul. More frequently, however, 
the appetitive part of the soul rules one's consciousness. Plato's 
welfare theory is conditioned by his theory of the soul— he believed 
that the degree of a man's happiness depended upon his soul's ability 
to discover knowledge of happiness. For the many, ruled as they are 
by passions and appetites, happiness would obtain from leading a 
virtuous life which is defined as a temperate or moderate life. 
According to Plato, the ordinary man is most likely to be happy if he 
works at a job which best suits his temperament and if he behaves 
temperately. The best state would thus be one in which virtuous 
behavior, and especially moderation of appetities, is best achieved.
Welfare economics is a controversial area of research in 
economics. The ethical and psychological roots of welfare analysis
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no doubt account for much of this controversy. That economists have 
not generally agreed upon a definition of welfare economics--some 
claim it to be the analysis of the efficiency attained with 
alternative organizations of productive factors, while others argue 
that it is the analysis of social utility maximization— attests 
to the extent of this controversy.
Welfare economics has as its aim the discovery of those 
economic conditions that affect or promote the welfare of a com­
munity. It is the investigation of the economic causes of happiness, 
and, in particular, the ways in which the production and exchange of 
commodities, services, and money in markets affect the welfare of the 
agents of the economy. Also important to the study of welfare 
economics is the investigation of the labor versus leisure decisions 
of economic agents and the effects of changes in work effort on 
social welfare.
III. Plato's Analysis of the Good
Plato's welfare analysis comprises all the areas of topical 
coverage that are mentioned above. It begins with a detailed inquiry 
of the nature of happiness (eudaemonia), which is closely related to 
the Good (agathon). This inquiry leads to the development of Plato's 
theory of knowledge (episteme), and culminates in the economical and 
political prescriptions of his mature works, especially the Laws. 
Although some controversy still exists concerning the aim of Plato's 
dialogues— some interpreters emphasize Plato's systematic philosophy, 
while others make more of his playful literary style— philoso­
phers and classicists agree, in the main, that Plato was a practical
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philosopher and that in his written work he never lost sight of the 
need to improve the human condition. This point is consistent with 
Plato's myth of the cave in which the enlightened philosopher is 
obligated to return to the cave in order to inform his fellow men of 
his discovery of the nature of the Good, rather than to bask in the 
light of his newly found knowledge.
Classicist Werner Jaeger advances a convincing argument in 
support of the belief that all of Plato's written work aims at dis­
covery of knowledge of the Good in Paideia: the Ideals of Greek
Culture. Describing a group of early, aporetic dialogues— the 
dialogues often referred to as the "Socratic" dialogues, in which the 
dialectic is thought to follow most closely the pattern of conversa­
tion established by Socrates— Jaeger says, "At first glance, Plato's
early dialogues seem to be separate investigations of moral concepts
27such as courage, piety, and self control." Jaeger contends, how­
ever, that
These conversations are all attempts to find out the 
nature of one virtue; and they all lead to the admission that 
this virtue, whichever it is, must be some kind of knowledge.
If we ask 'knowledge of what?' we discover that it is 
knowledge of the good. We recognize this for Socrates' 
well-known paradox: Virtue is Knowledge. But at the same
time we feel that a new force is at work in Plato's Socratic 
dialogues, not merely to re-create the master himself, but 
also to take up his problem and go further with it. The 
attentive reader will see the workings of this force in the 
fact that Plato's Socrates is exclusively concerned with the 
problem of virtue. From the Apology we know that the real 
Socrates tried above everything else to exhort his fellow-men 
to practise 'virtue' and 'the care of the soul'; and that the
27Werner Jaeger, In Search of a Divine Centre, Vol. II of 
Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 89.
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cross-examination which went along with his exhortation and 
convinced his interlocutor of his own ignorance was just 
as much a part of that protreptic mission. Its aim was to 
disquiet men and move them to do something for themselves.
But in Plato's other books of this early period, the pro­
treptic preaching is far less important than the elenctic 
cross-examination. Clearly Plato wants to push his readers 
forward to the knowledge of virtue, without letting them stop 
at the consciousness of their own ignorance. This helpless­
ness ( aporia) which was Socrates' perpetual state was for 
Plato a challenge to solve the problem and escape. He tries 
to find a positive answer to the question: what is virtue?
It is clear that he is following a well-planned course: for
in these dialogues he takes up first one virtue, and then 
another. Apparently he does not go beyond Socrates' con­
fession of ignorance; but only apparently. For each of these 
attempts to define this or that special virtue culminates in 
the acknowledgment that it must be knowledge of the good.
This concentrated advance shows clearly that the strategy of 
its guide is directed wholly towards one problem: what is
the nature of that knowledge which Socrates vainly sought 
among men— which must nevertheless lie buried somewhere in 
the soul, because without it man cannot reach true perfect 
tion? and what is the nature of its object, the 'good'?
The unified theme of the dialogues is the pursuit of happi­
ness or the Good for Men. Moreover, the recurring messages of the 
early dialogues devoted to the definition of special virtues are that 
(1) all virtues are a form of the Good, and (2) that men can be truly 
happy only if they possess knowledge of the Good. This second theme 
is made clear in the Symposium, in which Socrates recalls having been 
taught the virtue of knowledge of the Good by the Mantinean 
prophetess Diotima. Plato writes:
Well then, she went on, suppose that, instead of the 
beautiful, you were being asked about the good. I put it to 
you, Socrates. What is it that the lover of the good is 
longing for?
To make the good his own.
28Ibid., pp. 91-92.
Then what will he gain by making it his own?
I can make a better shot at answering that, I said. 
He'll gain happiness.
Right, said she, for the happy are happy inasmuch as they 
possess the good, and since there's no need for us to ask 
why men should want to be happy, I think your answer is 
conclusive.
29Absolutely, I agreed.
Plato's first point can be understood in light of his 
ontology. Plato, as I have demonstrated, assigns to universals or 
Forms a position of ontological priority over observable phenomena. 
That is, causes are seen to be ontologically prior to their effects. 
The Forms are the causes of the qualities of observable phenomena. 
The beauty of a face, for instance, is caused by its participation in 
beauty itself. A face can be beautiful, but it cannot be beauty, 
according to Plato's ontology.
The Good, for Plato, is the first and continuing cause of the 
qualities of sensible natural phenomena. Knowledge of the Good, 
therefore, becomes the most important type of knowledge in Plato's 
scheme of things. W. K. C. Guthrie expresses the central position of 
the Good in Plato's system of knowledge in his A History of Greek 
Philosophy. He notes:
The Good, then, is in Plato's words (505 3, trans. Lee 
from the Republic), 'the end of all endeavour, the object on 
which every heart is set, whose existence it divines, though 
it finds it difficult to grasp just what it is; and because 
it can't handle it with the same assurance as other things, 
it misses any value those other things have'. Whatever a man 
desires to strongly that he would put it before everything 
else is for him the good, and if you believe, as Socrates and
29Plato, "Symposium," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 557.
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Plato did, that there is an absolute good, 'man's chief end', 
then obviously no other knowledge can be so important as the 
knowledge of what this is. S[ocrates] believed that not only 
man, but everything in the world, had a function to perform, 
its fitness to perform it was its 'virtue', and the per­
formance was the good for it. For human beings it was the 
key to happiness. So far Plato is Socratic, but in the light 
of his theory of Forms he went further. A cause is prior to 
its effects, and since, for particular enterprises or life as 
a whole, the Good was the cause of their goodness, it was in 
itself not only an eternal, changeless Form 'by which' good 
particulars are good (as just acts are dependent on the Form 
of Ju&tice) but stood at the head of the hierarchy of 
Forms.
We have already seen the method whereby, according to Plato, 
one. acquires knowledge of Forms— the dialectic. One makes a state­
ment concerning a belief (pistis) or opinion (doxa) about some virtue 
or goal of human action. One then searches with his or her inter­
locutors for any obviously unsound quality concerning the statement. 
Should the statement be refuted it would be reformulated. The pro­
cess of stating, refuting and reformulating hypotheses would continue 
until agreement was reached. At this point, Plato would argue, the 
participants would be closer to possessing knowledge than before. 
The dialectic is the basis of all science according to Plato.
All of Plato's dialogues, it has been argued, dialectically 
push the reader toward the discovery of knowledge of the Good. One 
can see a progression in the dialogues of the early and middle 
periods of Plato's writing toward definition of the Good. The early 
dialogues, as Jaeger argues, all point in the direction of the Good 
by attempting to define the qualities of the individual virtues which
^0W. K. C. Guthrie, Plato The Man and His Dialogues: Earlier 
Period, Vol. IV of A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 50^!
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the Good comprises. Also, several of the early and middle period
dialogues deal directly with the general question of what is the
nature of the Good. The Protagoras, as was mentioned before,
inquires into the nature of the Good, and rejects as inadequate or
false the notion that it is, as Protagoras defines it, pleasure.
The nominal subject of the Protagoras, in which Socrates is
pitted against the great sophistic teacher of his day, Protagoras, is
whether or not knowledge can be taught. Protagoras claims in the
dialogues that students coming to him can be assured of the following
gain: "The very day you join me, you will go home a better man, and
the same the next day. Each day you will make progress toward a 
31better state." Socrates disputes this claim by having Protagoras 
admit that a teacher must possess knowledge if he is to impart it to 
others. Socrates proceeds to test Protagoras for knowledge by 
inquiring into the nature of the Good. When Protagoras equates 
goodness with pleasure Socrates refutes this premise by pointing out 
that there exist good pleasures as well as bad ones, to which 
Protagoras responds in agreement.
The Protagoras rejects the notion that pleasure is the Good. 
If the hedonist accepts that some pleasures are "bad" then he must 
reformulate his definition of the Good, perhaps to read "good 
pleasures." As Terrence Irwin points out in Plato1s Moral Theory:
^Plato, "Protagoras," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 316.
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The Early and Middle Dialogues, the hedonist must still give some
32account of what the Good is.
The nature of the Good is taken up again in the Euthydemus, a
dialogue which is devoted principally to showing the difference
between the useful (earnest) and useless (pedantic) forms of the
dialectic— Socrates' dialectical inquiry is held to be the earnest
form, while that practiced by the eristic interlocutors Euthydemus
and Dionysodorus is shown to be pedantic and nonproductive. In the
course of the dialogue knowledge is suggested to be the Good.
Socrates shows, however, that knowledge itself is not always good;
knowledge of things that do not benefit the knower are not good, and
knowledge of things that do benefit the knower are not good without
corequisite knowledge of how to use such knowledge. Socrates claims,
for instance, that knowledge of how to become immortal is not of use
to the individual without some knowledge of how to beneficially use 
33immortality.
The Phaedo and the Gorgias repeat the arguments of the 
Euthydemus and the Protagoras, respectively. Knowledge and pleasure 
are two popular definitions of the Good that Plato rejects. An 
extensive inquiry into the nature of the Good is not provided, 
however, until the Republic. In Book VI, which analyzes the Good,
oo
Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle
Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 224.
^Plato, "Euthydemus," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 394.
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pleasure and knowledge are, once more, rejected as candidate defini­
tions of the agathon. Prudence, too, is ruled out, as the following 
passage shows:
[Socrates:] "And, further, you also know that in the opinion 
of the many the good is pleasure, while in that of the more 
refined it is prudence."
[Adeimantus:] "Of course."
"And, my friend, that those who believe this can't point 
out what kind of prudence it is, but are finally compelled to 
say 'about the good.'"
Plato's rejections of knowledge, pleasure, and prudence as 
definitions of the Good hinge upon his assertion that such defini­
tions require the speaker to speak of good pleasures, good knowledge, 
and good prudence. This still requires that the Good be defined. In 
describing the Good Plato relies on his theory of Forms or Ideas. In 
Book VI of the Republic Plato notes:
"And we also assert that there is a fair itself, a good 
itself, and so on for all the things that we then set down as 
many. Now, again, we refer them to one idea of each as 
though the idea were one; and we address it as that which 
really jls ."
"That's so."
"And, moreover, we say that the former are seen but not 
intellected, while the ideas are intellected but not seen."
"That's entirely certain."33 
An Idea "is," while the things that participate in Ideas "come into 
and go out of being." Using the analogy of the sun as that which
3^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 185.
35Ibid., p. 187.
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illuminates things that are seen by the eyes, Plato establishes the
central importance of the Idea of the Good in the following way:
[Socrates:] "You know," I said, "that eyes, when one no 
longer turns them to those things over whose colors the light 
of day extends but to those over which the gleams of night 
extend, are dimmed and appear nearly blind as though pure 
sight were not in them."
[Glaucon:] "Quite so," he said.
"But, I suppose, when one turns them on those things 
illuminated by the sun, they see clearly and sight shows
itself to be in these same eyes."
"Surely."
"Well, then, think that the soul is also characterized in 
this way. When it fixes itself on that which is illuminated 
by truth and that which ijs, it intellects, knows, and appears 
to possess intelligence. But when it fixes itself on that 
which is mixed with darkness, on coming into being and 
passing away, it opines and is dimmed, changing opinions up 
and down, and seems at such times not to possess
intelligence."
"Yes, that's the way it seems."
"Therefore, say that what provides the truth to the 
things known and gives the power to the one who knows, is the
idea of the good. And, as the cause of the knowledge and
truth, you can understand it to be a thing known; but, as 
fair as these two are— knowledge and truth— if you believe 
that it is something different from them and still fairer 
than they, your belief will be right. As for knowledge and
truth, just as in the other region it is right to hold light
and sight sunlike, but to believe them to be the sun is not 
right; so, too, here, to hold these two to be like the good
is right, but to believe that either of them is the good is
not right. The condition wh^h characterizes the good must 
receive still greater honor."
36Ibid., pp. 188-189.
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Using the analogies of the segmented line and the Cave Plato goes on 
to describe the Good as the highest level of being; it is, even, 
beyond "being" in its fairness. Plato writes:
"Therefore, say that not only being known is present in 
the things known as a consequence of the good, but also 
existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, 
although the good isn't being but., is still beyond being, 
exceeding it in dignity and power."
In Book VII Plato, in writing the Cave analogy says the following of
the Idea of the Good:
At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in
the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with con­
siderable effort, is the idea of the good; but once seen, it 
must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that 
is right and fair in everything— in the visible it gave birth 
to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself 
sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence— and that the 
man who is £$ing to act prudently in private or in public 
must see it.
Guthrie summarizes Plato's concept of the Good, noting:
In the Good, then, Plato combines three conceptions: the
end of life, supreme object of desire and aspiration; the 
condition of knowledge, which makes the world intelligible 
and the human mind intelligent; and the sustaining cause of 
the Forms, which are in their timji the creative causes of 
natural objects and human actions.
In a later passage Guthrie says:
Through all the... ontological and epistemological mysteries 
(Plato would not reject the word), which have so fascinated 
and puzzled philosophers down the centuries, one is apt 
to lose sight of the fact that the ultimate goal, the self- 





Goodness (Agathon), tl^ unfailingly and universally advan­
tageous and beneficial.
The Good, as the analogies of the segmented line and the cave 
suggest, is supreme— it is the first and sustaining cause of human 
action. Knowledge of Good is, according to Plato, the final cause of 
human action. All men, we have seen, desire to be happy. The happy 
life requires that one possess knowledge of happiness (eudaimonia), 
which is virtue that originates in Goodness. For Plato, the end 
result of analyzing human welfare with an eye toward its improvement 
is the establishment of the good life— the happy life— for the 
citizens of the polis.
It might be suggested that by describing the Good as that 
which is "last to be seen, and that with considerable effort," Plato 
disables the economist from developing a theory of welfare— if one 
must know the Good in order to describe the happy life, and if the 
Good is the last known of the virtues, then how does one write of the 
happy life with any confidence? Plato, however, went beyond the 
Socratic profession of ignorance in his philosophy. The Socratic 
position on all this was that the virtues, which participate in the 
Good, are indescribable without some knowledge of the Good. Plato, 
however, allows that the virtues can be glimpsed even before one 
possesses knowledge of Goodness. The point of Plato's ontology and 
of his epistemology is not that the Good is that which enables 
us to know virtue, but rather that the Good is that which causes 
the virtues to possess their qualities. Plato asks that the reader
40Ibid., p. 518.
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accept the ontological priority of the Good; he does not insist that 
the reader stop at the aporetic conclusion of the Socratic arguments. 
Thus in the early dialogues Plato is content to describe individual 
virtues prior to taking up the formal task of analyzing the role of 
the Good.
IV. The Life of Virtue and Well-Ordered Soul
If the Good is the cause of the virtuous qualities that can 
be found associated with the happy life, then what are the natures 
of the virtues themselves? Plato attempts to answer this question in 
several of the dialectical investigations of the individual virtues. 
In these dialogues, as well as in the more comprehensive dialogues of 
the middle period of Plato's writing, one arrives at the conclusion 
that the happy life is one in which the individual lives virtuously. 
The virtuous life, for Plato, requires that the individual partici­
pate in the qualities of the virtues themselves. That is, the 
individual must strive to possess knowledge; he must be fair and just 
in his dealings with his fellow citizens; he must be temperate in his 
desire to accumulate wealth; and he must be liberal with the wealth 
that he accumulates.
In order that an individual might possess the virtues that 
are associated above with the happy life it is necessary for the 
individual to have a well-ordered soul. Recall that according to 
Plato the soul is the bodily organ responsible for discerning the 
existence and qualities of the intelligibles. Remember, too, that 
the soul comprises three distinct parts— the rational, spirited, and 
appetitive divisions. The soul, when it is well-ordered, pursues the
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Good, and is characterized by the possession of the virtues described 
above.
Plato discusses the well-ordered soul in several places in 
the dialogues. The most notable instances, however, can be found in 
the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, and the Republic. In the Phaedo Plato 
paints a picture of the soul as being the most divine and intel­
ligible part of the body:
The soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intel­
ligible, uniform, indissoluble, and ever self-consistent and 
invariable, whereas body is most like that which is human, 
mortal, multifô iji, unintelligible, dissoluble, and never 
self-consistent.
When the soul investigates itself, Plato writes,
it passes into the realm of the pure and everlasting and 
immortal and changeless, and being of a kindred nature, when 
it is once independent and free from interference, consorts 
with it always and strays no longer, but remains, in that 
realm of the absolute, constant and invariable, through 
contact with beings of a ŝ njilar nature. And this condition 
of the soul we call wisdom.
As I have mentioned before, the well-ordered soul must be one in
which the reasoning faculty yokes the spirited and appetitive parts
into its service. Reason, that part of the soul which partakes of
virtue itself, must guide the individual in his or her search for
happiness.
In the Phaedrus, Plato gives the reader a picture of the 
well-ordered soul through the use of the analogy of the charioteer 
and the two steeds. Plato likens the rational part of the soul to a
^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 63.
42Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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charioteer, who must somehow control his team of horses which con­
stantly tried to pull the chariot its own way. The spirited part of 
the soul is like the horse "that is..."
upright and clean-limbed, carrying his neck high, with some­
thing of a hooked nose; in color he is white, with black 
eyes; a lover of glory, but with temperance and modesty; one 
that consorts with genuine renown, and needs no whip, being 
driven by the work of command alone.
The appetitive part of the soul is likened to a horse that is
crooked of frame, a massive jumble of a creature, with thick 
short neck, snub nose, black skin, and gray eyes; hot- 
blooded, consorting with wantonness and vainglory^shaggy of 
ear, deaf, and hard to control with whip and goad.
The charioteer must find a way to control the unruly steed, in the
fashion in which reason must master appetite. In so doing, the
driver must enlist the aid of the honor-loving, temperate horse in
directing the progress of the team. So, too, the honor-loving part
of the soul must assist reason in checking the passions. If the
higher elements of the soul are successful in guiding it into the
ordered rule of the contemplative, philosophical life, Plato says,
their days on earth will be blessed with happiness and con­
cord, for the power of evil in the soul has been subjected, 
and the power of goodness Iterated; they [will have] won 
self-mastery and inward peace.
The Phaedrus recapitulates the argument of the Phaedo in
which Plato claims the soul to be immortal and imperishable. The




soul participates in virtue, which is immortal, and in its participa­
tion it possesses something of the immortal qualities of virtue 
itself. Plato's belief in an immortal soul is consistent with his
theory of learning as being a process of recollection— anamnesis. If
the soul possesses knowledge of virtue already, Plato argues in the
46Phaedo, it must exist prior to the coming into being of the body.
Plato's psychology, i.e., his theory of the soul, is insepara­
ble from his welfare theory. Happiness is the condition that
characterizes those individuals in whom the soul is well-ordered. 
Happy people seek wisdom, and in so doing lead a contemplative life. 
Only a true philosopher qua lover of wisdom can be truly happy. It
is the habit of the philosopher to lead a moderate life, and to
refrain from partaking excessively of the objects of appetitive 
passions. Plato describes the psychology of the true philosopher
saying:
Now the soul of the true philosopher feels that it must not 
reject this opportunity for release, and so it abstains as 
far as possible from pleasures and desires and griefs,
because it reflects that the result of giving way to pleasure 
or fear or desire is not as might be supposed the trivial 
misfortune of becoming ill or wasting money through self-
indulgence but the last and worst calamity of all, which the
sufferer does not recognize.
What is that, Socrates? asked Cebes.
When anyone's soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it
cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent 
emot^yn is the plainest and truest reality, which it is
not.
4^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, pp. 58-59. 
47Ibid., p. 66.
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Rather than fall into the trap of interpreting the sensibles to be
most real, Plato says that the true philosopher
secures immunity from its desires by following reason and 
abiding always in her company, and by contemplating the true 
and divine and unconjecturable, and drawing inspiration from 
it, because such a soul believes that this is the right way 
to live while life endures, and that after death it reaches a 
place which is kindred and similargto its own nature, and 
there is rid forever of human ills.
It is clear that for Plato the happy man is the rational 
man— he who manages to yoke the spirited and appetitive urges of the 
soul into subservience to the soul's charioteer, reason. Such 
individuals, if they are serious (spoudaioi) will be attuned to the 
inner beauty of the intelligibles, rather than be slaves to the 
passions. It is also clear that Plato did not think that such 
refined characters as his true philosophers stood much chance of 
developing in society. Indeed, he described the ideal state designed 
in his Republic as likely the realm of the children of gods, not of 
ordinary men. How then is happiness secured, if at all, for the 
many?
One will recall that Plato thought it unlikely that an 
individual would glimpse virtue itself early in life. Rather, 
knowledge of virtue, although the truest and clearest knowledge, is 
last seen, and only after the outer eyes have grown dim. In order 
that the polis might produce true philosophers, Plato designed in the 
Republic a rigorous system of education that would last thirty-five
^Ibid., p. 67.
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years. After such an education a few individuals might become 
virtuous and truly happy.
Plato has been thoroughly criticized for his contention that 
only the few become truly happy, and that the many are given over to 
indulgence in inferior pleasures that are associated with the 
appetites. In this century Plato has even been labelled fascist. 
For all this, however, Plato was not despotic or tyrannical in his 
desire to see his vision of virtue realized in society. Indeed, 
Plato would claim just the opposite— that the individual who would 
let the stronger, appetitive urges dominate the soul, and who would 
argue that of all things man is the measure is the tyrant. Plato 
defined tyranny as the condition where one considers himself "to be 
at liberty to do what [one] please[s] in the state— to kill, to 
exile, and to follow [ones] own pleasurefs] in every act."^
The happy life can be characterized by its opposition to the 
qualities of the unhappy life— tyranny. The tyrant, according to 
Plato, is the supremely unhappy individual. The tyrant listens to 
the message of the appetitive part of the soul in every action that 
he contemplates. The tyrant trusts no one; he assumes that everybody 
follows the commands of the passions, and, is as a consequence not 
worthy of trust any more than the tyrant is himself. The tyrant 
exists, Plato says, in a dream state in which the appetitive urges of 
the subconscious mind are awakened while the spirited and rational 
parts of the soul slumber.
49Plato, "Gorgias," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 252.
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The "acme of misery" in human life is attained when the
50tyrannical individual seeks public office. An "actual tyrant,"
i.e., an irrational individual in public office, is
really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a 
flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding 
even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of 
most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent 
if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety. And
throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of 
convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition 
of the city which he rules, and he is like it...
...And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all 
that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, 
by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was, 
envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel 
and nurse of all inquiry, and so in qnnsequence be himself 
most unhappy and make all about him so.
Plato's tyrant shares an attribute in common with the
Platonic vision of the happy man. This common psychological element 
is the erotic urge. Plato of course distinguished between different 
types of love— agape, philia, and eros— and erotic love did not carry 
for him the connotations that it evokes today. Rather, erotic love, 
as Plato makes clear in his masterful Symposium, is a longing for 
something that the soul lacks. In the Symposium and Phaedrus Plato 
eloquently points out that the philosopher is erotically drawn to 
knowledge of the Good. Knowledge, Socrates pointed out, is something 
that the soul typically lacks. The soul, which is in Plato's words 
"that which moves itself," aches with longing at the sight of the
^Plato, "Republic," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 805.
51Ibid., p. 806.
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52object of its desire. In this fashion the soul of the philosopher 
compels him to seek wisdom, while that of the tyrant, unbalanced as 
it is, seeks the objects of passion. The difference between the two 
souls is that in their longing one soul desires something that 
sustains and nourishes happiness, i.e., it longs for knowledge of 
virtue, while the other desires something that will always leave it 
unsatisfied— appetitive pleasures.
So man, who is "besouled," is driven by an erotic urge to 
seek the object of psychological vision. The happy man will seek 
that which the well-ordered soul desires— to possess the virtue that 
it glimpses with the inner eyes. The tyrant, however, will involun­
tarily seek misery by forever hankering for the objects of passion 
which the unbalanced soul fixes on.
When the soul fixes on the "upward path" toward knowledge of 
intelligible reality, it discovers in time the qualities of the 
particular virtues that, when known, enable the knower to be truly 
happy. In the ethical dialogues culminating with the Republic one 
sees what Plato's vision of these virtues is. Foremost in the soul 
of the happy man, according to Plato's investigation, is the desire 
for knowledge. Learning is for Plato the only endeavor that people 
should undertake without moderation. One can never know too much. 
The besouled man seeks ta onta with all vigor that can be mustered.
In order that man may discover knowledge, it is necessary for 
him to secure the necessities of physical and emotional sustenance.
*^Plato, "Phaedrus," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 493.
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Plato was no ascetic. He accepted the fact that the well-ordered 
soul exists within a body that must be nourished and otherwise main­
tained. With respect to the regulation of acquisition of those 
things that nurture the body, Plato argues that the inquiring mind 
would discover the virtues of justice, moderation, and liberality, 
which would cause the individual to turn away from acquisition of 
more than is necessary.
Justice, which is the nominal topic of the Republic, involves 
doing one's own business, according to Plato. This understanding of 
justice is arrived at after a lengthy dialectical refutation of other 
concepts of justice. Cephalus’ argument in Book I, that justice is 
paying back what is owed, is refuted on the grounds that one would 
not, for instance, be just in returning weapons borrowed from a 
lender who had subsequently gone mad. Polemarchus' reformulation of 
Cephalus' concept--that justice is helping one's friends and hurting 
one's enemies— is also shown, within the guidelines of the dialectic 
to be inadequate. This formulation of justice is abandoned after 
Socrates argues to the satisfaction of all but one of the partici­
pants in the dialogue, Thrasymachus, that doing harm to one's enemies 
does not make them more just; rather, it makes them more unjust. It 
must not be just, Socrates argues, to further injustice. Finally, 
Thrasymachus' claim that justice is the advantage of the power­
ful man--a sophistic concept of the Protagorean example of value
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relativism— is refuted at length, even after Thrasymachus has
53abandoned the conversation.
Instead of these concepts Plato shows justice to be doing 
good, which, in the case of labor and commerce, means doing what is 
right with respect to one's temperament. Philosophers would seek 
wisdom, guardians would cultivate courage and obedience, and the 
third class, the many, would strive to be temperate in their func­
tions as acquisitive beings. From Book IV of the Republic:
[Socrates] "All right," I said. "Three of them have been 
spied out in our city, at least sufficiently to form some 
opinion. Now what would be the remaining form thanks to 
which the city would further partake in virtue? For, 
plainly, this is justice."
[Glaucon] "Plainly."
"So then, Glaucon, we must, like hunters, now station 
ourselves in a circle around the thicket and pay attention so 
that justice doesn't slip through somewhere hereabouts. Look 
to it and make every effort to catch sight of it; you might 
somehow see it before me and could tell me."
"...Listen whether after all I make any sense," I said. 
"That rule we set down at the beginning as to what must be 
done in everything when we were founding the city— this, or a 
certain form of it, is, in my opinion, justice. Surely we 
set down and often said, if you remember, that each one must
practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which
his nature made him naturally most fit."
"Yes, we were saying that."
"And further, that justice is the minding of one's own
business and not being a busybody, this we have both heard
from many others and have often said ourselves."
"Yes, we have."
*^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 15.
"Well, then, my friend," I said, "this— the practice of 
minding one's own business— when it comes into being in a 
certain way, is probably justice. Do you know how I infer 
this?"
"No," he said, "tell me."
"In my opinion," I said, "after having considered modera­
tion, courage, and prudence, this is what's left over in the 
city; it provided the power by which all these others came 
into being; and, once having come into being, it provides 
them with preservation as long as it's in the city. And yet 
we were saying that justice would be what's left over from 
the three if we found them."
"Yes, we did," he said, "and it's necessarily so."
"Moreover," I said, "if one had to judge which of them by 
coming to be will do our city the most good, it would be a 
difficult judgment. Is it the unity of opinion among rulers 
and ruled? Or is it the coming into being in the soldiers of 
that preserving of the lawful opinion as to which things are 
terrible and which are not? Or is it the prudence and
guardianship present in the rulers? Or is the city done the 
most good by the fact that— in the case of child, woman, 
slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler and ruled— each one minded 
his own business and wasn't a busybody?"
"It would, of course," he said, "be a difficult judg­
ment."
"Then, as it seems, with respect to a city's virtue, this 
power that consists in each man's minding his own business in 
the city is a rival to wisdom, moderation and courage."
"Very much so," he said.
"Wouldn't you name justice that which is the rival of
these others in contributing to a city's virtue?"
"That's entirely certain."
"Now consider if it will seem the same from this view­
point too. Will you assign the judging of lawsuits in the 
city to the rulers?"
"Of course."
"Will they have any other aim in their judging than that 
no one have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of what 
belongs to him?"
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"None other than this."
"Because that's just?"
"Yes."
"And therefore, from this point of view too, the having 
and doing of one's qwn and what belongs to one would be 
agreed to be justice."
This justice that Plato writes about forms the basis of his well-
known psychological division of labor. Justice, defined as doing
what is one's own business, is the key to understanding this division
for what it is. Some economists have, I have shown, argued it to be
a crude precursor to the more nearly scientific division made famous
by Smith. This understanding seems incorrect. The fact of the
matter is that Plato's division of labor is logically consistent with
the premise that it is justice, rather than efficiency, which should
be promoted in an economy. Smith's division addresses an underlying
question of how efficiency can be best served. One cannot, from the
basis of positive science, suggest that one proposal for a division
is more or less adequate than another. They are simply aimed at
attaining different things. With respect to the aim of each each is
logically consistent.
Besides behaving justly and always striving to know the truth 
of all matters, the happy man, according to Plato, behaves both with 
courage and temperance. The courage of which Plato writes has to do 
with being able to discern the Good in a situation and upholding it
54Ibid., pp. 110-112.
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even at great odds. It is not enough for people to know the Good; 
they must have the conviction— the courage— to do the Good as well.
Plato's initial examination of courage appears in the Laches. 
Here Plato shows that courage is not the same thing as behaving 
bravely. Bravery, such as that which one might encounter on the 
battlefield, is inferior if it does not originate in knowledge of 
what it means to be brave. As always, Plato insists that virtuous 
behavior is like some virtue itself insofar as it stems from an 
intimate and reasoned knowledge of virtue. The Laches is centered 
around a discussion of courage between three individuals who were 
well-known for their courageous behavior in battle— Laches, Nicias, 
and Socrates. As an aporetic dialogue the Laches is primarily con­
cerned with establishing the claim that while these men are 
courageous, they do not themselves yet possess knowledge of courage. 
This situation is deemed lamentable by Socrates who admonishes Nicias 
and Laches to seek an education in the area of virtue. The dialogue, 
without defining courage, attempts to convince the reader that action 
based upon right opinion is inferior to action originating from
knowledge. The three men in the dialogue are courageous, but they do
55not know what courage is.
In the Republic Plato resumes his discussion of courage. In 
this dialogue he describes it as being a "kind of p r e s e r v i n g . I n  
a conversation between Socrates and Glaucon Plato writes:
^Plato, "Laches," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 144.
^^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 107.
"So a city is also courageous by a part of itself, thanks 
to that part's having in it a power that through everything 
will preserve the opinion about which things are terrible—  
that they are the same ones and of the same sort as those the 
lawgiver transmitted in the education. Or don't you call 
that courage?"
"I didn't quite understand what you said," he said. "Say 
it again."
"I mean," I said, "that courage is a certain kind of 
preserving."
"Just what sort of preserving?"
"The preserving of the opinion produced by law through 
education about what— and what sort of thing— is terrible.
And by preserving through everything I meant preserving that 
opinion and not casting it out in pains and pleasures and 
desires and fears..."
Courage is here defined to be the willingness to uphold a standard 
that is known to be good. Standards must often be upheld against 
overwhelming opposition and, at times, at great peril. The con­
viction among the guardians of a regime that the laws are worthy of 
being upheld because they are good is a requirement in a state for 
enabling its citizens to pursue happiness.
Moderation is the last virtue that is ordinarily referred to 
by Plato when he describes the happy life. For the many, whose souls 
Plato says are dominated by the appetitive urges, moderation (sophro- 
syne) is the principal virtue to be attained in pursuit of happiness. 
One cannot become happy if one is enslaved by the uncritical, 
passionate part of the soul, i.e., if one becomes a tyrant.
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It is, perhaps, somewhat difficult to appreciate the prom­
inence that Plato gives the virtue of sophrosyne in his investigation 
of welfare. A temperate life is not, after all, necessarily a good 
one. Plato obviously thought that true happiness could only be 
realized in the soul of the individual whom he describes as a 
philosopher. Such an individual, Plato argues, possesses the 
qualities of soul in the proper proportion— the rational part of the 
soul dominates the appetites, with spirit serving as its guardian. 
Plato also argues that very few true philosophers will likely be
generated in society. This leads one to conclude that Plato did not 
think that very many individuals in society could ever be happy.
The key to understanding Plato's description of the happy
life lies in understanding his theory of participation in virtue. 
From Plato's theory of Forms we know that the soul does not possess 
virtue itself; rather, if attuned properly to the intelligibles the 
soul partakes of the qualities of virtue itself. Knowledge for Plato 
is a type of participation in the type of reality that he describes 
as being "beyond being." These "things that are" (ta onta)— intel­
ligible virtues--are the causes of the qualities of the things that 
"come into and go out of being." Plato understands man to have a 
soul that is capable of following an upward path that leads to a 
sublime level of participation in virtue. This is what he means when
he describes philosophy as being the habit of practicing death, which
58he does in the Phaedo. Not all souls will participate in the
^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 50.
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qualities of virtue itself in the same degree. The serious indi­
vidual spoudaious, will not veer from the upward path, and will, 
therefore partake more fully of the virtues than the many will. The 
average man would not be temperamentally suited, Plato thought, for 
the life of philosophy. Although the average man could not volun­
tarily do evil or seek anything other than happiness, he would not 
likely possess the seriousness of the desire to know things as they 
are to attain true knowledge of intelligible virtues. Thus the many 
would never likely attain the level of happiness that is theo­
retically attainable, according to Plato's system, by philosophers.
This is not to say that the many are incapable of happiness. 
Should they master their passions and thereby attain moderation, the 
many will be happy. By being happy Plato suggests not that the many 
are happy, but, rather, that they partake of happiness to the extent 
commensurate with their powers of intellection.
It is important to realize that by the many Plato referred to 
nearly everyone. The ideal state, as described in the Republic, 
could not be expected to produce great numbers of philosophers. 
Plato's observation that the souls of men are made in different 
proportions— that some individuals do not, by temperament, possess 
the seriousness to fully cultivate reason--led him to conclude that 
happiness for the many is different from happiness for the few. 
Happiness for the many, endowed as they are with a surplus of 
appetite, would arise principally from the mastery of the tyrannical 
self, and, thus, the attainment of sophrosyne.
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According to Plato's epistemology moderation is, like other 
intelligible virtues, undefinable in the strictest sense. Since 
moderation can be counted in Plato's system among the things that 
are, ta onta, it is not a concept that is sensibly demonstrable— it 
exists in the region of things that are beyond being and, thus, is 
known only to the soul. As is the case with the other particular 
virtues, one can partake of moderation and even ultimately possess 
knowledge of it. Because moderation is a virtue, however, it qua 
virtue defines human existence; the human mind is powerless, 
according to Plato's epistemology, to define it. Recalling 
Voegelin's interpretation of intelligible phenomena: Forms cannot be
held as objects of consciousness.
That moderation itself is an intelligible, and, thus, is not
easily known is the subject of the dialogue Charmides. In the usual
dialectical fashion this dialogue centers around a structured series
of hypotheses, refutations, and reformulations of hypotheses that
lead to the aporetic stage of awareness on behalf of the participants
of their lack of knowledge on the subject of sophrosyne. The first
approximation of moderation is uttered by the youth Charmides, who
has been extolled to Socrates as being the most moderate youth in
Athens. Charmides defines moderation as being "a kind of quiet- 
59ness." Plato writes:
toPlato, "Charmides," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 105.
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...he said that he thought temperance was doing all things 
orderly and quietly— for example, walking in the streets, and 
talking, and indeed doing everything in that way.
This opinion is quickly abandoned in favor of the notion that modera­
tion is the same thing as modesty. This definition is soon replaced 
with the idea that moderation is defined as doing one's own business. 
This definition is agreed to be unsatisfactory and is replaced with 
the notion that moderation is the science of self-knowledge, arising 
from the twin Delphic commands "Know thyself," and "Be temperate." 
Ultimately, the group rejects the idea of defining moderation as, in 
effect, the science of science itself, or the knowledge of knowledge 
itself, which is what the last definition implies. The dialogue ends 
on an aporetic note.
By whittling away from the notion of moderation those things 
that can be agreed that it is not, Plato undoubtedly moved closer to 
understanding the truth about this concept. As a result he freely 
uses the term moderation to describe a part of the virtuous behavior 
that corresponds with the happy life. He has arrived at the point of 
knowledge of what moderation is like, without actually being able to 
define it. He recognizes it as some kind of good, and, thus, as 
something associated with happiness. In the Republic Plato uses this 
knowledge of qualities of moderation when describing the well-ordered 
soul, the educational process (paideia) that produces well-ordered 
souls, and the constitution of the ideal state which is composed of 
citizens with well-ordered souls.
60Ibid.
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In Book III of the Republic Plato discusses the educational 
needs of youngsters, claiming that they include the need for modera­
tion. Describing this moderation Plato says "the most important 
elements of moderation for the multitude" are: "being obedient to the 
rulers, and being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex, 
and eating...
In Book IV Plato continues his discussion of moderation,
claiming through Socrates that it "is surely a certain kind of order
62and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires..." With 
respect to the constitution of the ideal city Plato reasons that "any
city ought to be designated stronger than pleasures, desires, and
63itself." Moreover, all its citizens— rulers as well as ruled—
ought to behave moderately. Moderation, he concludes, is "like a
kind of harmony,"
...[b]ecause it's unlike courage and wisdom, each of which 
resides in a part, the one making the city wise and the other 
courageous. Moderation doesn't work that way, hut actually 
stretches throughout the whole, from top to bottom of the 
entire scale, making the weaker, the stronger and those in 
the middle— whether you wish to view them as such in terms of 
prudence, or, if you wish, in terms of strength, or multi­
tude, money or anything else whatsoever of the sort— sing the 
same chant together. So we would quite rightly claim that 
this unanimity is moderation, an accord of worse and better, 
according^Jjo nature, as to which must rule in the city and in 
each one.





Moderation is required of the citizens of a polis if the polis is to 
be expected to operate smoothly in its economic and political under­
takings .
Plato discusses the virtue of the temperate life over the
intemperate life in the Gorgias. In this dialogue Socrates questions
Callicles on the matter of pleasure. The life of pleasure, Callicles
65says, requires the fullest influx of experiences and sensations.
Callicles thus champions the intemperate life. Socrates, on the
other hand, claims intemperance to be among the greatest of all 
66possible evils. He associates intemperance with tyranny. Failure
to master the erotic yearning of the passions for the objects of
sensation results in the generation of the tyrannical soul, which,
Socrates says, "indulges in the greatest injustice and yet contrives
67to escape admonition, correction, or punishment..."
Callicles, in the Gorgias, exemplifies the life of the
hedonist. Having already reduced virtue and happiness to the status 
of what is pleasurable and agreeable, Callicles argues that knowledge 
is cultivated by indulging to the fullest extent in the appetites. 
How else could one come to judge which are pleasant from those that 
are miserable? Plato compares the intemperate life extolled by
Callicles with the life of moderation in the analogy of the jars. He
writes:




SOCRATES: Come then, let me offer you another image from
the same school as the last. Consider whether you would say 
this of each type of life, the temperate and the undis­
ciplined. Imagine that each of the two men has several jars, 
in the one case in sound condition and filled, one with wine, 
another with honey, another with milk, and many others with a 
variety of liquids, but that the sources of these liquids are 
scanty and hard to come by, procured only with much hard 
labor. Imagine then that the one after filling his vessels 
does not trouble himself to draw in further supplies but as 
far as the jars are concerned is free from worry; in the case 
of the other man the sources, as in the first instance are 
procurable but difficult to come by, but his vessels are 
perforated and unsound and he is ever compelled to spend day 
and night in replenishing them, if he is not to suffer the 
greatest agony. If this is the character of each of the 
lives, do you still insist that the lifgoof the uncontrolled 
man is happier than that of the orderly?
Of course, Socrates' interlocutor rejects the point of the analogy.
Plato, however, in a rare moment of non-dialectical expression, has
Socrates affirm the virtue of the temperate life in the following
statement:
This then is the position I take, and I affirm it to be 
true, and if it is true, then the man who wishes to be happy 
must, it seems, pursue and practice temperance, and each of 
us must flee from indiscipline with all the speed in his 
power and contrive, preferably to have no need of being 
disciplined, but if he or any of his friends, whether 
individual or city, has need of it, then he must suffer 
punishment and be disciplined, if he is to be happy. This I 
consider to be the mark to which a man should look throughout 
his life, and all his own endeavors and those of his city he 
should devote to the single purpose of so acting that justice 
and temperance shall dwell in him who is to be truly blessed.
He should not suffer his appetites to be undisciplined and 
endeavor to satisfy them by leading the life of a brigand— a 
mischief without end. For such a man could be dear neither 
to any other man nor to God, since he is incapable of fellow­
ship, and where there is no fellowship, friendship cannot be.
Wise men, Callicles, say that the heavens and the earth, gods 
and men, are bound together by fellowship and friendship, and
68Ibid., p. 275.
order and temperagjje and justice, my friend, not the world of 
disorder or riot.
Temperance is fundamental for the happy life, both for the 
individual and for the city, according to Plato's analysis. The 
happy man is the man who has no evil in his soul; he is the man who 
shuns tyranny. Temperance is not, however, simply the denial of 
self-indulgence. Self-control without the proper balance of the 
soul, Plato says, is itself intemperate. In the Phaedo Plato writes:
What about temperate people? Is it not, in just the same 
way, a sort of self-indulgence that makes them self-con­
trolled? We may say that this is impossible, but all the 
same those who practice this simple form of self-control are 
in much the same case as that which I have just described.
They are afraid of losing other pleasures which they desire, 
so they refrain from one kind because they cannot resist the 
other. Although they define self-indulgence as the condition 
of being ruled by pleasure, it is really because they cannot 
resist some pleasures that they succeed in resisting others, 
which amounts to what I said just now--±hat they control 
themselves, in a sense, by self-indulgence.
Moderation, Plato implies, must not arise for reasons other than from
the individual's mastery over the dark steed of appetite. Happiness
cannot be attained by the tyrannical mind.
Moderation, then, is the organizing principle for both the 
individual soul and for the state. The many and the philosophers 
must both practice the temperate life in order that happiness may be 
attained. For the many, however, it becomes the dominant psychologi­
cal characteristic of the happy life, according to Plato. The many 
are incapable by means of temperament of cultivating the rational
69Ibid., p. 290.
^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 51.
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part of the soul to the point of gaining true insight into the nature 
of the Good. For Plato, happiness for the many, which is to say 
happiness for the state as a whole, is realized only when the tyran­
nical, appetitive self is yoked by reason, law, or belief in the 
virtue of self-control.
In summary, Plato's description of the happy life is the same
thing as the virtuous life. Philosophers— those who choose the
upward path to knowledge— are the happiest people of all. It is 
their fortune to possess properly well-ordered souls. In addition, 
they lead contemplative lives characterized by the pursuit of true 
knowledge of intelligible virtue. Next in happiness are the spirited 
guardians of the ideal state. They cultivate honorable obedience to 
the point that it checks the appetites and serves reason by upholding 
the laws. The many, if they possess temperate characters, also 
attain happiness. Although they do not experience the periagoge that 
compels one to follow the upward path, they achieve happiness by 
driving from their being all traces of tyrannical self-indulgence in 
the passions. The least happy citizens of the polis are the tyrants. 
The life of tyranny, in which reason and courage are made subservient 
to the appetitive spirit, is one of aggression, distrust, and ulti­
mate misery, in Plato's opinion. Describing the existence of tyrants 
Plato writes:
"Therefore, those who have no experience of prudence and
virtue but are always living with feasts and the like are, it
seems, brought down and then back again to the middle and 
throughout life wander in this way; but, since they don't go 
beyond this, they don't look upward toward what is truly 
above, nor are they ever brought to it; and they aren't 
filled with what really is, nor do they taste of a pleasure
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that is sure and pure; rather, after the fashion of cattle, 
always looking down and with their heads bent to earth and 
table, they feed, fattening themselves, and copulating; and, 
for the sake of getting more of these things, they kick and 
butt with horns and hoofs of iron, killing each other because 
they are insatiable; for they are not filling the part of 
themselves that is, or can contain anything, with things that 
are."
Tyrants sustain themselves on only the things that come into and go
out of being; they never attain knowledge of the things that are.
Arguing that the tyrant stands last in a long line of corruption of
the soul from its pure state in the aristocratic man, Plato claims
72that the tyrant is nine times less happy than the true aristocrat.
V. The Psychological Division of Labor
The happy life according to Plato's inquiry into its nature 
is one that is associated with knowledge, courage, and temperance. 
It partakes of the particular virtues, which Plato describes as being 
qualities of happiness or goodness itself. This happy life is 
fostered in an economy by a division of labor. The virtues of
justice, wisdom, courage, and temperance are, in Plato's opinion,
best cultivated in an economy in which one man works at one job for 
which he is ideally suited temperamentally. Moreover, Plato recog­
nizes that the division affords society more economic output,
although this consideration is of secondary importance.
The division of labor is discussed in the Republic. In Book 
II, in which Plato discusses the origins of the city, Socrates and
7^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 268.
72Ibid., p. 270.
183
Plato's brother Adeimantus discuss the efficacy of a specialization
of labor. Plato writes:
[Socrates] "Now wait," I said. "How will the city be suf­
ficient to provide for this much? Won't one man be a farmer, 
another the housebuilder, and still another, a weaver? Or 
shall we add to it a shoemaker or some other man who cares 
for what has to do with the body?"
[Adeimantus] "Certainly."
"The city of utmost necessity would be made of four or 
five men."
"It looks like it."
"Now, what about this? Must each one of them put his 
work at the disposition of all in common— for example, must 
the farmer, one man, provide food for four and spend four 
times as much time and labor in the provision of food and 
then give it in common to the others; or must he neglect them 
and produce a fourth part of the food in a fourth part of the 
time and use the other three parts for the provision of a 
house, clothing, and shoes, not taking the trouble to share 
in common with others, but minding his own business for 
himself?"
And Adeimantus said, "Perhaps, Socrates, the former is 
easier than the latter."
"It wouldn't be strange, by Zeus," I said. "I myself 
also had the thought when you spoke that, in the first place, 
each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but 
rather differs in his nature; different men are apt for the 
accomplishment of different jobs. Isn't that your opinion?"
"It is."
"And, what about this? Who would do a finer job, one man 
practicing many arts, or one man one art?"
"One man, one art," he said.
"And, further, it's also plain, I support, that if a man 
lets the crucial moment in any work pass, it is completely 
ruined."
"Yes, it is plain."
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"I don't suppose the thing done is willing to await the 
leisure of the man who does it; but it's necessary for the 
man who does it to follow close upon the thing done, and not 
as a spare-time occupation."
"It is necessary."
"So, on this basis each thing becomes more plentiful, 
finer, and easier, when one man, exempt from other tasks, 
does one thing according to nature and at the crucial
moment."
"That's entirely certain."73 
In the passage above Plato sets forth his version of the economic 
division of labor. It is clear that Plato understood the increase in 
productive efficiency that accompanies specialization. It is on this 
level of thinking that Socrates discusses the division with
Adeimantus. Yet, productive efficiency is not the primary reason for 
the introduction of specialization into the discussion of the consti­
tution of the ideal state.
In his discussion of the correct education for the youth of 
the ideal state— that which promotes happiness through the develop­
ment of well-ordered souls— Plato again mentions the division of 
labor. In this context he claims that it is necessary for the 
educators to watch carefully for the glimpses one gets into the 
nature of a child. Once observed the educator can then channel the
youth's education into a course that prepares him for work in the
field that suits that nature. From Book IV:
[Socrates] "And still slighter than that," I said, "is what 
we mentioned earlier when we said that if a child of slight 
ability were born of the guardians, he would have to be sent
73Ibid., pp. 46-47.
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off to the others, and if a serious one were born of the 
others, he would have to be sent off to the guardians. This 
was intended to make plain that each of the other citizens 
too must be brought to that which naturally suits him— one 
man, one job— so that each man, practicing his own, which is 
one, will not become many but one; and thus, you see, the 
whole city will naturally grow to be one and not many."
In this passage one sees the intent of Plato's call for specializa­
tion— the city will grow to be one and not many. Harmony is an 
important concept in Plato's theory of welfare. At the level of the 
individual the soul should be harmonious— it should have the proper 
balance, and its parts should be present in the proper proportions. 
The state, which is, for Plato, man writ large, should also exhibit 
harmony. The functions of society should have the proper balance, 
and the classes should be present in proportions that follow those of 
the soul of the individual— the few, i.e., the philosophers and 
guardians, should rule the many in the same manner and proportions as 
reason and spirit in the soul are masters over the passions. Plato's 
division of labor, by fostering a psychological sense of well-being 
in the individual, results in the development of a smoothly operating 
polis. As a bonus specialization increases the quality and quantity 
of market output in the well-ordered polis.
Historians of economic thought who have discounted the 
importance of Plato's theory of labor specialization do him a dis­
service. Clearly Plato understood the advantages of a division as 
those advantages are described by Smith at a much later date. He
7AIbid., p. 101.
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even understood the fact that specialization on an international 
level could further increase the quality and quantity of output. 
Plato did not, however, put much stock in such advantages as these. 
One must recall that happiness for Plato does not revolve around the 
acquisition of things— at least, not the things that come into and go 
out of being. Rather, happiness, as understood by Plato, and this 
understanding is that which develops after careful analysis— not from 
mere opinion— comes to those who possess wisdom, courage, and temper­
ance. The economy does not generate commodities and services for the 
satisfaction of appetitive urges, according to Plato's theory of the 
ideal state. Instead, it produces such commodities and services that 
afford the citizens of the polis with a desirable level of material 
affluence. This level of production is neither so small that it does 
not afford men the time to engage in the contemplation of the upward 
path, nor so large so as to coerce men to devote their full atten­
tions to the simple problems of management of the things that come 
into and go out of being.
Plato's division of labor is based upon the idea that happi­
ness is not pleasure hut virtue. Plato's support for labor 
specialization is consistent with his observation that the natures of 
men are different— some being high-minded and capable of following 
the upward path, and some more ideally suited for the temperate 
pursuit of appetitive endeavors. Plato's division is scientific. 
Plato understood science to be the exercise of reason; his division 
of labor is the product of the exercise of reason concerning the 
possible means of achieving happiness. It differs from the modern
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conceptions of labor specialization principally on the point that it
obtains from the hypothesis that man partakes of happiness rather
than defines it. Happiness exists for Plato as an intelligible. For
him, man is not, as the sophists argued, the measure of all things.
Ultimate virtue itself--the Good--is the universal concept that
serves as the measure of all things. In the Laws the Athenian
stranger, speaking the opinion of Plato, says: "Now it is God who
is, for you and me, of a truth the 'measure of all things,' much more
75truly than, as they say, 'man.'" Given this understanding of 
ontology it is entirely logically consistent for Plato to admire the 
specialization of labor for its qualities for producing psychological 
and political harmony, rather than for its ability to afford society 
more of the things that it must guard against acquiring in excess in 
the first place.
VI. The Moderate Economy
A division of labor is but one prescription for an economy 
that Plato calls for in his design of the ideal state— the state that 
maximizes happiness. In the two dialogues devoted to a description 
of the good state, i.e., the Republic and Laws, one sees an impres­
sive group of prescriptions for the economy that arises from Plato's 
theory of happiness. These economic reforms are well known, but have 
typically been overlooked as relatively unimportant value judgments 
of an ancient philosopher. In fact, they constitute Plato's welfare 
economics. After systematically analyzing the nature of virtue in
^Plato, "Laws," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 1301.
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the early and middle dialogues, and after having designed an educa­
tional process whereby virtue can be attained, Plato describes in 
some detail the characteristics of an economy that would promote the 
virtuous life, which Plato understood to be synonymous with happi­
ness. These prescriptions make up the basis for an analysis of 
welfare economics that deserves a position among early theories of 
welfare. That they are subjectively derived, we have seen, is insuf­
ficient reason to exclude them from the body of thought on economic 
welfare.
Plato's economic prescriptions are derived from his observa­
tions concerning the historical generation and development of the 
Hellenic economy. Plato was a keen critic of the profligacy that he 
witnessed in Athens. In addition he was armed with the unpleasant 
memories he carried of the economy of Syracuse, with which he had 
become familiar while serving as an advisor to Dionysius. Plato 
reacted against what he saw as an atmosphere of tyranny— enslavement 
to the passions. His economic prescriptions serve to repair the 
Greek economy by yoking it under the rule of justice and moderation 
and rejecting the licentious rule of self-tyranny.
Plato's theory of the origin of the economy is found in Book 
II of the Republic. Searching for knowledge of justice Plato reasons 
that if it is detectable in the individual it must be magnified in 
the city. This leads to a dialectical discussion of the historical 
beginnings of an economy. According to Plato, the city has its 
origin in men's realization that they lack economic self-sufficiency. 
That is, one man cannot easily secure the things that can be produced
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in a small economy benefiting from a division of labor. Socrates
says: "a city, as I believe, comes into being because each of us
76isn't self-sufficient but is in need of much." Labor specializa­
tion afforded ancient man the economic means of securing a standard 
of living conducive to the happy life. In attributing the origin of 
the economy to a human need to specialize the tasks of labor, instead 
of relating it to some notion of kindred spirits, people, or gens, 
Plato displays a more economic interpretation of history than 
Aristotle's.
A simple, good city arises when a few people specialize and
exchange the commodities and services resulting from their labor.
The city in which Plato lived, however, was more than this. Economic
growth in Athens did not stop with the specialization of labor on a
small scale. Athens, along with its port Piraeus, flourished, and
had grown, by the time of Plato, to a size and state of affairs
resembling the city of sows mentioned in the Republic. Plato
describes the development of such a city in order to trace the
development of injustice, as well as justice, in society. The
luxurious city is condemned by Plato as being "feverish."77 In the
city of sows, as Plato describes it,
Nothing stands in the way. For these things, as it seems, 
won't satisfy some, or this way of life, but couches, tables, 
and other furniture will be added, and, of course, relishes, 
perfume, incense, courtesans and cakes— all sorts of all of
7^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, pp. 45-46.
77Ibid., p. 49.
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them. And, in particular, we can't still postulate the mere 
necessities we were talking about at first— houses, clothes, 
and shoes; but painting and embroidery must also be set in 
motion; and gold, ivory, and everything of the sort must be 
obtained. Isn't this so?
"Yes," he said.
"Then the city must be made bigger again. This healthy 
one isn't adequate any more, but must already be gorged with 
a bulky mass of things, which are not in cities because of 
necessity— all the hunters and imitators, many concerned with 
figures and colors, many with music; and poets and their 
helpers, rhapsodes, actors, choral dancers, contractors, and 
craftsmen of all sorts of equipment; for feminine adornment 
as well as other things. And so we'll need more servants 
too. Or doesn't it seem there will be need of teachers, wet 
nurses, governesses, beauticians, barbers, and, further, 
relish-makers and cooks? And, what's more, we're in addition 
going to need swineherds. This animal wasn't in our earlier 
city— there was no need— but in this one there will be need 
of it in addition. And there'll also be need of very many 
other fatted beasts if someone will eat them, won't there?"
"Of course."
"Won't we be in much greater need of doctors if we follow 
this way of life rather than the earlier one?"
"Much greater."
"And the land, of course, which was then sufficient for 
feeding the men who were then, will not be small although it 
was sufficient. Or how should we say it?"
"Like that," he said.
"Then must we cut off a piece of our neighbors' land, if 
we are going to have sufficient for pasture and tillage, and 
they in turn from ours, if they let themselves go to the 
unlimited acquisition of money, overstepping the boundary of 
the necessary?"
78"Quite necessarily, Socrates," he said.
^®Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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In this way Plato describes the city in which he finds himself. 
Although Plato did not think Athens to be as contemptible as Syracuse 
and other Italian cities, it is clear that he did not think it to be 
the ideal, just city either. The economic and social reforms that 
are defended in the Republic and Laws are intended to repair Athens 
to a state that is consistent with the idea of virtue that runs 
through all the dialogues.
Plato attributes the generation of a luxurious city to the 
degeneration of the souls of its inhabitants. In Books VIII and IX 
of the Republic Plato traces this psychological deterioration. In 
the simple city— that which is capable of affording men a happy 
life— the inhabitants are true aristocrats (aristoi). In such cities 
a rule of the best, i.e., aristocracy, prevails. "A city so com­
posed," Plato writes, "is hard to be moved." According to Plato, 
however, even the best conceived cities are not static. One expects, 
given Plato’s ontology, that regimes, like people, come into and go 
out of being. This expectation is not ill-founded— Plato espouses a 
theory of flux that is remarkably similar to the modern entropy law 
of thermodynamics. He writes: "But, since for everything that has
come into being there is decay, not even a composition such as this 
will remain for all times; it will be dissolved." Over time human 
nature turns the souls of the aristoi away from the path of excel­




The existence of factions in the city gives rise to the
development of timocratic man. The timocrat prefers honor to true
excellence. The economic institutions that support timocracy are the
development of money-making as a pursuit in itself, and the private
possession of land and other private riches. The psychological
condition that spawns the timocrat is an excess of spiritedness over
the reasoning part of the soul. Because such a soul cannot partake
of virtue through philosophy it inevitably lapses into pursuit of
80false virtues— chiefly money-making.
Like aristocracy, timocracy is unstable. The psychological
imbalance of the inhabitants of the timarchy which resulted in the
81paying of "fierce honor to gold and silver," results in the 
development of overweaning stinginess among the timocrats. The love 
of victories and of honors that accompanies an excess of spiritedness 
gives rise to the pursuit of excessive private fortune. The result­
ing excess of stinginess and money-making creates the oligarchic man 
and the corresponding oligarchic city. The oligarch, who has lost 
sight of honor and the spiritedness of the timocrat, "turns greedily 
to money-making." "There is," Plato writes, "no other transformation






Oligarchy dissolves into democracy, according to Plato's 
theory. Noting that it is "not possible to honor wealth in a city 
and at the same time adequately to maintain moderation among the 
citizens," Plato argues that temperance is lost among the inhabitants 
of the oligarchic city. This yields democracy. Democracy in its 
Platonic formulation is characterized by the prevalence of licen­
tiousness. In a democracy one is free to do as one pleases. Because
of this sort of freedom, a democracy "contains all species of
83regimes." Happiness in a democracy, however, is a matter of
chance. Moreover, without moderation checking the appetitive urges, 
the soul of the democratic man is likely to develop into that of the 
tyrant.
Tyranny is the ultimate state of the decaying polis. It is 
characterized by fear and desire— people are given over to fits of 
desire, and they fear that others might stand in the way of their 
securing the objects of their desire. Plato thought Athens to have 
degenerated into tyranny. How else could a regime have put its 
fairest citizen, Socrates, to death? Plato's prescriptions for 
economic change constitute a response to tyranny. They are, more­
over, consistent with his theory of the soul in flux— the hypothesis 
that argues that the soul, if diverted from reason, degenerates from 
excellence to tyranny and licentiousness.
Plato reasoned that human nature is such that the soul is
easily diverted from the true path to happiness. In Book II of the
83Ibid., p. 235.
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Republic Plato's brother, Adeimantus, quotes Hesiod in describing the
two paths that the soul can follow when seeking the things that it
desires. Plato writes:
Vice in abundance is easy to choose,
The road is smooth and it lies very near,
While the gods have set sweat before vig^ue,
And it is a long road, rough and steep.
The self-tyranny that is spawned when the soul follows the smooth
road is not, in Plato's opinion, consistent with the attainment of
happiness.
Plato's welfare economics seeks to combat the degeneration of 
the polis into a state of tyranny. His prescriptions designed to 
prevent this generation, however, can be divided into two categories: 
(1) those designed to create the best state, and (2) those that, in 
view of the improbability of society choosing the best state, are 
intended to bring about the creation of a "second-best" state. 
Plato's discussion of the best state can be found principally in the 
Republic. In this discussion Plato associates the regime capable of 
maximizing happiness with a caste system in which the ruling classes 
of society are propertyless. The theory of the state found in the 
Republic is based upon the principle of harmony. Harmony occurs when 
each thing in a system, in this case individuals within a polis, 
displays natural, well-ordered relationships with the other things of 
the system. Strings on a lyre, tuned to the harmonious intervals of 
the Western scale, exhibit this relationship. For the Greeks, and
^Ibid., p. 41.
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for Plato in particular, harmony applied not only to music, but to 
all elements of the cosmos. Plato's science presupposes the 
existence of an underlying logos, i.e., an order to things, within 
the cosmos. When individuals achieve an existence that is consistent 
with this logos the relationship between man and the cosmos is 
harmonious. Plato understands man's proper relationship with the 
cosmos to center around his attainment of knowledge of the things 
that are, and, thus, the virtuous life.
Because man, in Plato's understanding of things, ought to 
attune himself to ta onta psychologically— the soul is the part of 
being that perceives the intelligibles— Plato's theory of the best 
state requires an ordering of the city in a fashion that is patterned 
after the well-ordered soul. Society is to be divided up into 
classes. These classes are compared so as to correspond to human 
nature, and, in particular, to the different degrees to which the 
souls of the inhabitants of the polis are capable of partaking of 
virtue. Individuals capable of following the upward path to the 
point of the establishment of episteme make up one class— the 
philosophers. Philosophers in the best state would lead a 
contemplative life that prepares them to recollect a knowledge of the 
things that are, i.e., the virtues. The rulers of the happy state 
would be chosen from this class of individuals. Plato reasoned that 
only those who partake of reason and follow the upward path are 
capable of resisting corruption, and, therefore, promoting justice.
Individuals whose souls are characterized by an abundance of 
spiritedness, who place honor above all else, it is imagined would
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serve as the auxiliaries of the rulers. These guardians would con­
stitute the second class of citizens of the happy state. Their 
function, like that of the spirited part of the soul itself, would be 
to serve reason, in the form of the philosophers, by protecting the 
state. Another important role of the auxiliaries would be to uphold 
the laws, thereby checking the licentiousness of the many.
The first two classes are intended by Plato to live a com­
munistic life. In the best state property would cease to exist. 
Moreover, women, children, and their education would also exist in 
common. Moved, i.e., erotically drawn to, reason, the inhabitants of 
the happiest state would not be much interested in the practice of 
labelling as "mine" the things that come into and go out of being.
Property held in common by these classes is limited in the 
best state to that which is necessary to provide the guardians with 
an adequate level of material well-being. This level of affluence is 
by design neither insufficient to afford guardians the opportunity to 
spend time in pursuit of virtue instead of subsistence, nor so great 
as to awaken the appetitive part of the guardian's soul to the 
pleasures of money-making and fortune-building.
Plato summarizes the lifestyle of the guardians in his intro­
duction to Book VIII of the Republic. He writes:
"All right. This much has been agreed, Glaucon: for a
city that is going to be governed on a high level, women must 
be in common, children and their entire education must be in 
common, and similarly the practices in war and peace must be 
in common, and their kings must be those among them who have 
proved best in philosophy and with respect to war."
"Yes," he said, "it has been agreed."
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"Furthermore, we also accept that when the rulers are 
once established, they must take the lead and settle the 
soldiers in houses— such as we spoke of before-that have 
nothing private for anyone but are common for all. And, in 
addition to such houses, as to possessions, if you remember, 
we presumably came to an agreement about what sort they are 
to have."
"Yes, I do remember," he said, "that we supposed that no 
one must possess any of the things the others nowadays have; 
but that like champions of war and guardians, they will 
receive a wage from the others consisting of the bare sub­
sistence required for their guarding, and for this wage they 
must take care of themselves and the rest of the city."
The life of the many is not mentioned much in Plato's dis­
cussion of the best state. Presumably, in the happiest regime they 
would cease to exist— they would be compelled by reason to possess 
well-ordered souls, and would voluntarily take up philosophy as the 
helmsman of their lives. Plato does mention, time and again, that 
the many must accept moderation as the virtue most dear to their 
souls. The many, incapable as they are of acquiring true knowledge 
of virtue, must seek temperance, on basis of faith (pistis), as the 
avenue to happiness.
Plato concedes in the Laws, if the Athenian stranger's
utterings may be interpreted as the opinions of Plato, that the best 
regime does not likely exist anywhere. Moreover, it is unlikely that 
such a regime would be spontaneously generated in the future. The 
propertyless, contemplative life of the true philosophers is de­
scribed in the Laws as probably only attainable by the gods or their
85Ibid., p. 221.
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86children. To anticipate the actual abolition of private property
would be, in Plato's words, "too demanding for the birth, nurture,
87and education" of the inhabitants of a city.
It is doubtless that Plato was an idealist, although not 
of the naive sort that we envision today. For Plato, idealism 
corresponded to an unshakable belief in the existence of virtues qua 
Forms. Plato's idealism— his preoccupation with the attempt to 
acquire knowledge of eidoi— did not render him a less than capable 
student of human nature. Plato paid attention to the world around 
him. He understood well the fact that people strive to be happy. He 
thought, however, some people not serious enough, in terms of tem­
peramental endowment, to recognize that happiness itself was not 
discoverable through hedonism. He recognized that the many are 
motivated by the opinion that happiness is the same thing as 
pleasure, which, in turn, they identified with the satisfaction of 
desire. Plato, therefore, designed a constitution for a "second- 
best" state, which can be found in the Laws. Plato's theory of the 
"second-best" state attempts to theorize the nature of the regime 
that would best promote happiness in a society in which the many 
would never become philosophers.
Plato's "second-best" regime exists in the form of the con­
stitution of a planned city on the island of Crete— Magnesia. The 
design of this city is the focus of the Laws, which is a dialogue
8^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 126.
87Ibid., p. 127.
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cast in the form of a discussion between three gentlemen— a Spartan, 
a Cretan, and an Athenian (not Socrates). Property would be per­
mitted in Magnesia. The accumulation of property, would be strictly 
regulated. Moreover, the laws that regulate the production, 
exchange, and consumption of property would be reinforced by a 
rigorous plan for education ( paideia) and censorship that would 
render moderation and justice desirable to the many.
In the "second-best" city property would exist in the form of 
lots to be drawn-up by the state. Lots would be distributed to the 
citizens of the city by its founders. The lots would not be equal in 
size, but would vary in accordance with the principle of propor­
tionate inequality. According to this principle the inhabitants of a 
city deserve unequal distributions of property, because of the tem­
peramental differences that exist in their natures. Temperaments, 
Plato reasons, vary in accordance with the composition of the 
individuals' souls. Because of this an egalitarian distribution of 
lots would be inconsistent with the promotion of happiness— it would 
not be harmonious.
The number of lots to be created for the Magnesian population 
would be 5,040. This implies that the city would be somewhat smaller 
than is common today. Guthrie reports that a community of 5,040 
households would correspond to a population of 40,000 to 48,000 
people. In addition the city would be inhabited by about 7,000 to
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8,000 metics--resident aliens--and perhaps 30,000 slaves. The
number of lots being fixed, Plato envisioned a stable population
corresponding to that reported by Guthrie. Presumably, a city of the
size envisioned by Plato would be large enough to produce subsistence
for a community of people living happily, without being so large as
to be luxurious. In addition, taxation in a polis comprising 5,040
households would be convenient, Plato argued, since that number is
89divisible evenly by the numbers one through ten.
Accumulation of wealth in Magnesia would be strictly limited 
by the authorities. The permitted spread of wealth would be no more 
than fourfold— the most valuable estate would be no more than four 
times more valuable than the least valuable lot. In this way Plato 
intended to allow for differences in wealth that suit the tempera­
ments of the Magnesians, while preventing an accumulation of wealth 
that would encourage the timocratic development of money-loving 
within the souls of the citizens. One measure described by Plato
that would limit the accumulation of wealth is that selling and
90buying estates would be punishable by law.
All property accumulated on an estate would have to be 
registered with the authorities, according to Plato's plan. This 
not only facilitates assessment of property value for purposes of 
taxation, but also permits close monitoring of estates in order to
W. K. C. Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, Vol. V 
of A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978), p. 341.
**9Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 124.
90Ibid., p. 132.
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91prevent an excessive accumulation of wealth. These limitations
correspond with Plato’s belief that happiness and material wealth are
not usually found together. He writes:
I at least would never agree with them that a rich man 
becomes truly happy, if he is not also good. But it is 
impossible fotg2 someone to be both unusually good and 
unusually rich.
In the Republic Plato concedes the need for the existence of 
money within the city. In Book II he admits that money can serve as 
a useful standard and store of value. In his discussion of the 
simple city Socrates reasons with Adeimantus that
"Out of this we'll get a market and an established cur­
rency as a token for exchange."
"Most certainly."
"If the farmer or any other craftsman brings what he has 
produced to the market, and he doesn't arrive at the same 
time as those who need what he has to exchange, will he sit 
in the market idle, his craft unattended?"
"Not at all," he said. "There are men who see this 
situation and set themselves to this service; in rightly 
governed cities they are usually those whose bodies are 
weakest and are useless for doing any other job. They must 
stay there in the market and exchange things for money with 
those who need to sell something and exchangeg~ for money 
again, with all those who need to buy something."
In this context money is seen as being superior to barter because it
enables craftsmen to look after their crafts, rather than remain idle
in the marketplace. In addition, it provides work for tradesmen—
91Ibid.
92Ibid., p. 130.
QQPlato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 48.
those who by temperament and physical composition are unsuitable for
94work in the crafts.
One sees in Book VIII, however, that the existence of money
can serve to turn the souls of noble men away from virtue and create
95within them the craving for money-making. For this reason Plato
limits the use of money within the Magnesian economy. First, there
will only be token money in circulation in Magnesia. Plato writes
"no private person shall be allowed to possess any gold or silver,
but only coinage for day-to-day dealings which one can hardly avoid 
96having..." He continues:
For these purposes, we assert that they should possess a kind 
of coin that carries value among themselves but is valueless 
among other human beings. The city itself, however, must 
necessarily possess some money of the sort that is common to 
the Greeks, for use by army expeditions and by travelers who 
go abroad among other human beings— ambassadors, for 
instance, and any other necessary messengers whom the city 
must send out. For the sake of these ^ings, the city, must, 
on each occasion, possess Greek money.
All privately held foreign money, such as the common Greek coinage,
is to be confiscated by the state.
In addition to limiting the circulation of currency to just 
token coinage for day-to-day use, Plato would not have any craftsmen 
work for money. When craftsmen bring their products to the market 
they will exchange them for money, and, in turn, exchange the money
M ibid.
95Ibid., pp. 228-233.
96Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 211.
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for needed commodities and services. The tradesmen of the city, who 
are permitted to work for money, will consist of the group of 
resident aliens or metics. No citizens of the polis will be per­
mitted to become money-changers.
Plato places a further restriction on the use of money in the 
Magnesian economy. Money must not be used to make money--there will 
be no lending of money at interest. It will be quite acceptable 
Plato notes for borrowers in the Magnesian economy to refuse to repay 
both principal and interest upon being charged interest by a 
lender.98
The citizens of the good polis, then, are to be divided into 
four classes of propertyholders in accordance with their natures. 
Citizens will be expected to adopt agriculture as their trade. 
Metics and other visitors will work the marketplace— some as 
craftsmen, others as tradesmen. Neither citizens nor metics are 
permitted to work at two or more jobs. The cultivation of virtue, 
Plato notes, requires full-time effort, and is, therefore, incon­
sistent with part-time jobs. Retail trade in the polis will be 
regulated so that avarice is checked by virtue. Exchange of com­
modities and services will be regulated by Market-Wardens. Their job
is to ensure that exchange between the citizens and metics and
99visitors occurs in the manner prescribed by the law.
98Ibid., p. 129.
"ibid., p. 151.
Plato spells out the laws concerning retail trade in
VIII of the Laws. These laws are described as follows:
One the first day of every month the portion that is to 
be sold to strangers should be brought forth by the selling 
agents (either strangers or slaves, who will act for the city 
dwellers). The first commodity is the twelfth-part of grain. 
Each stranger should at the first market buy the grain that 
he will need for the whole month, along with whatever else 
goes with grain. Then on the tenth day of the month the one 
party should sell, and the other buy, enough liquid goods to 
last the whole month. The third market, for livestock, 
should take place on the twentieth of each month. At that 
time there should be whatever selling and buying of animals 
is necessary for each, as well as the sale on behalf of the 
farmers of any equipment or other goods the strangers must 
acquire by purchase from others (such as animal skins and all 
sorts of clothing, woven goods, wool felt, and some other 
such things).
But as regards retail trade in any of these things, 
including barley, wheat turned into flour, and every other 
sort of food, no one is ever supposed to sell or to buy from 
the city dwellers or their slaves; it should be in the 
strangers' marketplaces that a stranger does his selling to 
craftsmen and their slaves, and performs those dealings in 
wine and grain that are termed "retail trade" by most people. 
Once animals have been slaughtered and cut up, the butchers 
should distribute them to strangers and craftsmen, or their 
domestic servants. And any stranger who wants to, can on any 
day buy any sort of firewood in bulk from agents out in the 
country, and then sell it himself to other strangers— in 
whatever amount and whenever he wishes.
All the other sorts of goods and equipment each needs 
should be brought to the common marketplace and sold in a 
location for each, where the Guardians of the Laws and the 
Market Regulators, along with the City Regulators, should 
mark out appropriate boundaries for stalls for the goods to 
be bought. In these allotted spaces they should exchange 
money for goods and goods for money, not allowing each other 
to get anything without gaining something in return. He who 
gives something on trust must be content whether or not he 
receives the thing, since there'll no longer be a just cause 
of action in such transactions.
If what's purchased or sold creates an excess or a 
deficiency contrary to the law that has said there must not 
be an increase or a decrease beyond a certain sum, then, 
in the former case, the excess should be recorded with the
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Guardians of the Laws and, in the opposite case, the short­
fall should be cancelled. The same ordinances •, concerning
registration of property apply to resident aliens.
These laws set strict standards for the Market-Wardens to follow.
They are designed to prevent the degeneration of the soul to a condition
that is inconsistent with happiness.
The Market-Wardens, Plato describes, will come from the
first and second property c l a s s e s . T h e y  are selected by a
process of electing by vote ten candidates from a list of 
suitable names. From this group five Wardens are chosen, after "due 
scrutiny," by lot. Market-Wardens are to be given the power to
uphold commercial and retail laws on their own, and will be
authorized to fine citizens and metics who fail to observe the
market laws.
In addition to ensuring that only appropriate commodities 
are traded at each market described by the laws, the Market-Wardens
are empowered to regulate the prices of commodities for sale. The
law to be invoked here is:
The seller of anything whatsoever in the marketplace
may never mention two prices for the things he may be
selling, but must utter the price simply, and if he
doesn't obtain this, he would act correctly if he took
the item away again; ajtyl, he may not set a greater or




Prices that Plato considers to be proper are those that will give the
103retailer a "well-measured gain." The guardians of the city are
supposed to meet to establish in writing the "ratio of expenditure to 
receipts" that provide this profit margin. The recorded prices are 
to be put on display in the marketplace and imposed by the 
Market-Wardens.
Plato's laws of the economy extend beyond the regulation of 
the marketplace. In Book VIII of the Laws one finds restrictions on 
agricultural production and resource utilization as well. In 
general, these laws require that citizens of the polis not try to 
produce more than is proper from an estate. One must not attempt to 
encroach on another's property. One must not damage the water supply 
and thereby render it unsuitable for use by farmers who live down­
stream. And, importantly, one should not attempt to stockpile a 
surplus of agricultural products over and beyond what is needed on 
the estate.
The regulation of the economy that Plato envisions includes 
the restriction of international trade. Plato, through the Athenian 
stranger in the Laws, advises that cities should be founded on land 
that is not overly easy to cultivate. Moreover, the location of the 
city should be well away from safe harbors. In the frame of the 
Republic Plato displays his dislike of port towns when Socrates shows
his uneasiness at finding himself detained in Piraeus and outside the 
walls of Athens. Port towns, Plato reckons, are the avenues of 
introduction into a well-ordered state of strange ways and objects 
and artifacts that are designed to stimulate unduly the appetitive 
part of the soul. As with domestic trade, Plato encourages modera­
tion when approaching trade with foreign economies. In the Republic
Plato approves the importation of "what's needed from another 
106city." Imported necessities, however, do not include supplies
used in religious ceremony. Nor are imports of "substances...needed
for an unnecessary purpose in any other art"'^ approved. In any
case, retail trade between states, whose sole purpose is to increase
the wealth of the state, is never to be allowed in the well-conceived 
108city.
Plato's restrictions on trade may strike some modern readers 
as Draconian. To be sure they are inconsistent with an atmosphere of
free-trade within the marketplace. Nevertheless, Plato reasoned that
these regulations on trade, production, and the accumulation of 
wealth promote true happiness. They do so by institutionalizing the 
observance of sophrosyne, moderation, within the economy. It is 
difficult to imagine the existence of immoderate behavior in a market 
in which intemperance is made illegal. This is the effect of the 
laws concerning commerce and property found in Plato's Laws.
■^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 47.
^^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 240.
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The moderation that Plato seeks in his laws is intended to 
produce happiness for the inhabitants of Magnesia by securing true 
freedom for them. Moderation ensures that the soul will not fall 
under the influence of its sub-rational parts. In Book VIII of the 
Republic Plato notes that freedom to do what one pleases is the chief 
characteristic of a democracy— a form of government that he identi­
fies with diseased souls. He argues, however, that this type of 
freedom, i.e., license, is not the same thing as true liberty. 
Liberty, for Plato, arises when the soul subjugates its appetitive 
and spirited parts, and, thereby, enables itself to seek the upward 
path to reasoned knowledge. For the many, who are the inhabitants of
the realistic, "second-best" regime, this liberty becomes attainable
109through the practice of moderation.
This, then, is Plato's theory of economic welfare. Perhaps 
its most unusual feature is that it is designed to produce happiness 
involuntarily among the inhabitants of the city for which it was 
designed. Specifically, Plato claims that the legislation of modera­
tion will produce happiness for the many, even though it is unlikely 
that the many would enthusiastically submit to the institution of 
such laws. In this manner Plato's theory of economic welfare is 
nearly antithetical to much of contemporary welfare analysis. This 
may explain the history of opposition to Plato's views and the dis­
missal of his analysis as pre-scientific. Contemporary welfare 
analysis is based upon the notion that welfare is promoted whenever
■^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 235.
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at least one individual is able to satisfy some desire and no one 
else is penalized; or, when the utility realized from the satisfac­
tion of the individual's desire exceeds any loss in satisfaction 
realized by others. Contemporary welfare economics attempts to 
explain market behavior in terms of voluntary actions taken by 
economic agents. Plato's analysis, on the other hand, explains 
economic welfare in terms of people happily existing in a regulated 
economy in spite of the fact that their appetitive impulses remain 
unsatisfied.
Compared in this way contemporary welfare analysis seems more 
sophistic in nature than Plato's analysis. From a methodological, if 
not a philosophical, perspective contemporary analysis assumes that 
man is the measure of the things that are. The reasoning behind much 
of contemporary analysis suggests that (1) men seek the objects of 
their desire, (2) this quest sometimes produces conflict when desires 
of two or more individuals conflict, (3) welfare analysis seeks to 
suggest patterns of production and distribution that result in the 
greatest level of satisfaction of desires that is reasonably 
attainable.
Plato's analysis, by comparison, assumes the existence of 
objective virtue. Happiness exists as an intelligible Form. Welfare 
is promoted when people acquire reasoned knowledge of happiness 
itself. According to Plato's epistemology, however, such knowledge 
is difficult to come by. People attain knowledge of intelligible 
virtues by recollecting their characteristics through a process of 
serious dialectical inquiry. For Plato the Good, or, in the Laws,
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God, is the measure of the things that are. The Good— the ultimate 
virtue in which the particular virtues partake— moves the soul by 
making its existence known to it. Happiness is thus defined as the 
result of the soul's partaking of virtue through the virtuous life 
that is piloted by reason.
It is consistent for Plato to have reasoned that welfare for 
the many is improved through institutionalized temperance. Modera­
tion, after all, is the virtue to which the sub-rational soul can 
aspire, according to Plato's analysis. It is logical, therefore, for 
Plato to have prescribed a series of market restrictions designed to 
quell the tyrannical desires that he recognized in the souls of the 
many. Society, Plato reasoned, is chained, by its failure to master 
the passions, and in the dark; it is forever looking at shadows and 
misperceiving the clues that suggest the existence of virtue itself. 
Moved by this view of society Plato sought to promote welfare by 
making society virtuous. If society could not partake of reason on a 
grand scale, at least it could become virtuous by acquiring tem­
perance. Plato's theory of welfare is, thus, the economics of 
moderation.
Plato's theory of moderation is the product of the systematic 
exercise of reason. Consequently it constitutes an attempt to 
produce science. It analyzes the best organization of the economy in 
terms of the economy's ability to be brought into conformity with an 
absolute standard of goodness. That this analysis does not antici­
pate all of the features of modern analysis does not make it non- 
scientific. It simply reflects the fact that Plato was nearly the
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first scientist to inquire into the nature of the economy that best 
produces well-being.
In summary, Plato reasoned that the Good exists, albeit in a 
plane that is "beyond being." This supreme virtue engenders parti­
cular virtues with their qualities. Happiness, or well-being, is 
attained, according to Plato's system of knowledge, when the soul 
recognizes the existence of the Good and conforms to it, producing 
harmony. A harmonious existence requires that no individual attempt 
to pursue many crafts, i.e., that there should exist a division of 
labor, and that individuals produce, exchange, and consume com­
modities and services moderately.
CHAPTER 4
PLATO’S NOTION OF THE SUFFICIENT ECONOMY
I have argued that Plato envisioned an economy organized 
around the principle of moderation. An economy in which citizens 
produce, exchange, and consume with an eye toward temperance, Plato 
argued, would produce the greatest degree of social well-being. This 
temperate economy was ultimately based upon the notion of suf­
ficiency. One must remember that Plato concerned himself primarily 
with discovery of things that were beyond being— things that are, 
i.e., that do not come into and go out of being. According to Plato, 
the serious person, spoudaios, attempts to become like the things 
that are. For example, the serious person attempts to become
virtuous, i.e., like virtue itself. For such an individual the realm 
of things that are sensed—  aisthesis— offers little that could 
promote happiness. After all, Plato conceived happiness to be an 
intelligible concept; to possess happiness one must seek it through a 
disciplined program of rational inquiry. According to Plato's system 
of thought, men acquire physical things for the purpose of sub­
sistence, rather than for the attainment of happiness. With respect 
to the acquisition of physical things, Plato considered the operative 
principle to be sufficiency--ikanotes. An economy constructed around 
this principle would seek to be sufficient and whole; it would not 
lock itself into the viscious cycle of growing to meet the demands of
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the many, whose demands, in turn and as a result of economic growth, 
grow. The principle of ikanotes, or sufficiency, provides con­
temporary policy-makers with a useful solution to the many problems 
that are associated with a perpetually growing global economy.
I. Sufficiency
Plato's concept of sufficiency is directly related to his 
theory of moderation. A temperate life, which is associated with the 
happy life, is assured when the many acquire commodities and services 
with a goal of becoming sufficient. Plato introduces the notion of 
the sufficient life in the Lysis. In a passage from a discussion 
between Socrates and Lysis, Plato establishes parameters for suf­
ficiency by dispelling one common formulation of the life of 
sufficiency, i.e., the life of self-sufficiency. Recall that in the 
Lysis the overall theme concerns the nature of friendship. Socrates 
inquires about the nature of friendship and, at one point, connects 
it with sufficiency. In the Lysis Plato writes:
[Socrates:] But, you will say, the like man is not a friend 
to the like man, but the good will be a friend to the good, 
in so far as he is good, not in so far as he is like.
[Lysis:] Perhaps I may.
And I should rejoin, Will not the good man, in so far as 
he is good, be found to be sufficient for himself?
Yes.
And if sufficient, he will want nothing so far as his 
sufficiency goes.
Of course not.
And if he does not want anything he won't feel regard for 
anything either.
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To be sure not.
And what he does not feel regard for, he cannot love.
Not he.
And if he does not love, he won't be a friend.
Clearly not.*
In the passage above Plato argues that good men are friends, and yet 
they are not self-sufficient. Ikanotes, as Plato envisions it, does 
not mean that an individual requires nothing of anyone else. This, 
remember, would be inconsistent with his notion of the specializa­
tion of labor. Sufficiency is, then, clearly not the same thing as 
self-sufficiency.
In the Republic, Plato again introduces the idea of the 
sufficient life. Discussing the proper size of the ideal city in 
Book IV, Plato argues through Socrates that a proper city should not 
grow beyond a certain size. Socrates argues with Adeimantus:
"Therefore," I said, "this would also be the fairest 
boundary for our rulers; so big must they make the city, and 
bounding off enough land so that it will be of that size, 
they must let the rest go."
"What boundary?" he said.
"I suppose this one," I said, "up to that point in 
its growth at which it's willing to be one, let it grow, and 
not beyond."
"That's fine," he said.
"Therefore, we'll also set this further command on 
the guardians, to guard in every way against the city's being
*Plato, "Lysis," in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961), p. 158.
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littl| or seemingly big; rather it should be sufficient and 
one."
The ideal city, it seems, should be neither too small, nor so large
as to qualify as luxurious. Rather, an ideal city should be of a
size so as to yield sufficient production for the subsistence needs
of its inhabitants.
The analogy of the jars from the Gorgias serves to illustrate
the virtue of obtaining temperance through the acquisition of a
sufficient amount of subsistence commodities. One will remember that
in this analogy Socrates discusses two men possessing several jars
each, while the other, whose jars are riddled with holes, is unable
to achieve sufficiency. He is reduced, according to the analogy, to
perpetually returning to the sources of the items that he needs to
refill his damaged containers. By this analogy Plato means to
suggest that temperance requires that an individual secure sufficient
stocks and stores of those physical items that contribute to a
comfortable existence. To constantly consume commodities without a
proper end— sufficiency— in sight, is to misperceive the appropriate
3ends of human action, in Plato's opinion.
Gerald Alonzo Smith restates Plato's analogy in a slightly
different form in his essay "The Teleological View of Wealth: A
4Historical Perspective." Smith writes:
^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan 
Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 100-101.
^Plato, "Gorgias," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 275.
^Gerald Alonzo Smith, "The Teleological View of Wealth: A
Historical Perspective," in Economics, Ecology, Ethics, ed. Herman E. 
Daly (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1980), pp. 215-237.
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The practice of medicine may require the prescription of an 
addictive stimulant for the sake of good health. The amount 
of the stimulant is finite and limited by the end. When, 
however, one takes a stimulant for its own sake, the desire 
for it becomes infinite since it is no longer limited by a 
final goal but is an end in itself.
The point of each analogy is the same— acquisition of physical things
ought properly to be limited by an end. For Smith the proper end of
human actions is linked with Aristotle's causa finalis, or final
cause, from the peripatetic's theory of causes. According to this
theory there exist four essential causes for every course of human
action. These are the causa materialis, the causa efficiens, the
causa formalis, and the causa finalis. Smith summarizes Aristotle's
conception of causes in the following example:
An example is the building of a house wherein the wood and
other materials are the causa materialis, the carpenter's 
labor and the tools are the causa efficiens, the blueprint or 
plan in the carpenter's mind is the causa formalis, and the 
desire to have a home for shelter and comfort is the causa 
finalis.
The example above does in some respects trivialize the Aristotelian
concept of causes. It does provide the reader with analogies to the
four causes, but succeeds in reducing the significance of Aristotle's 
final cause of human activity. Aristotle, like Plato before him, 
envisioned the causa finalis to be the attainment of happiness. 
Smith cites the work of four economists— Sismondi, Ruskin, Hobson, 




which can lead to appropriate causa finalis is destined to give 
satisfaction in fruition since only the appropriate causa finalis 
gives a fundamental unity to the problem of human behavior."7 Plato, 
too, realized the necessity of adopting a teleological view of 
wealth. According to this view, the proper end of acquisition is 
sufficiency. Sufficiency, however, is subordinate to the end of 
temperance, which, in turn, is subordinate to the ultimate aim of 
happiness. Viewed this way Plato's notion of the happy life can be 
categorized thus: sufficiency provides the causa efficiens, modera­
tion provides the causa formalis, and happiness provides the causa 
finalis of human activity. That is, sufficiency is that which 
enables the model of the temperate life to be achieved by an 
individual. This model life, i.e., the life of moderation, is, in 
turn, ultimately oriented toward the final goal of the individual's 
attainment of happiness.
Happiness, then, requires that an economy be oriented toward 
the goal of producing a sufficient quantity of commodities and ser­
vices . The sufficient quantity that Plato has in mind is an amount 
that rids men of poverty, and, yet, does not constitute such a large 
quantity of material riches so as to qualify as a luxurious estate. 




SOCRATES: ...Look at it in this way. In the fabric of a 
man's material estate do you see any other evil than poverty?
POLUS: No, only poverty.
SOCRATES: And what about his bodily constitution? Would
you say its evil is weakness and sickness and ugliness and 
such things?
POLUS: I would.
SOCRATES: And do you consider there is an evil condition
of the soul?
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And do you call this injustice and ignorance
and cowardice and the like?
POLUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then for these three, material fortune, body,
and soul, you have named three evils, poverty, disease, and 
injustice?
POLUS: Yes.8
The art which rids men of material evil— poverty— is economics or
9money-making, in Plato's opinion. This art enables men to con­
veniently and efficiently produce a level of material affluence that 
is sufficient to nourish a life of moderation.
Among the three human evils that Plato identifies in the
passage above, injustice is singled out as being the most severe 
evil. Injustice, after all, is a psychological state which turns the
soul away from the true aim of happiness. In several places in the
8Plato, "Gorgias," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 260.
9Ibid., p. 261.
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dialogues Plato associates the life of injustice with tyranny. In 
the Gorgias he makes this point clear in the following passage:
SOCRATES: And is not this just the man who does the
greatest wrong and indulges in the greatest injustice and yet 
contrives to escape admonition, correction, or punishment—  
the very condition you describe as achieved by Archelaus and 
other tyrants, orators, and potentates?
POLUS: It seems so.
SOCRATES: For what these have contrived, my good friend,
is pretty much as if a man afflicted with the most grievous 
ailments should contrive not to pay the doctors the penalty 
of his sins against his body by submitting to treatment,
because he is afraid, like a child, of the pain of cautery or
surgery. Do you not agree?
POLUS: I do.
SOCRATES: He is evidently ignorant of the meaning of
health and physical fitness. For apparently, as our recent 
admissions prove, those who escape punishment also act much 
in the same way, Polus. They see its painfulness hut are
blind to its benefit and know not how much more miserable
than a union with an unhealthy body is a union with a soul 
that is not healthy but corrupt and impious and evil, and so 
they leave nothing undone to avoid being punished and liber­
ated from the greatest of ills, providing themselves with 
money and friends and the highest attainable powers of 
persuasive rhetoric. But if we have been right in our 
admissions, Polus, do you see the results of our argument, or 
shall we sum them up together?
POLUS: Yes, if you wish.
SOCRATES: Is not our conclusion then that injustice and
the doing of wrong is the greatest of evils?
POLUS: Evidently.10
The life of tyranny is the opposite of the life of poverty. 
The tyrannical state refrains from the production of no thing that 
the appetitive soul desires. The tyrannical state is that which
10Ibid., pp. 262-263.
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Plato associates with the city of sows in the Republic. It is a city
of luxury. It is the "feverish city."** "Nothing," Plato writes,
12"stands in its way." In such a state men become addicted to the
stimulants of appetite, consuming them for their own sake. Under
such circumstances the soul of the individual is turned from the
proper causa finalis— happiness. Smith points out that this
existence accounts for the enslavement of mankind to the constant
requirements of production and economic growth. Plato understood
Smith's point well. Referring to the jars analogy, and, in
particular, to the individual who slavishly attempts to keep his
perforated jars filled, Plato notes that "a life of pleasure demands
13the largest possible influx." He continues:
SOCRATES: Then if there is a big influx, must there not
also be a great outflow, and must not the holes for the 
outflow be large?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: It is the life of a plover you mean, not that
of a corpse or a stone. And now tell me. You are thinking 
of some such thing as being hungry and, when hungry, eating?
CALLICLES: I am.
SOCRATES: And being thirsty and, when thirsty, drinking?
CALLICLES: Yes, and experiencing all the other appetites 
and being able to satisfy them and living happily in the 
enjoyment of them.
SOCRATES: Good, my worthy friend, just continue as you
began, and mind you do not falter through shame. And I too,
**Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 49.
Ibid.
*"*Plato, "Gorgias," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 276.
it seems, must throw all shame aside. First of all then, 
tell me whether one who suffers from the itch and longs to 
scratch himself, if he can scratch himself to his heart's 
content and continue scratching all his life, can be said to 
live happily.
CALLICLES: How absurd you are, Socrates, a regular mob
orator!,
SOCRATES: That, Callicles, is why I frightened Polus and
Gorgias and put them to shame, but you surely will not be 
dismayed or abashed, for you have courage. Only give me your 
answer.
CALLICLES: Well then, I sĵ y that even one who scratches
himself would live pleasantly.
Socrates goes on to discredit Callicles' notion of the happy life,
likening the life of the man who scratches himself interminably with
the life of a catamite. He makes clear the point described by
Smith— to be given over to attempting to satisfy appetitive urges
without having a final cause in mind is to be miserable.
II. The Sufficient State
The sufficient state exists somewhere between the state of 
poverty and the state of tyrannical luxury. Such a state would not 
have as an economic goal the maximization of economic output. Plato 
suggests that the tyrannical state is that which is caught up in the 
production of the largest influx and outflow of commodities and 
services. Its problem is that it does not yield happiness for its 
inhabitants, according to Plato's theory.
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The constitution of Magnesia serves as Plato's description of 
the sufficient state. In Plato's condemnation of the Persian regime, 
which appears in the Laws, one sees that the Magnesian economy should 
not participate in the production of luxury. From Book III:
Ath. Now I divine that Cyrus, though in other respects a
good general and a friend to his city, failed com­
pletely to grasp what is a correct education, and 
didn't direct his mind at all to [economics.]
Kl. What makes us assert such a thing?
Ath. It's likely that he spent his whole life, from youth 
on, preoccupied with military matters, and turned his 
children over to the women to be brought up. They 
brought the children up as though they were happy 
from the time they were babies, and blessed from the
moment they were born, lacking nothing. The women
allowed no one to oppose them in anything, on the
grounds that they were endowed with happiness, and
compelled everyone else to praise whatever the chil­
dren said or did: that was the sort of children they
raised.
Kl. It sounds lovely, this upbringing you've described!
Ath. A feminine upbringing— the children were brought up 
by royal, newly-rich women, and in the absence of the 
men, who were unable to find leisure because of wars 
and many other dangers.
Kl. That stands to reason.
Ath. Their father, meanwhile, kept acquiring flocks and 
herds, including many droves of men along with many 
other animals, on their behalf; but he didn't know 
that they to whom he was going to give all this were 
not being educated in their father's art, which was 
Persian (for the Persians are shepherds because of 
the rough country from which they originate). This 
art is a tough one, sufficient to make men very 
strong herdsmen, capable of living outdoors, able to 
keep watch without sleep, and ready to serve as 
soldiers whenever they have to. Anyway, he failed to
see that women and eunuchs had given his sons an 
education which had been corrupted by the so-called 
happiness of the Medes, and the sons turned out as 
one would expect, after having been brought up 
without any restraint. When his children took over
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from Cyrus after his death, they were bursting with 
luxury and lack of restraint. First one killed the 
other because he couldn't bear to share equally; 
after this the one who remained, maddened by drunken­
ness and lack of education, had his rule destroyed by 
the Medes and by the fellow they, at that time, 
called "the Eunuch," who had nothing but contempt for 
the silliness of Cambyses.
Through this story Plato relates the corruption of tyrannical luxury.
When individuals receive an inadequate education concerning the true
nature of virtue, they are given over to excess, and killing in order
to prevent the loss of acquired luxury. Such is the fate of regimes
that do not reconcile the usefulness of sufficient production and
temperance with the goal of happiness.
The Magnesian state is also contrasted with the Spartan 
regime in Book III of the Laws. Plato associated Sparta with the 
ascetic life, in which the city's inhabitants engage in restraint and 
material poverty. A careful reading of Plato's description of 
Sparta, however, cannot but reveal that Plato views the Spartan 
asceticism as being that type of moderation that arises from a sense 
of self-indulgence. The Spartans practice a severe form of 
temperance not because they perceive the moderate life to be happy, 
but, rather, because the ascetic life breeds tough citizens who are 
capable of holding their own in battle. This sort of temperance has 
not happiness as its goal, but, instead, is designed to promote 
excellence in the area of martial arts. The Spartans practice 
temperance for fear of falling prey to uncontrolled passion, which
^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L.
Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 79-80.
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would render them effeminate, and similar in character to the sons of
Cyrus. One will recall that this type of moderation is associated in
17the Phaedo with a perverse sort of self-indulgence. Plato charac­
terizes such individuals saying: "it is really because they cannot
18resist some pleasures that they succeed in resisting others..." 
This amounts to controlling one's appetites by indulging in others—  
in the case of the Spartans, it is indulgence in honor-loving and 
spirited forms of living.
Plato uses the Persian and Spartan economies to illustrate 
the excesses to which an economy can subscribe if organized around 
models of the soul which are deficient in one sense or another. The 
Persian economy is illustrative of the tyranny which results when 
individuals indulge the passions in an attempt to sate the appetitive 
part of the soul. Plato is careful to show that such a regime is 
generated when the many, here represented by the child-like minds of 
the spoiled Persian Princes, are not given strong models of honor in 
which to invest their faith. The sons of the king are never schooled 
in the virtue of temperance, according to Plato's story, and thus 
become slaves of their appetites. As Plato argues earlier in the 
Republic, such behavior cannot result in the attainment of happiness; 
rather, it breeds the tyrannical overindulgence of appetite that 
characterizes the Persian state after the passing of the king. The 
lack of trust in the motives and intentions of one's fellow, which
^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 51.
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typifies the tyrannical soul, turns brother against brother in a 
battle for that which is fundamentally unattainable. Plato rejects 
the Persian model for the economy as unsound on the grounds that it 
precludes the attainment of happiness for individuals by virtue of 
its encouragement of cultivation of the appetitive part of the soul.
Plato, too, rejects the model of the Spartan economy for the 
reason that it represents the institutionalization of a deficient 
psychology. In the case of Sparta, however, it is not that the state 
promotes appetitive behavior, but, rather, that it restricts it in an 
undesirable way. When Plato discusses the notion of temperance 
through overindulgence, it includes the Spartan psychology. The 
Spartans adopted an ascetic life style, not out of a belief in the 
self-evident virtue of temperance, but out of a worship of honor and 
spiritedness. The Spartans sought to cultivate citizens who could 
excel in battle. The honor-loving individual recognizes, Plato 
reasons, the dangers of overindulgence of the passions. Such 
behavior breeds the weakness that proved to be the undoing of the 
Persians. Spartan temperance, however, is not grounded in true 
virtuous behavior, but, instead, is based upon a psychology which 
suffers from an excess of spiritedness. Just as Plato rejected the 
notion that the Persian model of the economy could foster happiness, 
so, too, he dismisses the possibility that the Spartan model would 
suffice to promote welfare. To be sure, Plato considered the Spartan 
model superior to the Persian. After all, it represented the result 
of an imbalance of the soul which veers from the ideal less than the 
tyranny of rule by appetite. Even so, the Spartan constitution is
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less desirable than one which obtains from a model of the virtuous 
soul in which reason governs both spiritedness and appetite. For 
this reason, Plato speculates on the design of the Magnesian economy.
Magnesia is designed to lie, in terms of moderation, some­
where between the Spartan and Persian regimes. It is, recall,
designed to be constructed well away from good harbors, and on soil 
of only average productivity. This location insures that the 
Magnesians would find it difficult to develop a luxurious state. The 
fact that the land would be difficult to work, or that the Magnesians 
would experience difficulty in establishing a profitable foreign
trade, does not dismay Plato. He views such hardship as beneficial 
to society. In such conditions the inhabitants of a city would 
produce a sufficient quantity of economic output by default. This 
sufficiency would guarantee that the inhabitants live moderately. 
This moderation would, in Plato's opinion, serve well the ultimate 
goal of happiness.
Magnesia is envisioned by Plato to be a stationary-state. 
Its population, recall, is to be limited to the number corresponding 
to a city with 5,040 households. The land in the city is to be 
carefully administered in a way that promotes sufficiency for all 
inhabitants of the city. Recognizing the different needs of individ­
uals, which arise, Plato claims, from differences in temperament, 
Plato permitted a spread of wealth that would amount to a fourfold 
difference between the largest and smallest estates. The absolute 
size of these estates, Plato envisioned, would never be allowed to 
increase— any surplus value would be turned over to the government.
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In this way the physical wealth of Magnesia would remain constant 
19over time.
The population of Magnesia, like the stock of physical
wealth, would remain constant. In Book V of the Laws Plato describes
a system of population management. He writes:
[I]n families where there are more than one [child], the 
females should be given in marriage according to the law that 
will be ordained, and the males should be distributed as sons 
to those citizens who lack sons. Personal likes and dislikes 
should be followed as closely as possible. If there are some 
who can find no one who pleases them, or if a surplus of 
females or males occurs, or on the contrary a deficiency 
because of a lack of childbirths, there will be a magistracy 
which we will designate— the greatest and most honored, in 
fact— which should, after looking into all these things, 
devise means of assisting those who have too many offspring 
and those who are lacking, so as to maintain the five 
thousand forty households always intact insofar as is 
possible. There are many devices, including ways of pre­
venting birth in those who conceive too many offspring, and, 
on the contrary, various ways of encouraging and stimulating 
a greater number of conceptions. The use of honors and 
dishonors, as well as the encouraging words of elders 
addressed to young people, can accomplish what we're talking 
about.
In extreme cases in which the population were to exceed that which is
appropriate to 5,040 households, the surplus of people would be
dispatched to build new cities. Plato, however, is not desirous of
21permitting an economy to grow beyond a sufficient size.
Plato's notion of sufficiency is based upon his observation 
that the ideal city should be like a man. According to Plato's




theory of being, men possess souls that serve as the bodily organ 
capable of discovering the existence and qualities of the intel­
ligible virtues. The souls of men are well-ordered if they partake 
of the virtues in the proper proportions— this is Plato's principle 
of harmony. The city, too, ought to exist in harmonious proportion 
with virtue. The well-ordered city is not unlike the well-ordered 
soul. In the Republic Plato writes:
[Socrates:] "Then is that city best governed which is most 
like a single human being? For example, when one of us
wounds a finger, presumably the entire community— that commu­
nity tying the body together with the soul in a single ar­
rangement under the ruler within it— is aware of the fact,
and all of it is in pain as a whole along with the afflicted 
part; and it is in this sense we say that this human being 
has a pain in his finger. And does the same argument hold 
for any other part of a human being, both when it is
afflicted by pain and when eased by pleasure?"
[Glaucon:] "Yes, it does," he said. "And, as to what you 
ask, the9 city with the best regime is most like such a human 
being."
The city is similar in its composition to the body of an individual. 
The human body reaches an equilibrium when it is healthy. If it is 
undernourished it withers; if overfed and pampered, the human body 
loses fitness and becomes subject to disease. The body seeks an 
equilibrium in which it is sufficiently nourished. In Plato's opin­
ion, the ideal city enjoys an equilibrium that is similar to that of 
the well-nourished, well-exercised body--if the city is too small it 
is incapable of producing subsistence for its inhabitants; if the 
city grows excessively it is, in Plato's terms, no longer one, i.e.,
^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, pp. 141-142.
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no longer sufficient. The city, like the body, is a finite, open
system, which requires a constant influx and outflow of matter and
energy. As Plato suggests in his analogy of the jars, the influx and
outflow of materials should not be excessive. In order that a city
may produce happiness for its inhabitants, it must be founded upon
the virtue of moderation, which requires that it produce the physical
necessities for its inhabitants in sufficient, not luxurious, quanti- 
23ties.
Economists are beginning to appreciate the importance of the 
idea of the stationary-state, such as the one described by Plato. 
The popular models of physical science suggest that the natural 
condition of life on earth is that of a finite, open biosystem. This 
biosystem requires that relatively low-entropy matter and energy be 
available for use, and that higher-entropy wastes be removed from the 
system. Plato's biological analogy, likening the economy to the 
human body, is as appropriate for today as it was for his discussion 
of the ideal state in antiquity. Herman E. Daly has pointed out that 
economists such as Marshall and Hobson have encouraged the use of 
biological analogies in contemporary economics. Daly himself likens 
the economic process to the process of metabolism in the human body. 
He notes:
The close similarity of the basic within-skin life process of 
metabolism (anabolism and catabolism) with the outside-skin 
life process of economics (production and consumption) is 
evident...
O O
Plato, "Gorgias," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 276.
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In either process the only material output is waste. The 
purpose (value produced) of the metabolic process is the
maintenance of life. The purpose (value produced) of the
economic process is the maintenance and enjoyment of life.
As man comes to appreciate the view of the world as a finite dowry of
available matter and energy, and one in which the capacity to absorb
the waste by-products of economic activity is limited, he becomes
aware of the inevitability that economic growth cannot be achieved
indefinitely in the future. Like the body, the economy must reach a
size that is sufficient to produce a comfortable subsistence for its
inhabitants, and, yet, it must not grow so large as to disrupt the
equilibrium— the harmony, in Plato's term— of the environment that
enables the human economy to successfully slough off its waste
by-products.
The economy, as understood from the perspective of contempo­
rary economics, grows in response to the effects on prices of an 
excess demand for commodities and services at existing market 
prices--the increases in prices that ordinarily accompany conditions 
of excess demand precipitate increases in output in the marketplace. 
That excess demand should prevail in a market is the result of what 
Plato describes as a psychological imbalance in which the soul is 
given over to preoccupation with the satisfaction of the appetites. 
The individual who possesses such a soul is, in Plato's terms, 
poverty-stricken. Plato defines poverty in the Laws as a problem
24Herman E. Daly, "On Economics as a Life Science," in 
Economics, Ecology, Ethics, p. 240.
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associated with excessive greed, rather than with insufficient
wealth. He writes that "poverty consists not in a lessening of one's
25property but in an increase of one's avarice."
In Plato's mind, the ideal economy is one in which the 
poverty of avarice is displaced by a spirit of sufficiency that is 
embraced by the people. This sufficiency is the belief that there 
exists such a thing as "enough." The belief by the individual that 
"enough" possessions may be possessed comes easily, Plato argues, to 
the soul that is well-ordered. A city inhabited by citizens possess­
ing this temperament would find that a moderate-sized economy is 
capable, under the circumstances Plato describes as being associated 
with the location of the Magnesian economy, of producing a volume of 
commodities and services suitable for maintenance of a comfortable 
lifestyle, i.e., sufficiency.
Contemporary economies have resorted to different solutions 
to the fundamental problem of scarcity of desired resources. Market 
economies typically use the price system to ration valuable commodi­
ties and services. In those instances in which a market economy is 
incapable of adequately providing a rationing function, for example 
when externalities exist, the market is frequently assisted by the 
legal system, which attempts to complement the price system with a 
just method of allocating resources. In societies in which the 
market is subordinated to the operations of the regime, the legal
^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 123.
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system provides an almost complete, although frequently unsatisfac­
tory, rationing of the things held dear by individuals. In either 
instance the economy is based upon the notion that people want more 
than they can conveniently secure, because of scarcity. Such econo­
mies operate as if there is nothing inherently wrong with such de­
sires, rather the fault can be credited to a less than generous 
nature of physis.
According to Plato's theory of welfare, scarcity is rooted in 
the soul's tendency towards imbalance— in particular, an imbalance in 
which the appetitive part of the soul masters reason and spirit. 
Scarcity is alleviated when harmony is restored to the soul. When 
this occurs the individual accepts the notion that "Enough is 
enough." Under such conditions it is not likely that an economy 
would be plagued by excess demand for output. Instead, the economy 
would be organized to produce a sufficient level of output.
Plato realized that individuals are driven by the tendency to 
seek pleasure and avoid pain. "By nature," Plato writes, "the human 
consists above all in pleasures and pains and desires. To these
every mortal animal is, as it were, inextricably attached and bound
26in the most serious ways." Desire and longing are natural and
provide the basis for Plato's philosophia— the theory of the erotic
27urge from the Symposium. Nevertheless, true pleasure, which is 
desirable, is not associated with the life of profligacy; it can be
26Ibid., p. 119.
2^Plato, "Symposium," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 553.
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found in the psychological harmony which attends the soul that dis­
covers the sublime nature of the intelligible virtues. For this 
reason Plato did not believe that an economy should strive to produce 
an ever-increasing array of commodities and services. Moderation 
affords the many happiness. Sufficiency, ikanotes, corresponds to 
the level of economic output that is consistent with moderation.
A restoration of the belief in the virtue of sufficiency 
could solve many of the economic problems that hamper economic wel­
fare today. Daly and others point out that an optimum size for 
population exists. This population corresponds to that which is 
capable of maximizing the level of material well-being for the 
inhabitants of an economy. A population that falls short of this
level, as well as one that exceeds it, would prove incapable of
28providing a similar level of affluence. There must also exist a 
level of physical capital that corresponds to the optimum population. 
Such a stock of physical artifacts would sustain life comfortably. A 
smaller capital stock than this would be insufficient to generate a 
comfortable subsistence; one that is larger would prove unwieldy and 
prohibitive, if not impossible, to maintain. Adoption of Plato's 
notion of sufficiency by the inhabitants of the contemporary economy 
would enable welfare to be served without resort to various 
unpleasant methods of rationing commodities in a world of poverty—  
poverty being defined in the Platonic sense.
28Herman E. Daly, "The Optimal Population," a lecture on the 
Economics of Population, Resources, and the Environment, Economics 
4320, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, February 1976.
CHAPTER 5
PLATO'S THEORIES OF USURY AND THE JUST PRICE
An important element of Plato's theory of welfare is the 
notion of economic justice. Justice, recall, is one of the chief 
virtues which must be cultivated in the best state. Justice requires 
of an individual that he or she do what is his or her own business. 
This behavior ensures that an individual will perform the task for 
which he or she is best suited temperamentally. In the best economy 
an individual would be allowed to specialize in a field of endeavor 
in which he or she could find happiness. No citizen in the best 
economy would be permitted to speculate in the market-place. Mar­
keting and money-changing would be left to the class of resident 
aliens— metics.
Plato's reason for not wanting citizens to earn a livelihood 
within the marketplace is teleological in nature. The aim of life is 
the attainment of happiness. Happiness, in the Platonic conception, 
requires that an individual seek a psychological balance in which 
reason rules spirit and the passions. The proper goal of production 
and consumption is subsistence— one does not seek profit in the 
marketplace for the sake of wealth alone. Because Plato does not 
associate wealth with happiness— "wealth...corrupts the soul of human
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beings through luxury"1--he does not permit the acquisition of wealth 
for its own sake in the best economy.
For this reason Plato outlawed forms of increasing wealth 
which serve chiefly to enhance one's estate. Charging interest on 
loans, and selling a thing for "more than its real value" are exam­
ples of wealth-getting to be outlawed in the best economy.
Plato was not the originator of theories of usury and the 
just price. Baldwin points out that the term "just price" is "almost
as old as existing commercial records and probably as old as economic
2exchange itself." Baldwin finds the term in use in Babylonian
3records not long after the time of Hammurabi. Nevertheless, in his 
theory of welfare Plato was an early articulator of ideas of market
justice which excluded from the best economy the practices of charg­
ing interest on loans and selling above the "true worth" of a thing.
I. Medieval Just Price Theory
The economic literature devoted to the analysis of the devel­
opment of early market theories of value does not credit Plato with 
contributing to just price and usury theories. Instead, the litera­
ture focuses on medieval-to-Enlightenment-period formulations of 
these concepts, while pointing in the direction of their roots in the
^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L. 
Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 319.
^John W. Baldwin, "The Medieval Theories of the Just Price,"
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, July 1959, re­
printed in Pre-Capitalist Economic Thought Three Modern Interpreta­
tions , ed. Leonard Silk (New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 8.
3Ibid.
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philosophy of Aristotle, as well as in Roman law. There can be 
little doubt concerning the intellectual debt of Scholastic phi­
losophy to both its Greek and Roman inheritance. There can be no 
doubt, further, that St. Thomas, who along with his teacher St. 
Albert popularized the writings of Aristotle in the Medieval period, 
drew heavily upon Aristotelian thought on the principles of economic 
justice. Even so, it is unlikely that Aristotle formulated his 
theories of usury and the just price independent of his teacher's 
opinions on these subjects. Why, then, does Plato not appear in the 
literature on the Medieval theories of price?
The obvious answer to the question concerning Plato's absence 
from the literature on usury and the just price is that his work 
simply did not influence the doctors to the extent that Aristotle's 
did. In the strictest sense this response is correct, although 
Platonism did shape Medieval Catholic philosophy through the 
influence of St. Augustine. One suspects, however, that the general 
dissatisfaction that exists among contemporary economists concerning 
Plato's economic thought, accounts for at least part of the tendency 
to overlook Plato's contributions to notions of economic justice. In 
this chapter I will discuss these contributions and argue that they, 
owing to their similarity to Aristotle's theories, helped shape the 
conception of the "real value of things" which flourished under the 
Schoolmen during the Medieval period.
The literature devoted to the analysis of ancient and 
medieval theories of usury and the just price is unusually well- 
developed. This fact can be explained by the importance accorded by
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economists to theories of value and price. In an attempt to come to 
grips with different societies’ methods of valuation economists have 
studied well the Schooolmen's tendency to associate price with the 
"real value of things." The literature, however, tends to be split 
into two categories— that which associates market justice in ancient 
and medieval times with the maintenance of existing class structures, 
and that which associates market justice from this period with a wide 
amount of freedom in the marketplace. Many of the popular works on 
the notion of the just price, for instance, claim that the medieval 
doctors argued in favor of the just price being that which maintains 
the status of the seller of a commodity or service. This interpreta­
tion of medieval economic thought is found, in particular, in the
4writings of Max Weber and Werner Sombart. Weber and Sombart appear
to have placed undue importance on the work of the unorthodox
Scholastic Heinrich von Langenstein, who did espouse a status-
maintaining view of the just price.^ Recent literature on medieval
economic thought, however, tends to associate the doctors' just price
6with the market price for a commodity or service.
4cf. the exposition of their theories by Raymond De Roover, 
"The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy," The
Journal of Economic History, 18 (1958), 418-434, reprinted in
Readings in the History of Economic Theory, ed. Ingrid H. Rima (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 10.
5Ibid.
^For compelling arguments in favor of the view that the 
Schoolmen held the just price to be the market price of a thing, 
rather than the cost-covering price or the status-maintaining price, 
consult De Roover and Baldwin. For a more recent and quite elegant 
presentation of this thesis see Odd Langholm, "Economic Freedom in 
Scholastic Thought," History of Political Economy, 14 (1982),
260-283. See especially pp. 277-280.
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Whatever the view, the literature demonstrates agreement on 
one subject— the origins of the medieval theories of market justice. 
The literature on medieval economic thought credits Roman law, espe­
cially the sixth century compilation of Justinian, and, later, the 
influence of Aristotle on Scholastic philosophy as being seminal in 
the development of the medieval position on usury and the just price. 
In one of the early attempts to describe pre-Smithian value theory 
Sewall suggests the importance of the Roman principle of laesio 
enormis for the medieval Catholic position on market justice.^ The 
Romans generally favored a lack of price regulation in the market­
place. Cicero, for example, speaking of the price of bronze statues, 
said: "The only limit to the valuation of such things is the desire
g
which anyone has for them..." One exception to the Roman principle 
of freedom in trade, however, was laesio enormis. According to this 
principle a seller could recover if he received less than one half of 
the real value ( verum pretium) of a plot of land. Most con­
temporary work on the just price follows the lead of Sewall in 
describing the importance of the Roman laesio enormis in the medieval 
formulation of the concept of the justurn pretium.
^Hannah R. Sewall, The Theory of Value Before Adam Smith 
(1901; rpt. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), p. 7.
8Ibid., p. 5.
9Ibid., p. 7.
^For an extensive treatment of the implications of laesio 
enormis see Baldwin, p. 22.
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Baldwin describes the importance of the principle of laesio 
enormis. He argues that the revival of the compilation of Justinian 
by the medieval Romanists, or Glossators, which occurred around the 
turn of the twelfth century in Bologna, led to a renewed interest on 
the part of the church in Roman trade practices. In large measure, 
the Romanists adopted the Roman practice of permitting trade between 
buyer and seller to be transacted without legal intervention. In the 
thirteenth century Accursius and Odofredus described the legal 
contract price as that price which was agreed upon after a bargaining 
process involving a certain amount of h i g g l i n g . S u c h  contract 
prices, however, could be set aside under the law of laesio enormis, 
which in medieval times was extended from Roman considerations of 
land dealings to cover other areas of exchange.
The problem of laesio enormis, both in Roman and medieval 
times, was that it necessitated the estimation of the justurn pretium 
in order that it may be determined to what extent contract prices 
diverge from true values. It had been customary in cases involving 
laesio enormis for the court to appoint boni homines, good men, to 
agree upon the just price. Odofredus, however, provided four stan­
dards for determining the true or just value of things. The first 
method had the broadest appeal inasmuch as it could be applied to 
commodities other than just land. This method involved observing the 
current common price for a commodity, or communiter. By current 
price Odofredus meant not simply the transitory current price of a
"^Baldwin, p. 21.
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thing, which was influenced by market conditions affected by war, 
disaster, and unusually severe weather, but, rather, the price for 
which a commodity was commonly sold. Odofredus' other provisions
applied ordinarily in cases of laesio enormis which involved the
exchange of parcels of land. One technique whereby the true value of
land could be determined was to compare its price with the value of 
recently sold adjacent pieces of property. Alternatively, the 
amounts of rent received on pieces of land could be compared to 
determine land values. Finally, one could seek the opinion of men 
knowledgeable of values of their patrimonies for a standard of
i 12value.
Determination of the just price in medieval times appears to 
have revolved around Roman practices. Usually this meant accepting 
the prevailing market price for a commodity as its true value. Not 
all of the Roman trade practices were adopted by the medieval
writers, however. Prior to the revival of the Institutes, Digest, 
and Code of Justinian, the decretists from the time of the Emperor 
Charlemagne declared the Roman practices of centisima and sescuplum 
unacceptable. Centisima was the normal rate of interest applied to 
loans, amounting to twelve percent per annum. The sescuplum was a 
sort of Roman in-kind interest charge equal to one half of the goods 
borrowed. Each practice was outlawed during the Carolingian period 




By the middle of the thirteenth century the writings of 
Aristotle had been rediscovered by the doctors. With the rediscovery 
of these works Greek notions of justice began to appear in the 
writings of the Schoolmen concerning problems of just and unjust 
trade practices. In particular, Albert and Thomas revived two of
Aristotle's three notions of justice— commutative and proportional
14justice. With respect to the exchange of economic commodities and 
services Albert and Thomas applied the ideas of Aristotle to deter­
mine the justice of the transaction. Proportional justice referred 
to the principle of justifiable inequality between members of dif­
ferent socio-economic classes. This difference could be justly 
maintained in exchange— a king would maintain his status before and 
after an exchange with an underling, as would the subordinate. Sale 
between equals could be explained by the principle of commutative 
justice— bargains struck between trading partners would be just if 
the parties be equals. In addition, Baldwin notes that Aristotle 
intended another type of justice, although the Schoolmen never 
understood it. This type of justice concerned the proper proportions 
concerning the exchange of commodities. Specifically, one could not 
expect the principle of equality to pertain to the trade of different 
commodities. One bed could not justly be exchanged for one house, to 
borrow an example from the doctors. Instead, it was necessary to 
determine the proper proportion which would govern the exchange of 
such things, i.e., several beds for a single house. The type of
l4Ibid., p. 62.
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justice described here is reciprocal justice, which is the type of
15justice which governs trade.
In all this the Scholastics intended to preserve justice 
through the practice of trade. Aristotle had provided elegant models 
of justice which the Schoolmen were happy to copy. In the classical 
conception justice meant doing what was one's own, or receiving what 
was one's due. One's due, in turn, depended upon who one was, as 
well as what it was that one had to offer. Exchange between nobleman 
and craftsman would preserve the natural inequality which society had 
spawned. Justice concerning the exchange of commodities between 
those whom the law could view as equals could be counted on through 
fair bargaining between equals. Finally, although the Schoolmen 
never fully articulated the Aristotelian idea of reciprocity, justice 
would prevail through exchange if the proportions of exchanged com­
modities reflected the true, objective values of things, which re­
vealed a flagon of wine, for example, to be less dear than a fleet of
, . 16 ships.
Baldwin, de Roover, and others have convincingly argued that 
the Schoolmen, including Albert and Thomas, held the just price of a 
commodity, i.e., its objective value, to be revealed in its market 
price during ordinary times. In normal times the Schoolmen 
maintained that justice would be done if parties to exchange traded 




beyond this description of just trade in borrowing 
another Aristotelian principle to regulate economic exchange. 
Aristotle maintained in the Politics that there exist two types of 
trade. The first type existed because no one in society is wholly 
self-sufficient. This type of exchange between individuals aimed at 
the satisfaction of subsistence needs. A second type of exchange 
existed because of a desire by some to acquire wealth. This second 
type of trade could not be considered just, because it was intended 
to produce a corrupt result. This Aristotelian distinction, which 
Thomas supported, provides, among other things, a rationale for the 
dismissal of usury as unjust. Usury, at least according to Aristotle 
and, later, Thomas, constitutes an attempt by an individual to 
increase his estate without exchange of subsistence goods.77
II. Plato's Contributions to the Theories 
of Usury and the Just Price
The notions of usury and the just price, handed down from 
Justinian and Aristotle and embraced by the Scholastics, presuppose 
the existences of objective value and justice qua metaphysical 
virtue. Plato, of course, posited the existences of these things. 
In fact, the theories of the Scholastics, especially those attributed 
to the influence of Aristotle, have close parallels in the work of 
Plato. This should be expected in light of the nature of the rela­
tionship between Plato and Aristotle— that of teacher to student. 
And yet, the literature nowhere examines Plato's ideas concerning the
17Ibid., p. 65.
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nature of justice in exchange. While the following argument does not 
prove that the Schoolmen depended upon Plato for their theories of 
usury and just prices, it does demonstrate that an intellectual 
common ground, likely attributable to the existence of Aristotle as 
philosophical middleman, does exist between Plato and the medieval 
thinkers concerning the nature of market justice.
Plato's notion of justice, which is analyzed elsewhere in 
this dissertation, was worked out at length in the Republic. 
Justice, as it is revealed in that dialogue, is concerned with doing 
what is one's own business. Central to this conception of justice is 
the idea that the individual should perform one task only— that for 
which he or she is suited temperamentally. The character of an 
individual's soul, Plato thought, predisposed him or her to taking up 
a certain life style, complete with economic boundaries on both the 
type of work that one should pursue and the acquisition of wealth. 
This notion of what is economically just for an individual provided 
Plato with the rationale for devising an elaborate system of market 
regulations which were geared to the preservation of temperance and 
sufficiency— the just individual is simply not intended to acquire 
wealth beyond his due.
In Chapter III the set of market restrictions concerning the 
sale of commodities and services which Plato placed upon citizens of 
the best state was described. With respect to the pricing of com­
modities and services, Plato thought it best, i.e., most just, if 
these things were priced by the Guardians of the Laws, who, in turn,
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would consult experts to determine the prices of things. From the 
Laws:
In order that [a metic] in the city may be for us the best 
possible, or the least bad possible, the Guardians of the 
Laws are to understand that they are not only guards of those 
whom, because they have been well educated by birth and 
upbringing, it is easy for them to guard against becoming 
lawless and bad, but also that they should guard even more 
those who are not such, but are engaged in practices that 
have certain strong influence in prompting men to become bad.
With this end in view, the Guardians of the Laws ought 
again to meet concerning these matters [of retail trade] with 
those who have experience in each branch of retail trade, 
just as we earlier ordered them to do in the case of 
adulteration, which is a practice akin to this; with respect 
to those aspects of retail trade (which is extensive, and 
includes many practices of the sort just alluded to) which 
have seemed to be highly necessary in the city and have been 
allowed to remain, they should meet and see what receipt and 
expense balance at any time makes a well-measured gain for 
the retail merchant. The receipt and expense balance arrived 
at is to be posted in writing and guarded by the Market 
Regulators, City Regulators, and Field Regulators. In this 
way, what pertains to retail trade would be pretty beneficial 
to each person, and would do pretty mucl^gthe smallest injury
to those in the city who make use of it.
Prices corresponding to those which provide merchants with the
well-measured gains determined by the Guardians of the Laws would be
strictly enforced by the Market Regulators. In another passage from
the Laws Plato notes:
If what's purchased or sold creates an excess or a
deficiency contrary to the law that has said there must not
be an increase or a decrease beyond a certain sum, ||en, in
the former case, the excess should be recorded with
the Guardians of the Laws and, in the opposite case, the
1 ftPlato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 320.
19Saunders translates "recorded" as "confiscated" in his 
translation of Plato's "Laws." See p. 353 of Saunder's translation.
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shortfall should be cancelled. The same ordinances con^ 
cerning registration of property apply to resident aliens.
The price of a commodity which is prescribed by law is, for
Plato, the just price. Plato's just price, however, differs from
that of Schoolmen in that it does not necessarily reflect the true
value of a thing. To be sure, Plato believed in the existence of
objective value. But, while the Scholastics were concerned with
determining the verum pretium of a commodity, Plato was preoccupied
with determining the value which would preserve justice among those
making the exchange. This justice preserved preordained limits to
wealth of Plato's four property classes by permitting prices which
would afford the seller a decent profit, while preventing the seller
or the buyer of a thing from increasing their wealth much beyond what
is prescribed by law--that which corresponds to the value of their
original estates. Plato writes:
So let the limit of poverty be the value of the allotment, 
which must be maintained, and which no magistrate, and none 
of the others who desires to be honored for virtue, should 
ever allow to be diminished in the case of anyone. Taking 
this as the measure, the lawgiver will allow citizens to 
acquire twice again, and three times again, and up to four 
times again this amount. But if anyone acquires more than 
four times this amount— by finding something or by being 
given something, or by money-making, or some other such 
stroke of luck— let him dedicate2^he surplus to the city and 
to the gods who possess the city.
Plato's just price appears to differ somewhat from the main­
stream notion of the justum pretium of the doctors. For the School­
men, justice prevails under conditions of exchange whenever contract
90Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 243.
21Ibid., p. 132.
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prices reveal the true, underlying value of things exchanged. For
Plato, on the other hand, justice prevails if wealth is exchanged in
due proportion. An individual, under Plato's conception of just 
exchange, must not receive an unreasonable gain from trade--a gain 
which would prove a temptation to the soul to become corrupt with 
avarice. For all the difference between the medieval and Platonic
conceptions of the just price, however, there do exist common bonds
between the two.
Plato's notion that the just price corresponds to that which 
affords the seller a just gain from trade is repeated by the Scholas­
tics in their doctrine of turpe lucrum. Turpe lucrum describes an
unreasonable gain from an exchange. Ordinarily the notion of turpe 
lucrum was restricted to cases involving usury. In the Carolingian 
period, however, the concept was stretched to cover all cases of 
shameful gain. Baldwin points out, in fact, that under Charlemagne 
turpe lucrum was extended to cover all forms of greediness, and was 
almost synonymous with avarice. Defined in this manner, turpe lucrum
was connected not just with usury, but also with simony and price 
22profiteering. The medieval doctrine of turpe lucrum, like Plato's
notion of the just price, attempted to prevent unjust gains from
trade from occurring.
The similarity between Plato's idea of an unjust gain from 
trade and the medieval turpe lucrum is, unfortunately, very likely 
coincidental. While the neo-Platonists of the Catholic church found
99 Baldwin, p. 32.
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much to their liking in the philosophy of Socrates and Plato— prayers
were frequently made evoking the name of St. Socrates— the medieval
notion of turpe lucrum does not originate in Plato's work, but,
rather it owes its existence to the Nicene Council of 325. The
philosophy of the early church is not so much indebted to Plato's
23ideas as it is compatible with them.
If it cannot be said that the Schoolmen owe their conception
of the just price to the writings of Plato, it can, at least, be
argued that it and Plato's conception are based upon the same notions
of justice. Plato's just price was intended to preserve the unequal
status of members of his best society. Plato, recall, believed in a
system of proportionate inequality. Individuals were expected to
accumulate wealth only to the extent that their temperaments allowed
under the strict observance of justice. As Plato writes in Book VI
of the Laws, "Indiscriminate equality for all amounts to 
24inequality." Plato, no doubt, means by this that a strictly equal 
distribution of esteem, honor, and wealth among the members of a 
society would produce unequal distributions of happiness and good­
ness, owing to the heterogeneity of temperaments among the 
inhabitants of a state. This idea of achieving justice through a 
proportionate inequality is echoed in Aristotle's notion of dis­
tributive justice, which governs the exchange of commodities 
and services between unequals. Moreover, Aristotle's notion of
24Plato, "Laws," in The Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 229.
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distributive justice was adopted essentially unchanged by Albert and
Thomas, who thought that it governed "the relations of things
25among...social superiors and private individuals..."
The idea of proportionate inequality is fundamental to the 
ethics of both Plato and Aristotle. Both men believed in the exist­
ence of heterogeneous temperaments. Because of the existence of 
different temperaments among men, Plato and Aristotle reasoned that 
some men require more and some less than others concerning physical 
wealth. We have seen in Plato's Laws that Plato intended the distri­
bution of wealth to be justly unequal. The justice of unequal shares 
is more subtle in Aristotle's writing. He mentions it, however, in 
Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. He writes:
[E]quality will exist between the persons and between the 
things concerned; for as the latter— the things concerned—  
are related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they 
will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quar­
rels and complaints— when either equals have and are awarded 
unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. Further, this is 
plain from the fact that awards should be 'according to 
merit'; for all men agree that what is jus,^ in distribution 
must be according to merit in some sense...
Justice, according to both Plato and Aristotle, demands equality
between equals and inequality between unequals.
In the literature devoted to the analysis of medieval value 
theory much effort has been made to establish the status-maintaining 
theory of the just price as being central to the medieval conception
^Baldwin, p. 62.
Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," in Introduction to 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 1947J7
p. 403.
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of market justice. As De Roover points out, Weber and Sombart were
emphatic in their belief that the Schoolmen thought the just price to
be that which afforded the seller of a commodity the ability to
maintain his social status. It now appears to be the case that the
mainstream thought among the doctors concerning the just price was
that it corresponded to the market price of a thing. Nevertheless, a
few of the Schoolmen, notably Henry of Langenstein, believed the just
price to be the status-maintaining price. This formulation of just
price theory appears to have its roots in that part of Platonic
philosophy, carried over by Aristotle, which argues that individuals
should receive subsistence commodities in accordance with need and
merit. For Plato, any surplus holdings of property beyond those
necessary by demonstration of need or merit revert to the state.
Aristotle, too, frowned upon the accumulation of property beyond what
merit dictates. Thomas J. Lewis explains this side of Aristotle's
theory of exchange well in "Acquisition and Anxiety: Aristotle's
27Case Against the Market." Lewis notes that in Aristotle
The right to property is limited to what is sufficient to 
sustain the polis life of the citizen. Too little would 
leave the citizen without adequate means for the exercise of 
his capacities; a vast quantity would exceed the required 
amount and no right t̂p this excess would exist (Politics, 
1256b, 1257a, 1257b).
According to Lewis, Aristotle viewed any acquisition beyond the
necessary amount as a "diversion of the citizen's capacities" and,
27Thomas J. Lewis, "Acquisition and Anxiety: Aristotle's




therefore, as being unnatural. While Aristotle realized that the 
exchange process would likely result in the accumulation of unneces­
sary surplus, he adopted it in his philosophy in an attempt to
harness it and to force the redistribution of goods to "supply
29deficiencies out of surplusses."
Regardless of whether or not all Scholastics advocated a 
status-maintaining theory of the just price it is evident that at 
least a few of them did. Those who did view the just price as that 
which covered the costs of the seller and allowed him to maintain his 
social status followed in Plato’s footsteps. The system of legally 
fixed prices which Plato advocates in the Laws is based upon the 
notion that a commodity's price should cover the seller's costs and 
provide him with a decent profit— a "well-measured gain." Plato
intended to have his property distribution system, in which the 
largest estate exceeded the smallest by a factor of no more than 
four, strictly observed. Commodity prices that would enable a seller 
to earn an unreasonable gain, i.e., would enable him to accumulate a 
surplus of wealth, would violate Plato's principles of market
justice.
Concerning the problem of usury, Plato appears to have 
opposed it for essentially the same reason that Aristotle did, which, 
in turn, was the same reason offered by Albert and Thomas for the 
abolition of credit from the medieval economy. The reason given for 
the abolition of credit in church doctrine is that income earned from
29Ibid., p. 79.
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the extension of credit constituted turpe lucrum. This view of usury 
differs from the Roman understanding of the usefulness of credit. 
Indeed, the Romans routinely charged interest, both monetary and 
in-kind, on loans. The Scholastic opposition to usury, therefore, 
arises from influences other than Roman. Under Albert and Thomas 
church doctrine reflected an opposition to usury for the reasons 
provided by Aristotle. Aristotle opposed usury on grounds that the 
generation of income from the lending of money, i.e., the sale of 
credit, resulted from an unjust motive for exchange. The just moti­
vation for exchanging commodities and services in the marketplace is 
the desire to trade subsistence goods, which, in turn, arises out of 
recognition of the fact that men are not self-sufficient. According 
to Aristotle money was invented to facilitate this sort of exchange—  
subsistence good for subsistence good. Aristotle did not recognize 
credit as being a legitimate item to be exchanged in the market. To 
him interest income represented the result of an attempt to make 
money from money, which was unnatural. This view arose from Aris­
totle's contention that money is not a commodity, but was, rather, an 
artificial invention which facilitated the exchange of true commodi­
ties. This notion that interest is obtained when money begets money 
is reflected in the term from ancient Greek for interest-- tokos. 
Tokos literally means "offspring," and its application in describing
interest income denotes the Greek view that interest is the child,
30the offspring, of money.
30Aristotle, "Politics," in Introduction to Aristotle, 
pp. 571-572.
253
Albert and Thomas advocated the Aristotelian view that inter­
est income constitutes the illegitimate product of an unjust 
exchange. Baldwin claims that Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's 
two bases for exchange constitutes the height of Aristotelian 
influence on medieval economic thought. He writes:
Basing his justification of the merchant on a passage from 
t*16 Politics, Thomas approximated in his Summa an Aris­
totelian distinction between two kinds of commerce. The 
first consisted of an exchange of goods for goods or goods 
for money because of the necessities of life, and was natural 
and necessary to society. Men who participated in this 
exchange could be called more properly oeconomici or politici 
because they provided for the direct needs of their house­
holds or cities. The other exchange was between money and 
money or sometimes goods and money for the purpose of profit.
Men who performed this kind of exchange were merchants 
( negotiatores) in the true sense. Under i m y  conditions 
their profits could be rightfully condemned...
Usury would fall under the heading of the exchange between money and
money, and, thus, could be condemned. Thomas' view is pure
Aristotle, which can be seen when compared with Aristotle's own view
on usury. From the Politics:
Usury is hated with good reason because of its being 
acquisition from currency itself and not from that for which 
currency is provided. For currency came into being for the 
sake of exchange. The tokos makes it more. And it is from 
that that it got its name. For as the offspring are like the 
parents, so tokos breeds currency from currency. And in this 
way it of the kinds of moneymaking the most contrary to 
nature.
Just as Thomas' position against usury echoes Aristotle's 
view, Aristotle's condemnation of the charging of interest echoes
“̂ Baldwin, p. 65.
■^Aristotle, "Politics," 1258b, translated in The Republic of
Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 463-46?.
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that of his teacher. In both the Republic and Laws Plato forbids the 
practice of the extension of credit. Aristotle's position on tokos 
can certainly be seen in Plato's condemnation of money-makers from 
Book VIII of the Republic:
"And these money-makers, with heads bent down, not seem­
ing to see these men, would with injections of silver and any 
man among the remainder who yields; and carrying off from the 
father a multiple offspring in interest, they make the drone 
and the beggar great in the city."
Plato, too, held that usury was unnatural because it represented
money begetting money. In a passage from the Republic which follows
that above, Plato notes that the market would be a better place if
all contracts involving credit were made at the seller's risk. This
position is elevated to the status of legal prescription in the Laws.
In Book V he writes: "no money should be lent at interest. Anyone
who has received a loan will be permitted to refuse to pay it back,
34both interest and principal." Again, in Book XI Plato argues:
and no one is to make a sale or purchase on credit. If one 
person should exchange with another in another way or in any 
other places whatsoever, trusting the one he's exchanging 
with, he is to do these things on the understanding that 
there are no lawful judicial suits for things that are not 
sold under the conditions now being stated.
In these passages Plato makes it clear that credit is forbidden in
the best state.
Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 234.
3^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 129.
35Ibid., p. 315.
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Although Plato nowhere makes a detailed argument against the 
practice of usury, the basis of his opposition can be inferred from 
the statements above. Plato did not approve of merchandising. The 
merchant class in the best polis was to be composed of metics and 
those too feeble to perform useful, i.e., subsistence securing, work. 
Merchandising, and especially the exchange of money for money, was, 
for Plato, unjust in that it could promote avarice instead of suffi­
ciency and moderation. Unnatural exchange spawns tyranny, which 
Plato held to be the most miserable state. Plato's reference to 
interest being the multiple offspring of money reveals his opinion 
that usury constitutes an unnatural, tyranny-promoting form of ex­
change .
There can be little doubt that Aristotle's rejection of usury 
was influenced by Plato's; their association at the Academy confirms 
this. Similarly, the bond between Aristotle and Thomas is strong. 
It seems odd, then, that nowhere does one find an account of Plato's 
position on usury in the literature on medieval price theory. It can 
be argued that because Thomas' views are aired in his commentary on 
Aristotle that Plato's influence is unimportant. And, yet, this 
cannot be so, given the importance of Plato's philosophy to Aris­
totle's thought. I suspect that it is because Plato nowhere makes a 
systematic case against usury, unlike Aristotle, that his argument is 
overlooked. Nevertheless, Plato's case does exist. Indeed, it is
even stated systematically, if one includes Plato's analysis of 
justice and exchange with it. It is only the method of Plato's 
argument which distinguished it from Aristotle's and Thomas'. As I
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have argued elsewhere, however, Plato's decision to reason dialec- 
tically rather than analytically should not discredit his 
contributions. His own defense of this methodology, which is found 
in the Republic, shows dialectical reasoning to be appropriate for 
the consideration of ethical issues in social science.
Plato's stand on the just price and usury is noteworthy for 
its similarity to that of the Schoolmen. Given Aristotle's position 
as an intellectual conduit for philosophy between the ancients and 
medieval scholars, this fact should not prove surprising. Of partic­
ular, interest to the student of medieval price theory should be 
Plato's position on the just price as the status-maintaining price, 
which is revitalized by certain heretical doctors in medieval times. 
To prove that the connection here is as direct as, say, that between 
Aristotle and Thomas, is beyond the scope of this paper. An histori­
cal inquiry into this possibility should be pursued, however. In any 
event, a complete history of just price theory and usury analysis 
should include Plato's contributions, which have been shown to origi­




Plato clearly analyzed matters of political economy which
ought to be understood to be the concern of the economics of welfare.
The entire corpus of Plato's dialogues is dedicated to the attempt to 
understand the nature of the Good, and to how knowledge of the Good 
can be used to organize the best society. Throughout his career 
Plato maintained that the happy life— that which participated to the 
fullest extent in the Good--is the life of virtue. The virtuous life 
he defined to be one in which the individual is able to secure 
wisdom, honor, and temperance in proper proportions. To be happy, 
Plato argues, one must follow the biddings of the rational part of 
the soul, yoking the spirited and appetitive parts in its service. 
In order to judge the extent to which human action engenders happi­
ness, Plato reasoned, one must determine the extent to which such
action promotes the ordering of the soul in the proportions mentioned 
above. To maximize welfare for the individuals of society is to do 
things that cultivate in individuals well-ordered souls.
Plato understood the happiest life to be the examined life—  
that which allows philosophy, i.e., the love of wisdom, to be the 
helmsman of the soul. As a practical man, however, Plato recognized 
that the many are not temperamentally suited to the contemplative 
life of philosophy. For the many to be happy, Plato reasoned, they
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must participate in virtue to the extent permitted by their tempera­
ments. To Plato this entailed the achievement of temperance by the 
many. The best constitution of society, i.e., that which most pro­
motes the welfare of its citizens, is one in which temperance and 
sufficiency are institutionalized. The souls of the many Plato 
reasoned to be ruled by the passionate urges of appetites of all 
kinds. For souls so constituted, the life of temperance, in which 
individuals' appetites are subordinated to the honorable laws of the 
polis, affords the attainment of happiness.
In the Republic, Laws, and elsewhere Plato designs a consti­
tution for a state which he felt maximizes the welfare of its 
citizens. Included in this constitution are economic prescriptions 
which are intended to promote the best organization of the economy-- 
that which affords the most happiness for the many. Under this 
constitution citizens are subject to strict monitoring of economic 
activity by the state. Market Wardens determine the time, place, and 
prices which govern the exchange of commodities and services in the 
economy. There is to be a strict division of labor, determined 
according to the psychological temperaments of the citizens of the 
polis, in which no able-bodied citizens are permitted to become 
merchants. A system of fiat money is to be imposed, it being felt by 
Plato that such a system would minimize avarice. The practice of 
buying on credit, as well as the practice of charging interest on 
loans, are abolished under Plato's laws. Finally, strict limits are 
set on the levels of population and physical wealth that are to be 
permitted in the economy— in order to be truly sufficient the economy
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must be a steady-state. The best economy, according to Plato, is 
truly the administered state that Lowry described in his review of 
Greek economics.
It is difficult for contemporary western economists to
embrace the administered economy of Plato. Not only does it violate
the principles of liberalism, under which the notion of methodologi­
cal individualism drives the contemporary analysis of welfare, it
also derives from a method of inquiry which is foreign to the 
contemporary economist. The analysis of welfare, as the literature 
on the subject shows, depends upon the existence of a welfare func­
tion, i.e., a set of universally supported values and goals, to be 
maximized. Under criteria of liberalism and individualism, a welfare 
function must be socially desirable in order to merit consideration 
by the analyst for candidacy for maximization. Plato's set of 
economic objectives, derived from what appear to be sub-scientific 
value judgments, and developed along lines that render it undesirable 
by the many, is rejected by welfare economics as unsuitable for the 
maximization of welfare.
We have seen, however, that the method of inquiry of Plato's 
economic analysis is appropriate for the discovery of the set of 
virtues to be upheld by society within the economy, if it is viewed 
from the perspective of Plato's epistemology and ontology. The Good, 
along with its associated virtues, exists as Forms beyond being, 
which engender existing things with their qualities. Knowledge 
of the Good is, according to Plato, attainable through the pro­
cess of reasoning beyond hypotheses by the method of dialectics. The
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statements of value which result from such analysis are grounded in 
truth, Plato reasoned, and are beyond the doxa, or value judgments, 
which contemporary economists dismiss as unscientific. Whereas the 
techniques of modern science are suited to the discovery of the 
qualities of the sensibles, dialectical reasoning is, by Plato's 
reckoning, suited to the discovery of intelligibles, including the 
Forms which he calls virtues.
It is understandable that contemporary economists, who by 
virtue of an acceptance of positivism or preoccupation with the 
development of what Samuelson refers to as "meaningful theorems," do 
not warm up to Plato's inquiry into the nature of intelligible Forms. 
Such inquiry is, after all, necessarily subjective in nature. Forms, 
not being, in Voegelin's terms, data of immanent experience, are 
necessarily perceived, if at all, by the mind's eye. This being the 
case, one must not take lightly the criticisms and rejections of 
Plato's method of inquiry. How, after all, are we to build a science 
of human action around principles and theorems which are not 
hypotheses about empirical data, and, thus are not demonstrable or 
refutable in the ordinary sense? That Plato was earnest and sincere 
in his approach to the problem of theorizing the nature of Forms, 
however, makes it important that contemporary scientists scrutinize 
his arguments.
Plato's system of inquiry into the nature of Forms, if valid, 
provides the contemporary economist with complementary knowledge to 
that generated by the "new" welfare economics. If valid, however, it 
provides the economist with a welfare "function" which violates the
261
ordinary assumptions of utility which underpin modern analysis. 
Specifically, it generates, under Plato's line of argument, a set of 
welfare maxims which promise to promote welfare if instituted, while 
proving undesirable according to the test that society be willing to 
voluntarily adopt them. In short, the problem of Plato's system for 
contemporary analysis is that it does not easily fit into the welfare 
model— it promises to maximize welfare for the individual by imposing 
on him or her economic sanctions that seem unpleasant. Whereas 
contemporary analysis strives to show how society can secure what it 
wants, under conditions of general scarcity, Plato's analysis shows 
how society can limit its desires to what it can get. By channeling 
human appetites through the adoption of laws which individuals find 
honorable and acceptable as objects of pistis, Plato attempts to 
create a sufficient state. In the sufficient state individuals 
temperately limit desires for artifacts of aisthesis in favor of the 
erotic pursuit of objects of noesis— virtues and knowledge of them.
The Platonic system of economic thought is important for 
today. Scientists today generally accept hypotheses about the human 
environment which hold it to be a finite system. According to these 
models the physical stuff which supports life is understood to be 
limited in the aggregate. Economic policies which minister to the 
appetitive part of the soul by attempting to sate it are bound, by 
the rules of the model of the environment, to come up short. Accord­
ing to Plato's analysis, however, it is possible to make men happy 
while limiting their desires to the attainment of sufficiency. It is 
this promise that makes desirable a return to an economic method in
which hypotheses grounded in noetic reasoning, such as Plato's theory 
of welfare, can be systematically analyzed. To dismiss the economics 
of Plato on methodological grounds is to reduce the possibility that 
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